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  Introduction 
 
 
 A. Work to date on this topic 
 
 
1. At its sixty-sixth session in 2014, the International Law Commission decided 
to include the topic “Crimes against humanity” in its current programme of work 
and appointed a Special Rapporteur.1 At its sixty-seventh session in 2015, the 
Commission held a general debate concerning the Special Rapporteur ’s first report 
and provisionally adopted four draft articles and commentaries thereto. 2  
2. At its sixty-eighth session in 2016, the Commission held a general debate on 
the Special Rapporteur’s second report and provisionally adopted six additional 
draft articles and commentaries thereto.3 
 
 
 B. Debate in 2016 in the Sixth Committee 
 
 
3. During the debate in the Sixth Committee in 2016, thirty-nine States 
(including one on behalf of the Nordic States) commented on the topic of “Crimes 
against humanity”,4 with views that generally favoured the Commission’s work to 
date, stressing the overall importance of the topic 5 and welcoming the draft articles 
adopted during the sixty-eighth session.6 Numerous States again expressed 
appreciation of the steps taken to ensure that the Commission’s work does not 
conflict with existing instruments, in particular the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.7 Along these lines, several States expressed support 
for the Commission’s use in certain instances of language similar to that of the 
__________________ 
 
1
 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty -sixth session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/69/10), 
paragraph 266. 
 
2
 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty -seventh session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/70/10), 
paragraph 113. 
 
3
 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty -eighth session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-first session, Supplement No. 10 (A/71/10), 
paragraphs 79–83. 
 
4
 Presentations to the Sixth Committee on this topic were made by: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czechia, El Salvador, Egypt, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland (on behalf of the Nordic countries), India,  Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sudan, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America and Viet Nam. 
 
5
 See, for example, Croatia, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-first session, Sixth 
Committee, 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 47; and El Salvador, ibid., paragraph 50.  
 
6
 See, for example, Czechia, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 69 ; and Slovakia, 
ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 141.  
 
7
 See, for example, Argentina, ibid., 29th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.29), paragraph 85; Australia, 
ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6.71.SR.25), paragraph 90; Germany, ibid., 26th Meeting 
(A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 35; Iceland, on behalf of the Nordic countries, ibid., 24th meeting 
(A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 58; Mexico, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 14; 
Peru, ibid., 30th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.30), paragraph 5; Portugal, ibid., 25th meeting 
(A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 92; Switzerland, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 
67; and the United Kingdom, ibid., paragraph 73.  
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 8 such as in draft article 5, 
paragraphs 2 and 3.  
4. Several States welcomed the inclusion of an obligation to adopt national laws 
on crimes against humanity,9 noting the importance of the harmonization of national 
laws10 so as to allow for robust inter-State cooperation.11 States also expressed their 
support for the approach taken by the Commission on command responsibility,12 the 
inapplicability of a superior orders defence13 and the inapplicability of statutes of 
limitations.14 At the same time, some States felt that draft article 7 on the obligation 
to investigate was unclear15 and that additional analysis might be given to the 
concept of “universal jurisdiction”16 and liability for legal persons.17 Additionally, 
some States pressed for the consideration of additional issues, such as extradition, 18 
mutual legal assistance,19 reparations for victims20 and amnesty,21 while other States 
expressed a view that certain issues should not be included, such as civil 
jurisdiction22 or monitoring mechanisms.23 
5. Several States indicated that they support the possibility of the present draft 
articles becoming a new convention,24 though one State proposed that the project 
focus on creating guidelines instead of a binding instrument. 25 One State also 
expressed concern that the current topic risked duplicating efforts being undertaken 
__________________ 
 
8
 See, for example, Argentina, ibid., 29th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.29), paragraph 85; Ireland, ibid., 
27th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.27), paragraph 14; Romania, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), 
paragraph 74; and Slovenia, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 106.  
 
9
 See, for example, Australia, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 90; Brazil, ibid., 
26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 89; Hungary, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), 
paragraph 78; and Iceland, on behalf of the Nordic countries, ibid., paragraph 58.  
 
10
 See, for example, Brazil, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 89.  
 
11
 See, for example, Australia, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 90; and Iceland, 
on behalf of the Nordic countries, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 58.  
 
12
 See, for example, Chile, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 98; Croatia, ibid., 
paragraph 48; and Switzerland, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 66.  
 
13
 See, for example, Chile, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 98; and Switzerland, 
ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 66.  
 
14
 See, for example, Chile, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 99; Romania, ibid., 
paragraph 74 ; and Spain, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 4.  
 
15
 See, for example, Spain, ibid., paragraph 7.  
 
16
 See, for example, Hungary, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 82.  
 
17
 See, for example, Czechia, ibid., paragraph 69; Hungary, ibid., paragraph 81; and Mexico, ibid., 
26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 18.  
 
18
 See, for example, Spain, ibid., paragraph 3; and Switzerland, ibid., 24th meeting 
(A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 67.  
 
19
 See, for example, Mexico, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 19; the Netherlands, 
ibid., paragraph 40; and Portugal, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 93.  
 
20
 See, for example, Poland, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 54.  
 
21
 See, for example, Spain, ibid., paragraph 3. 
 
22
 See, for example, the United Kingdom, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 73.  
 
23
 See, for example, Israel, ibid., 25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 43; and Mexico, ibid., 
26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 15.  
 
24
 See, for example, Croatia, ibid., 25th Meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 47; Egypt, ibid., 
23rd meeting, (A/C.6/71/SR.23), paragraph 42; Hungary, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), 
paragraph 78; and Germany, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 34.  
 
25
 See Malaysia, ibid., paragraph 66.  
A/CN.4/704 
 
 
17-00990 6/165 
 
in existing regimes.26 Some States noted the existence of a separate initiative by 
several States to develop a convention focused on mutual legal assistance  and 
extradition for all serious international crimes, and encouraged the Commission to 
engage in a dialogue with those involved in this separate initiative. 27 One State 
urged the Commission to complete its work on this topic “as swiftly as possible”.28  
 
 
 C. Purpose and structure of the present report 
 
 
6. The purpose of the present report is to address a series of additional issues 
relating to this topic, to propose what might be an appropriate preamble in the event 
that the present draft articles are transformed into a convention, and to consider the 
possibility of final clauses to such a convention. The issues addressed herein are: 
the rights, obligations and procedures applicable to the extradition of an alleged 
offender; non-refoulement where there are substantial grounds for believing that a 
person would be in danger of being subjected to a crime against humanity; the 
rights, obligations and procedures applicable to mutual legal assistance; the 
participation and protection of victims, witnesses and others in relation to 
proceedings within the scope of the present draft articles; reparation for victims; the 
relationship to competent international criminal courts; obligations upon federal 
States; monitoring mechanisms and dispute settlement; a draft preamble; and further 
issues for which proposals are not being advanced.  
7. Chapter I of this report addresses rights, obligations and procedures applicable 
to the extradition of an alleged offender, based upon the different types of 
extradition provisions included in various treaties addressing crimes. Less detailed 
extradition provisions include a general obligation to consider the offences in the 
treaty to be extraditable offences in a State’s existing extradition treaties and any 
future extradition treaty the State completes. More detailed extradition provisions, 
however, allow for the treaty itself to be used as a basis for extradition, and address 
a wide range of issues that can arise in the context of extradition, including: the 
inapplicability of the political offence exception; satisfaction of the requirements of 
national law in the extradition process; extradition of a State’s own nationals; the 
prohibition on extradition when an individual will face persecution after extradition; 
and requirements of consultation and cooperation. Chapter I concludes by proposing 
a draft article addressing these points in the context of crimes against humanity.  
8. Chapter II addresses the principle of non-refoulement. This principle, or the 
prohibition on returning an individual to a territory when there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he or she will be in danger of a specified harm, is found 
in a wide range of legal instruments, including conventions relating to refugees and 
asylum, human rights and criminal law. In such treaties, non-refoulement is 
triggered when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person will be in 
danger of persecution or other specified harm upon return, with the harm in question 
varying depending on the subject matter of the treaty. Though there are limited 
__________________ 
 
26
 See India, ibid., 27th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.27), paragraph 40.  
 
27
 See, for example, Argentina, ibid., 29th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.29), paragraph 85; Chile, ibid., 
25th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.25), paragraph 100; Ireland, ibid., 27th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.27), 
paragraph 16; and the Netherlands, ibid., 26th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 41.  
 
28
 See, the United Kingdom, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), paragraph 73.  
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exceptions to the non-refoulement principle in conventions on refugees, including 
on grounds of national security, such exceptions are not included in more recent 
human rights treaties. Chapter II concludes by proposing a draft article providing 
for an obligation of non-refoulement in the context of crimes against humanity.  
9. Chapter III addresses the rights and obligations of States regarding mutual 
legal assistance in connection with criminal proceedings, based upon the different 
types of mutual legal assistance provisions included in various treaties. Less 
detailed treaties include general obligations to afford the greatest possible measure 
of assistance. Treaties with more detailed provisions place some general obligations 
on all States parties, but also include “mini mutual legal assistance treaty” 
provisions. Such provisions essentially create a detailed, bilateral mutual legal 
assistance treaty relationship between States parties in circumstances where they do 
not otherwise have such a relationship (or when those States elect to use the mini 
mutual legal assistance treaty to facilitate cooperation). Mini mutual legal assistance 
treaty provisions address topics such as: transferring detained persons to another 
State to provide evidence; designating a central authority to handle mutual legal 
assistance requests; using videoconferencing for witnesses to provide testimony; 
and permissible and impermissible grounds for refusing mutual legal assistance 
requests. Chapter III concludes by proposing a draft article on mutual legal 
assistance most suited to issues related to crimes against humanity. 
10. Chapter IV addresses the participation and protection of victims, witnesses and 
others in relation to proceedings within the scope of the present draft articles, as 
well as reparation for victims. Although prior treaties addressing crimes under 
national law often have not contained provisions concerning victims and witnesses, 
the most recent treaties do contain such provisions. Those treaties typically address 
the protection of victims and witnesses, as well as reparation for victims; they also 
sometimes address the participation of victims in legal proceedings undertaken 
against the alleged offender. Chapter IV concludes by proposing a draft article 
addressing these points. 
11. Chapter V addresses the relationship of the present draft ar ticles with the 
rights and obligations of States with respect to competent international criminal 
tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court. As a general matter, the present 
draft articles have been drafted so as to avoid any such conflicts. Even  so, to avoid 
any unanticipated conflict, there is value in a provision that makes clear that the 
rights or obligations of a State under the constitutive instrument of a competent 
international criminal tribunal prevail over the rights and obligations of t he State 
identified in the present draft articles. Chapter  V concludes by proposing a draft 
article addressing this issue. 
12. Chapter VI addresses obligations upon federal States. It reviews the practice 
by some States of making a unilateral declaration when signing or ratifying a treaty 
so as to exclude its application to part of their territories. In recent years, such 
declarations have been viewed with sufficient disfavour that some treaties have 
included articles precluding the ability of States to make such declarations. 
Chapter VI concludes by proposing a draft article addressing this issue.  
13. Chapter VII addresses monitoring mechanisms and dispute settlement. Various 
monitoring mechanisms already exist that are capable of scrutinizing situations of  
crimes against humanity, either as such or in the context of the types of violations 
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(such as torture) that may occur when such crimes are committed. If States wish to 
establish a new monitoring mechanism, numerous treaties, especially human rights 
treaties, provide for a monitoring mechanism body. This body can take the form of a 
committee, commission, court or meeting of States parties. In addition to 
monitoring mechanisms, many treaties also have dispute settlement clauses. These 
clauses will typically obligate States parties to negotiate in the case of a dispute. 
Should negotiations not succeed, such clauses provide for further methods of 
compulsory dispute settlement, including arbitration and resort to the International 
Court of Justice. Chapter VII concludes by proposing a draft article addressing 
dispute settlement.  
14. Chapter VIII addresses other issues that have arisen in the course of 
discussions within the Commission relating to this topic, specifically concealment 
of crimes against humanity, immunity and amnesty. 
15. Chapter IX proposes a preamble which highlights several core elements that 
motivate and justify the present draft articles.  
16. Chapter X addresses the issue of final clauses, in the event that the present 
draft articles are transformed into a convention. The Commission typically does not 
include final clauses as a part of its draft articles and consequently no proposal is 
made in that regard. Even so, this chapter discusses possible choices available to 
States with respect to a final clause on reservations. 
17. Chapter XI addresses a future programme of work on this topic, proposing that 
a first reading be completed in 2017 and a second reading in 2019.  
18. As a matter of convenience, annex I to this report contains the 10 draft articles 
provisionally adopted by the Commission to date. Annex II contains the seven draft 
articles and draft preamble proposed in this report.  
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Chapter I 
  Extradition 
 
 
 A. Extradition and crimes against humanity 
 
 
19. In 1973, the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 3074 
(XXVIII) of 3 December 1973 highlighted the importance of international 
cooperation in the extradition of persons who have allegedly committed crimes 
against humanity, where necessary to ensure their prosecution and punishment. In 
that regard, the General Assembly indicated that “States shall assist each other in 
detecting, arresting and bringing to trial persons suspected of having committed 
such crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them” (para. 4). Further, 
“[p]ersons against whom there is evidence that they have committed … crimes 
against humanity shall be subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a 
general rule in the countries in which they committed those crimes. In that 
connection, States shall co-operate on questions of extraditing such persons” 
(para. 5). Moreover, “States shall not take any legislative or other measures which 
may be prejudicial to the international obligations they have assumed in regard to 
the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of … crimes 
against humanity” (para. 8). In 2001, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights reaffirmed the principles set forth in General Assembly 
resolution 307429 and urged “all States to cooperate in order to search for, arrest, 
extradite, bring to trial and punish persons found guilty of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity”.30 
20. Draft article 6, paragraph 2, of the present draft articles provides that each 
State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences 
referred to in draft article 5 in cases where an alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction, and the State does not extradite or surrender the 
person. When an alleged offender is present and has been taken into custody, the 
State is obligated under draft article 8, paragraph 3, to notify other States that have 
jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged offender, which may result in those States 
seeking the alleged offender’s extradition. Further, draft article 9 obligates the State 
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless 
the State extradites or surrenders the person to another State or competent 
international criminal tribunal.  
21. Thus, when an alleged offender is in the jurisdiction of a State, there is a 
possibility of that offender being extradited to another State for the purpose of 
prosecution.31 When this occurs, it is useful to have in place clearly stated rights, 
obligations and procedures with respect to the extradition process. At present, there 
__________________ 
 
29
 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, International cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons 
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, resolution 2001/22 of 16 August 2001, Fifty-
third session (E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/22), para. 3. The Sub-Commission largely replicated in 
its resolution the General Assembly’s principles, but with some modifications.  
 
30
 Ibid., para. 2. 
 
31
 This chapter does not address procedures for surrender to a competent international criminal 
tribunal, which would be regulated by the relevant instruments associated with that tribunal.  
A/CN.4/704 
 
 
17-00990 10/165 
 
is no global or regional convention devoted exclusively to extradition of alleged 
offenders for crimes against humanity. Rather, extradition of such offenders may 
occur pursuant to the rights, obligations and procedures set forth in multilateral 32 or 
bilateral extradition agreements33 addressing crimes more generally, where they 
exist between a requesting State and requested State, or pursuant to national laws or 
policies when those are regarded as sufficient by the requested State.  
22. Multilateral or bilateral extradition agreements addressing crimes generally 
have not led to comprehensive global coverage. The 1990 United Nations Model 
Treaty on Extradition is one effort to help States in developing bilateral extradition 
agreements capable of addressing a wide range of crimes, 34 but any given State does 
not have such agreements in place with all other States. Rather, most States 
typically will have in place such an extradition agreement with only some other 
States, leaving no treaty-based extradition relationship with many other States. At 
the same time, many States will not extradite in the absence of an extradition 
agreement.  
23. Consequently, the approach taken for many treaties that address a particular 
crime, such as torture, corruption or enforced disappearance, is to include within the 
treaty an article providing in some detail the rights, obligations and procedures that 
will govern extradition between States with respect to that particular crime, in the 
absence of any other applicable extradition treaty. A survey of treaties that address a 
particular crime suggests two broad models for provisions addressing extradition. 
The first and less detailed approach is reflected in article 8 of the 1984 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
which contains just four paragraphs, and article 13 of the 2006 International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which 
contains seven paragraphs. 
24. The second and more detailed approach may be seen in article 16 of the 2000 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
substantially similar article 44 of the 2005 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, which contain 17 and 18 paragraphs respectively. Article 44 of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, for example, reads as follows:  
 
   Article 44. Extradition 
 
 1. This article shall apply to the offences established in accordance with 
this Convention where the person who is the subject of the request for 
extradition is present in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that 
the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the do mestic 
law of both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party.  
__________________ 
 
32
 See, for example, the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. See also Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States, Official Journal of the European Communities , No. L 190, 18 June 2002, p. 1. 
 
33
 See, generally, M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Multilateral and 
Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms, vol. II, 3rd ed., Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff , 2008; and D. A. 
Sadoff, Bringing International Fugitives to Justice: Extradition and its Alternatives , Cambridge 
University Press, 2016.  
 
34
 General Assembly resolution 45/116 of 14 December 1990, Annex (subsequently amended by 
General Assembly resolution 52/88 of 12 December 1997). 
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 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a State 
Party whose law so permits may grant the extradition of a person for any of 
the offences covered by this Convention that are not punishable under its own 
domestic law. 
 3. If the request for extradition includes several separate offences, at least 
one of which is extraditable under this article and some of which are not 
extraditable by reason of their period of imprisonment but are related to 
offences established in accordance with this Convention, the requested State 
Party may apply this article also in respect of those offences.  
 4. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be 
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between 
States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable 
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. A State 
Party whose law so permits, in case it uses this Convention as the basis for 
extradition, shall not consider any of the offences established in accordance 
with this Convention to be a political offence.  
 5. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of  a 
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it 
has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for 
extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies.  
 6. A State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall: 
  (a) At the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance 
or approval of or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary -General 
of the United Nations whether it will take this Convention as the legal basis 
for cooperation on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and  
  (b) If it does not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation 
on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition 
with other States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.  
 7. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the existence 
of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extraditab le 
offences between themselves. 
 8. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the 
domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, 
including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty 
requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State 
Party may refuse extradition. 
 9. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite 
extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating 
thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.  
 10. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition treaties, 
the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances so 
warrant and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take a 
person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into 
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custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at 
extradition proceedings. 
 11. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does 
not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies 
solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request 
of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without 
undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same 
manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the 
domestic law of that State Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate 
with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure 
the efficiency of such prosecution.  
 12. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite 
or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the 
person will be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a 
result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of t he 
person was sought and that State Party and the State Party seeking the 
extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may 
deem appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient 
to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 11 of this article.  
 13. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused 
because the person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the 
requested State Party shall, if its domestic law so permits and in conformity 
with the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting State 
Party, consider the enforcement of the sentence imposed under the domestic 
law of the requesting State Party or the remainder thereof.  
 14. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in 
connection with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be 
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment 
of all the rights and guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party 
in the territory of which that person is present.  
 15. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation 
to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing 
that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a 
person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin 
or political opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice 
to that person’s position for any one of these reasons. 
 16. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole ground 
that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.  
 17. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where 
appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample 
opportunity to present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its 
allegation. 
 18. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements 
or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.  
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25. The core elements addressed in both the “less detailed” and “more detailed” 
approaches to extradition are analyzed in the next section. Thereafter, this chapter 
concludes with a proposed draft article consisting of 13 paragraphs entitled 
“Extradition”. The proposed draft article is largely modelled after article 44 of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption. At present 181 States have adhered 
to the text of that Convention. It provides ample guidance as to all relevant rights, 
obligations and procedures for extradition in the context of crimes against humanity, 
and its provisions are well understood by States, especially through detailed guides 
and other resources developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC).35 Further, the draft article proposed in this report on mutual legal 
assistance (see chapter III below) is based on the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, and certain institutional structures called for in that regard  — such as 
national contact points — could be harnessed for implementing extradition in the 
context of crimes against humanity. At the same time, some substantive and stylistic 
modifications to the text of article 44 are warranted in the context of the present 
draft articles. 
26. It is noted that extradition treaties typically do not seek to regulate which 
requesting State (if any) should have priority in the event that there are multiple 
requests for extradition. For example, the Model Treaty on Extradition, in article 16, 
simply provides: “If a Party receives requests for extradition for the same person 
from both the other Party and a third State it shall, at its discretion, determine to 
which of those States the person is to be extradited.”36 Some instruments identify 
elements to be taken into account, but still leave the ultimate decision to the 
requested State.37 A variety of factors in any given situation may suggest that one or 
the other requesting State is best situated to prosecute, and it is always the case that 
the State where the alleged offender is present may elect to submit the case to its 
own competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution instead of extraditing. The 
__________________ 
 
35
 See, for example, UNODC, Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, 2nd rev. ed., 2012, available from 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/legislative-guide.html; UNODC, Technical Guide to the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption , 2009, available from 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/technical-guide.html; and UNODC, Travaux 
Préparatoires of the Negotiation for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, United Nations publication (Sales No. E.10.V.13), available from 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/travaux-preparatoires.html. For additional resources, 
visit www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/publications.html. UNODC has developed similar 
resources for the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which 
contains many of the same provisions as the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 
its article on extradition. See, for example, UNODC, Legislative Guides for the Implementation 
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
Thereto, United Nations publication (Sales No. E.05.V.2), available from 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/legislative-guide.html; and the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the 
work of its first to eleventh sessions, Addendum: Interpretative notes for the official records 
(travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (A/55/383/Add.1).  
 
36
 Model Treaty on Extradition (see footnote 34 above), art. 16.  
 
37
 See, for example, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 … (footnote 32 above), art. 16, 
p. 7. 
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present report makes no proposal for inclusion of a provision addressing multiple 
requests for extradition. 
 
 
 B. Extradition provisions in treaties addressing specific crimes 
 
 
27. As noted in the prior section, treaties that address a particular crime, such as 
torture, corruption or enforced disappearance, typically include provisions 
addressing the rights, obligations and procedures that will govern extradition 
between the States parties with respect to that particular crime. While there is some 
variety among these agreements, the more detailed articles tend to have particular 
elements in common, as discussed below.  
 
 1. Dual criminality 
 
28. One element sometimes contained in such treaties is a “dual criminality” 
requirement, meaning that obligations with respect to extradition only arise in 
circumstances where, for a specific request, the conduct at issue is criminal in both 
the requesting State and the requested State.38 Such a treaty provision is typically 
included in two situations.  
29. First, a dual criminality requirement is usually included in general extradition 
treaties, which are potentially capable of covering a wide array of conduct. In such 
circumstances, a requested State may not wish to be subject to extradition 
obligations with respect to conduct that it does not regard as criminal. 
Consequently, the dual criminality requirement is included to ensure that obligations 
with respect to extradition only arise if both States have criminalized the conduct at 
issue. 
30. Second, a dual criminality requirement is usually included where the treaty is 
focused on a particular type of crime, but has established a combination of 
mandatory and non-mandatory offences, with the result that the offences existing in 
any two States parties may differ. For example, the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption establishes both mandatory (arts. 15, 16, para. 1, and arts. 17, 23, 
and 25) and non-mandatory (art. 16, para. 2, and arts. 18-22 and 24) offences 
relating to corruption. The Convention’s provisions on dual criminality, contained in 
the first three paragraphs of article 44,39 essentially allow a State party that has not 
__________________ 
 
38
 See, for example, M. C. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice , 
6th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 500 (“Dual criminal (also referred to as double 
criminality and double incrimination) refers to the characterization of the relator’s  conduct as 
criminal under the laws of both the requesting and requested states. It is a reciprocal 
characterization of criminality that is considered a substantive requirement for granting 
extradition”); and UNODC, Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on the 
Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Part One: Revised Manual on the 
Model Treaty on Extradition, p. 10, para. 20 (“The requirement of double criminality under the 
laws of both the requesting and requested States of the offence for which extradition is to be 
granted is a deeply ingrained principle of extradition law”).  
 
39
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, articles 16, 
paragraphs 1–2 (“1. This article shall apply to the offences covered by this Convention or in 
cases where an offence referred to in article 3, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), involves an organized 
criminal group and the person who is the subject of the request for extradition is located in the 
territory of the requested State Party, provided that the offence for which extradition is sought is 
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adopted a non-mandatory offence to decline an extradition request relating to such 
an offence.40 At the same time, the dual criminality requirement should be fulfilled 
among States parties with respect to all mandatory offences established under the 
Convention.41 
31. By contrast, treaties addressing a particular type of crime that only establish 
mandatory offences typically do not contain a dual criminality requirement. Thus, 
treaties such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which define specific 
offences and obligate States parties to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
they constitute offences under national criminal law, contain no dual criminality 
requirement in their respective extradition provisions. The rationale for not doing so 
is that when an extradition request arises under either convention, the offence 
should already be criminalized under the laws of both States parties, such that there 
is no need to satisfy a dual criminality requirement. A further rationale is that such 
treaties typically do not contain an absolute obligation to extradite; rather, they 
contain an aut dedere aut judicare obligation, whereby the requested State may 
always choose not to extradite, so long as it submits the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.  
32. The present draft articles on crimes against humanity define crimes against 
humanity in draft article 3 and, based on that definition, mandate in draft article 5, 
paragraphs 1 to 3, that the “offences” of “crimes against humanity” exist under 
national criminal laws of each State.42 As such, when an extradition request from 
one State is sent to another State for an offence referred to in draft article 5, the 
offence is criminal in both States; dual criminality is automatically satisfied.  
33. Draft article 3, paragraph 4, does acknowledge that the definition of the 
offence “is without prejudice to any broader definition provided for in any 
international instrument or national law” but, for purposes of the present draft 
articles, the “offence” of “crimes against humanity” is as defined in draft article 5, 
paragraphs 1 to 3. Any broader definition of “crimes against humanity” provided for 
in any international instrument or national law is not an “offence” referred to in 
draft article 5.  
__________________ 
punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the requested State 
Party. 2. If the request for extradition includes several separate serious crimes, some of which 
are not covered by this article, the requested State Party may apply this article also in respect of 
the latter offences”).  
 
40
 Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption  
(see footnote 35 above), p. 152, para. 556 (“With respect to those offences whose establishment 
is optional and that some parties may have established while others have not, the dual 
criminality requirement may constitute an obstacle to extradition. In this context, article 44, 
paragraph 2, can be considered as an encouragement for parties to extradite in the absence of 
dual criminality, if their domestic law allows it”).  
 
41
 Ibid. 
 
42
 Draft article 3, paragraph 4, provides that the draft article is without prejudice to a broader 
definition of crimes against humanity provided for in any national law. An extradition request 
based on an alleged offence arising outside the scope of draft article 3, paragraphs 1–3, 
however, is not based on an offence arising under draft article 5.  
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34. Draft article 5, paragraph 7, addresses the liability of legal persons for the 
“offences” referred to in draft article 5 (hence referring to paragraphs 1 to 3), and 
indicates that such liability “may be criminal, civil or administrative”. Thus, there 
may be divergences among the national laws of States when addressing the liability 
of legal persons. Yet such divergences are not with respect to the “offences” of 
“crimes against humanity” but, rather, with respect to the liability of legal persons 
for such offences. In any event, extradition procedures concern the transfer of 
natural persons. 
35. Draft article 6, paragraph 1, allows for some differential treatment as among 
States in the establishment of jurisdiction over offenders. At the same time, in the 
context of an extradition request, the requested State is the State in which the 
alleged offender is present, which falls within the scope of draft article 6, 
paragraph 2, for which there is no differential treatment. Even if the requesting State 
seeks to exercise a type of national jurisdiction that has not been established by the 
requested State (for example, jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim), the 
salient point is that the offence at issue is criminal in both the requesting and 
requested States. The requested State can chose not to extradite if it does not 
approve of the type of national jurisdiction that the requesting Sta te seeks to 
exercise, but the requested State must then submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, pursuant to draft article 9.  
36. In light of the above, there appears to be no need to include in a draft article 
on extradition a dual criminality requirement such as appears in the first three 
paragraphs of article 44 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  
 
 2. Inclusion as an extraditable offence in existing and future treaties  
 
37. A second element typically contained in such treaties is an obligation on States 
parties to regard the offence identified in the treaty as an extraditable offence both 
in existing treaties that address extradition generally and in any future such treaties 
concluded between State parties.43 
38. For example, article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that “[t]he 
offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable 
offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties 
undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition 
treaty to be concluded between them”. 
39. Likewise, article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides:  
__________________ 
 
43
 See article 7 of the draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic 
agents and other internationally protected persons, Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, pp. 319–320; and 
article 10 of the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, 
Yearbook…1996, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 32–33. See also J. J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages 
in International Law: Commentary on the Hostages Convention 1979 , Cambridge University 
Press 1990, p. 229; and J. H. Burgers and H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against 
Torture: a Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dordrech, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 138–139 and 238. 
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 2. The offence of enforced disappearance shall be deemed to be included as 
an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties 
before the entry into force of this Convention. 
 3. States Parties undertake to include the offence of enforced disappearance 
as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty subsequently to be 
concluded between them.44 
40. Similar provisions appear in: the 1970 Convention for the suppression of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft;45 1971 Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation;46 the 1973 Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents;47 the 1979 International Convention against the taking of 
hostages;48 the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel;49 the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings;50 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
__________________ 
 
44
 There was some concern during drafting that, as then written, it might not be “possible to 
require States parties to include enforced disappearance among the extraditable offences in 
every extradition treaty they concluded (art. 13, para. 3), since a contracting party or contracting 
parties that did not accede to the instrument might not agree” (Commission on Human Rights, 
Report of the inter-sessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding 
normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance 
(E/CN.4/2004/59), para. 110). Various wording changes were suggested, along with using the 
language in article 8, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ibid., paras. 110–114). The final text of article 
13, paragraph 3, reflects the language used in article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“State Parties 
undertake to include…”).  
 
45
 Art. 8, para. 1 (“The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any 
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include 
the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be concluded between 
them”). 
 
46
 Art. 8, para. 1 (“The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any 
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include 
the offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them”).  
 
47
 Art. 8, para. 1 (“To the extent that the crimes set forth in article 2 are not listed as extraditable 
offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties, they shall be deemed to be 
included as such therein. States Parties undertake to include those crimes as extraditable 
offences in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them”). For the 
Commission’s analysis of this provision, see Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 319,  
paragraphs (1)-(3).  
 
48
 Art. 10, para. 1 (“The offences set forth in article 1 shall be deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties 
undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be 
concluded between them”). 
 
49
 Art. 15, para. 1 (“To the extent that the crimes set out in article 9 are not extraditable offences in 
any extradition treaty existing between States Parties, they shall be deemed to be included as 
such therein. States Parties undertake to include those crimes as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be concluded between them”).  
 
50
 Art. 9, para. 1 (“The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable 
offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States Parties before the entry into 
force of this Convention. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable 
offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them”).  
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Crime;51 and regional treaties.52 It is also noted that the Commission’s 1996 draft 
code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind provides in article 10, 
paragraph 1, that, “[t]o the extent that the crimes set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20 
are not extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States 
Parties, they shall be deemed to be included as such therein. States Parties undertake 
to include those crimes as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be 
concluded between them”.53  
41. Article 44, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
contains such language, and provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft 
article on extradition (see draft article 11, paragraph 1, below). At the same time, 
paragraph 4 adds a further element barring use of the “political offence” exception, 
which is addressed in the next section.  
 
 3. Exclusion of the “political offence” exception to extradition 
 
42. A third element typically contained in such treaties excludes the “political 
offence” exception from being applied to certain crimes, meaning that it requires 
that the extradition proceed even if the offence for which extradition is  requested 
might be regarded by the requested State as an offence of a political nature.  
43. Under some extradition treaties addressing crimes, the requested State may 
decline to extradite if it regards the offence for which extradition is requested as 
political in nature, such as criminalizing as “treason” conduct that is in the nature of 
activism seeking political change.54 Yet “the rise of terrorism and other forms of 
international and transnational criminality is causing some governments to make an 
about-face and to seek to exclude the exception for international crimes and for 
serious crimes of violence”.55 
__________________ 
 
51
 Art. 16, para. 3 (“Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be 
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. 
States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition 
treaty to be concluded between them”).  
 
52
 See article 13 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, which 
reads, in relevant part: “The crime referred to in Article 2 shall be deemed to be included among 
the extraditable crimes in every extradition treaty entered into between States Parties. The States 
Parties undertake to include the crime of torture as an extraditable offence in every extradition 
treaty to be concluded between them”; article V of the 1994 Inter -American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons, which reads, in relevant part: “The forced disappearance of 
persons shall be deemed to be included among the extraditable offenses in every extradition 
treaty entered into between States Parties”; and article XIII, paragraph 2, of the 2007 ASEAN 
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Convention on Counter Terrorism, which reads, in 
relevant part: “The offences covered in Article II of this Convention shall be deemed to be 
included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the Parties 
before the entry into force of this Convention.”  
 
53
 Yearbook …1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 32.  
 
54
 For a general discussion of political offences and the political offence exception, see G. Gilbert, 
Aspects of Extradition Law, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, pp. 113 et seq. 
 
55
 Bassiouni, International Extradition (see footnote 38 above), pp. 669–739, at p. 671. There has 
also been movement towards not including the political offence exception in its ent irety. See 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 … (footnote 32 above) ; and the United Kingdom 
Extradition Act, 2003 c. 41, available from www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/contents.  
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44. In particular, there is support for the proposition that crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes should not be regarded as “political 
offences”. For example, article VII of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that its enumerated offences are not 
subject to any exception founded on political offence grounds: “Genocide and the 
other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the 
purpose of extradition” (art. VII).56 Commentators have noted that, given that the 
aim of the Convention was “to prevent impunity in the case of genocide”, article VII 
“was not a controversial issue in the drafting history”57 and was “accepted, without 
much controversy, by a majority of countries as a central provision in the Genocide 
Convention”.58 
45. There are similar reasons not to regard alleged crimes against humanity as a 
“political offence” so as to preclude extradition.59 Indeed, the Revised Manual on 
the Model Treaty on Extradition states that “certain crimes, such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, are regarded by the international 
community as so heinous that the perpetrators cannot rely on this restriction on 
extradition”.60 The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights has also declared that persons “charged with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity shall not be allowed to claim that their actions fall within the ‘political 
offence’ exception to extradition”.61 
46. Several other multilateral treaties addressing specific crimes contain 
provisions barring the “political offence” exception, including: the International 
__________________ 
 
56
 See, generally, R. Roth, “The extradition of génocidaires”, in P. Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide 
Convention: a Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2009 p. 279, at p. 283.  
 
57
 Roth (see footnote above), p. 279. See also B. Schiffbauer, in C. J. Tams, L. Berster and B. 
Schiffbauer (eds.), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: a 
Commentary, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2014, pp. 262–263. For the negotiating history of the 
Convention, see H. Abtahi and P. Webb, The Genocide Convention: the Travaux Préparatoires, 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff , 2008 (two volumes).  
 
58
 Roth (see footnote 56 above), p. 284. See also Economic and Social Council, Ad Hoc 
Committee on Genocide, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn up by the 
Committee (E/794), p. 37; and Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first session, 
Sixth Committee, 55th meeting (A/C.6/31/SR.55), pp. 8–9, especially paragraph 30 (statement of 
Australia referencing war crimes, genocide and violations of human rights as crimes for which 
“any such political character should not prevent extradition”).  
 
59
 See, for example, In the Matter of the Extradition of Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook , United 
States District Court, S. D. New York, 924 F. Supp. 565 (1996), p. 577 (“if the act complained 
of is of such heinous nature that it is a crime against humanity, it is necessarily outside the 
political offense exception”); Ordinola v. Hackman, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth 
Circuit, 478 F.3d 588 (2007) (providing an overview of the political offence doctrine in U.S. 
law); and Nezirovic v. Holt, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 779 F.3d 233 (2015) 
(holding that the political offence exception is not applicable to acts of torture committed during 
the conflict in Bosnia).  
 
60
 Revised Manual on the Model Treaty on Extradition (see footnote 38 above), para. 45.  
 
61
 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, resolution 2001/22 
(see footnote 29 above).  
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Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 62 the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;63 and the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.64 Contemporary bilateral extradition treaties also often specify 
particular offences that should not be regarded as a “political offence” so as to 
preclude extradition.65 Neither the International Convention against the taking of 
hostages66 nor the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,67 however, contain a provision barring the 
political offence exception to extradition.  
__________________ 
 
62
 Art. 11 (“None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for purposes of extradition 
or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political 
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or 
for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that 
it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives”).  
 
63
 Art. 14 (“None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of 
extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a 
political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly,  a request for 
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the 
sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence 
or an offence inspired by political motives”).  
 
64
 Art. 13, para. 1 (“For the purposes of extradition between States Parties, the offence of enforced 
disappearance shall not be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a 
political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for 
extradition based on such an offence may not be refused on these grounds alone”).  
 
65
 See, for example, the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and South 
Africa, done at Washington on 16 September 1999, available from 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/124464.pdf, article 4, paragraph 2 (“For the purposes of 
this Treaty, the following offences shall not be considered political offences: … (b) an offence 
for which both the Requesting and Requested States have the obligation pursuant to a 
multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their 
respective competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; (c) murder; (d) an offence 
involving kidnapping, abduction, or any form of unlawful detention, including the taking of a 
hostage”); the Treaty on Extradition Between the Republic of Korea and Australia, done at 
Seoul on 5 September 1990, available from www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/39362515.pdf, article 4, paragraph 1 (a) (“… Reference to a political 
offence shall not include … (ii) an offence in respect of which the Contracting Parties have the 
obligation to establish jurisdiction or extradite by reason of a multilateral international 
agreement to which they are both parties; and (iii) an offence against the law relating to 
genocide”); and the Treaty of Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United Mexican States, done at Mexico City on 16 March 1990, available 
from www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/traites/en_traites-ext-can-mex.html, article IV, subparagraph 
a) (“... For the purpose of this paragraph, political offence shall not include an offence for which 
each Party has the obligation, pursuant to a multilateral international agreement, to extradite the 
person sought or to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”). 
See also Bassiouni, International Extradition (see footnote 38 above), p. 670. 
 
66
 See also B. Saul, “International Convention against the Taking of Hostages”, introductory note, 
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, available from 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icath/icath.html.  
 
67
 See also M. Nowak and E. McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: a 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 373 (noting that “Switzerland feared that the 
motives for acts of torture might be such as to permit torturers to invoke the political nature of 
their actions as an argument against their extradition” and suggesting that a statement be added 
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
21/165 17-00990 
 
47. Article 44, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
contains a final sentence that reads: “A State Party whose law so permits, in case it 
uses this Convention as the basis for extradition, shall not consider any of the 
offences established in accordance with this Convention to be a political offence. ” 
This language limits the exclusion of the political offence exception only to 
extraditions occurring under the Convention itself. A broader exclusion of the 
political offence exception to all extraditions occurring between two States parties is 
found in article 13, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which reads: “For the purposes of 
extradition between States Parties, the offence of enforced disappearance shall not 
be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence 
or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition 
based on such an offence may not be refused on these grounds alone.” 
48. Broader language of this kind would be preferable for a draft article on 
extradition (see draft article 11, paragraph 2, below).  
49. It is noted that the key aspect of such language is to clarify that the conduct of 
committing a crime against humanity can never be regarded as a “political offence” 
(in other words, that such conduct itself cannot be regarded as some form of 
political activism). This issue differs, however, from whether a requesting State is 
pursuing the extradition on account of the individual’s political opinions; in other 
words, it differs from whether the State is alleging a crime against humanity and 
making its request for extradition as a means of persecuting an individual for his or 
her political views. The latter issue of persecution is addressed separately belo w. 
 
 4. States requiring a treaty to extradite can use the present draft articles  
 
50. A fourth element establishes the treaty itself as a possible legal basis for 
extradition, for the benefit of States that condition extradition upon the existence of 
a treaty.68 Article 44, paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption contains an example of such a provision. It reads: “If a State Party that 
makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for 
extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may 
consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to 
which this article applies.” 
51. The same or a similar provision may be found in the Convention for  the 
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft;69 the Convention for the suppression of 
__________________ 
that the acts defined in the Convention “shall not be deemed to be offences of a political 
nature”). 
 
68
 See Lambert (footnote 43 above),pp. 238–239; and L. M. Olson, “Re-enforcing enforcement in 
a specialized convention on crimes against humanity: inter-State cooperation, mutual legal 
assistance, and the aut dedere aut judicare obligation”, in L. N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a 
Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 323–344, at 
p. 330. 
 
69
 Art. 8, para. 2 (“If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of 
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition 
in respect of the offence”).  
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unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation;70 the Convention on the prevention 
and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents;71 the International Convention against the taking of hostages; 72 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment;73 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings;74 the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism;75 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime;76 and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance.77 The Commission’s 1996 draft code of crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind also contained such a provision.78  
52. In addition to this provision, and unlike other treaties, both the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 79 in its article 16, paragraph 5, 
__________________ 
 
70
 Art. 8, para. 2 (same language as the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
71
 Art. 8, para. 2 (“If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may, if it decides to extradite, consider this Convention as the legal basis for 
extradition in respect of those crimes. Extradition shall be subject to the procedural provisions 
and the other conditions of the law of the requested State”). For the Commission’s analysis, 
see Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, pp. 319–320. 
 
72
 Art. 10, para. 2 (“If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of 
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no 
extradition treaty, the requested State may at its option consider this Convention as the legal 
basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 1. Extradition shall be subject 
to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State”).  
 
73
 Art. 8, para. 2 (“If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such 
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the  
requested State”). 
 
74
 Art. 9, para. 2 (“When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no 
extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a 
legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition shall be 
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State”).   
 
75
 Art. 11, para. 2 (same text as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings). 
 
76
 Art. 16, para. 4 (“If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has  no extradition 
treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for extradition in respect of any offence to 
which this article applies”). 
 
77
 Art. 13, para. 4 (“If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the necessary legal basis for extradition in 
respect of the offence of enforced disappearance”).  
 
78
 Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 32, art. 10, para. 2 (“If a State Party which makes 
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from 
another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider the 
present Code as the legal basis for extradition in respect of those crimes. Extradition shall be 
subject to the conditions provided in the law of the requested State”).  
 
79
 Art. 16, para. 5 (a) (“States Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
shall … [a]t the time of deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval of or 
accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations whether they 
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and the United Nations Convention against Corruption,80 in its article 44, paragraph 6, 
include a requirement in their subparagraph (a) that any State party that makes 
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty not ify the depositary whether it 
intends to treat the Convention as the legal basis for extradition to or from States 
with whom they do not have an extradition treaty. Further, in subparagraph (b), 
these Conventions both provide that if the State party does not regard the 
Convention as the legal basis for extradition, it shall “seek, where appropriate, to 
conclude treaties on extradition with other States Parties”.  
53. One commentator asserts that subparagraph (a) “seeks to make transparent the 
process envisaged in [using the Convention as a legal basis for extradition] by 
requiring States Parties to make it clear whether they are exercising the optional 
power to take the Convention as the legal basis for cooperation”.81 Yet whether the 
provision has been effective in providing for transparency is unclear. For example, 
as of 2016 only about 50 out of 181 States parties to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption had provided notification to the Secretary -General as to whether 
they intended to treat the Convention as the legal basis for extradition to or from 
States with whom they do not have an extradition treaty. 82 Thus, for more than two 
thirds of the States parties, it is not clear whether they regard the Convention as the 
legal basis for extradition to or from States with whom they do not have an 
extradition treaty.  
54. Subparagraph (b) obliges a State party that does not use the Convention as the 
legal basis for extradition to conclude extradition treaties, “as appropriate”, with 
other States parties. Despite the “as appropriate” clause, a report of the Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime asserts that “those States which require a treaty basis and do not take the 
Convention as the legal basis for extradition have an obligation under paragraph 5 
to seek to conclude with other parties treaties on extradition in order to strengthen 
international cooperation in criminal matters as a stated purpose of the 
Convention”.83 
55. In light of the above, article 44, paragraph 6, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a 
draft article on extradition. Yet the text of subparagraph (a) could be altered to 
establish a default in favour of using the draft articles as a basis for extradition, 
__________________ 
will take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation on extradition with other States 
Parties to this Convention”). 
 
80
 Art. 44, para. 6 (same text as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime). 
 
81
 D. McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: a Commentary on the UN Convention and its 
Protocols, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 180.  
 
82
 A list of “Notifications made under article 6 (3), 44 (6)(a) and 46 (13) and (14)” of the 2003 
United Nations Convention against Corruption may be found on the United Nations Treaty 
Collection database, at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_  
no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&clang=_en#top. 
 
83
 Conference of the Parties to the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Analytical report of the Secretariat on the Implementation of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: updated information based on 
additional responses received from States for the first reporting cycle (CTOC/COP/2005/2/  
Rev.1), para. 69. 
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unless the State notifies the depositary otherwise (see draft article 11, paragraph 4, 
below). Doing so would provide a strong incentive for States to be transparent as to 
whether they intend to treat the draft articles as a legal basis for extradition.  
 
 5. States not requiring a treaty to extradite shall use the present draft articles  
 
56. A fifth element provides that a State party that does not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences identified in the 
treaty as extraditable offences between itself and other States parties. Such a 
provision appears at article 44, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. It reads: “States Parties that do not make extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as 
extraditable offences between themselves.” 
57. Similar provisions may be found in many other treaties addressing crimes, 
including the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft; 84 the 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil 
aviation;85 the International Convention against the taking of hostages;86 the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment;87 and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance.88 The Commission’s 1996 draft code of crimes 
against the peace and security of mankind also contains such a provision.89 
58. In light of the above, article 44, paragraph 7, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a 
draft article on extradition (see draft article 11, paragraph 5, below).  
 
 6. Satisfying other requirements of the requested State’s national law 
 
59. A sixth element provides that the extradition is otherwise subject to the 
conditions or requirements set forth in the law of the requested State. Such a 
provision appears at article 44, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. It reads: “Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided 
for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition 
treaties, including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty 
__________________ 
 
84
 Art. 8, para. 3 (“Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence 
of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable offence between themselves subject to 
the conditions provided by the law of the requested State”).  
 
85
 Art. 8, para. 3 (same text as the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft).   
 
86
 Art. 10, para. 3 (“States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 1 as extraditable offences between 
themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State”).  
 
87
 Art. 8, para. 3 (“States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State”).  
 
88
 Art. 13, para. 5 (“States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall recognize the offence of enforced disappearance as an extraditable offence between 
themselves”). 
 
89
 Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 32, art. 10, para. 3 (“States Parties which do not make 
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize those crimes as extrad itable 
offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided in the law of the requested 
State”). 
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requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party 
may refuse extradition.” 
60. Similar provisions may be found in the Convention for the suppression of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft;90 the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation;91 the Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents;92 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment;93 the Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel;94 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings;95 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;96 the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime;97 and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 98 Regional conventions 
also contain similar language.99 
61. Such provisions have not been controversial. For example, the negotiating 
history of the United Nations Convention against Corruption reveals that article 44, 
paragraph 8, was maintained in identical form throughout the negotiations and that 
there were no notable objections to the text or suggestions for change. 100 
__________________ 
 
90
 Article 8, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.” 
 
91
 Article 8, paragraph 2, reads in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.”  
 
92
 Article 8, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the procedural 
provisions and the other conditions of the law of the requested State.”  
 
93
 Article 8, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.”  
 
94
 Article 15, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the conditions 
provided in the law of the requested State.”  
 
95
 Article 9, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.” 
 
96
 Article 11, paragraph 2, reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other 
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.”  
 
97
 Article16, paragraph 7, reads: “Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the 
domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter 
alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds 
upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition.”  
 
98
 Art. 13, para. 6 (“Extradition shall, in all cases, be subject to the conditions provided for by the 
law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including, in particular, 
conditions relating to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds upon 
which the requested State Party may refuse extradition or make it subject to certain 
conditions”). 
 
99
 See, for example, article 13 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 
which reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions that may be 
required by the law of the requested State”; article V of the Inter -American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons, which reads, in relevant part: “Extradition shall be subject to 
the provisions set forth in the constitution and other laws of the request[ed] state”; and the 1999 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, article 27, paragraph 4 
(“Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the requested Party or 
by applicable extradition treaties, including the grounds on which the requested Party may 
refuse extradition”). 
 
100
 See the Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiation for the Elaboration of the United Nations 
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62. The wording of the provision allows the rules on extradition commonly 
included in a requested State’s national laws to continue to operate. Such laws 
might: include a requirement that an extradition only proceed if the offence at issue 
is punishable by a certain minimum penalty, such as imprisonment of one year; 101 
prohibit the extradition of the requested State’s nationals; prohibit extradition if the 
request is related to a trial that was conducted in absentia; or require that an 
extradited person only can be extradited to face the charge for which extradition was 
requested (the principle of specialty or speciality). 102 Whatever the reason, in the 
context of the present draft articles, it should be kept in mind that the requested 
State in which the offender is present is obligated to submit the matter to 
prosecution under draft article 9 unless it extradites or surrenders the alleged 
offender. Thus, while the requested State’s national law may preclude extradition to 
a requesting State in certain circumstances, the requested State remains obliged to 
submit the matter to its prosecuting authorities.103 
63. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime104 and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption contain an additional provision 
relating to the national law of the requested State, which essentially encourages the 
requested State to streamline its extradition procedures to  the extent permissible 
under national law. Thus, article 44, paragraph 9, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption reads: “States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, 
endeavour to expedite extradition procedures and to simplify evident iary 
requirements relating thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies. ” 
64. In light of the above, article 44, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides a suitable basis for paragraphs within a 
draft article on extradition (see draft article 11, paragraphs 6 and 7, below).  
 
 7. Deeming the offence to have occurred in the requesting State  
 
65. A seventh element allows for the situation in which the offence has not 
occurred in the requesting State. Some treaties and national laws provide that the 
requested State is only required to grant a request for extradition if it was made by 
the State in which the crime occurred.105 To counter such a rule, many treaties have 
included a provision stating that the offence at issue should be deemed to have 
occurred not only in the State where it physically occurred, but also in any State that 
__________________ 
Convention against Corruption (footnote 35 above), pp. 345–361. 
 
101
 See, for example, Bassiouni, International Extradition (footnote 38 above), p. 511. 
 
102
 See, for example, the United Kingdom Extradition Act (footnote 55 above), section 17.  
 
103
 See Saul (footnote 66 above) (“National law continues to govern the preconditions of 
extradition to the extent not modified by the Convention. Thus, for instance, Sta tes which refuse 
to extradite their nationals may continue not to do so; or States could still insist on satisfaction 
of the ‘specialty’ rule (namely, that an extradited person can only be extradited to face the 
charge for which extradition was requested). The State must then submit the case for 
prosecution”). 
 
104
 Art. 16, para. 8 (“States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expedite 
extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto in respect of 
any offence to which this article applies”). 
 
105
 Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 33, para. (3) of the commentary to draft article 10 
(“Under some treaties and national laws, the custodial State may only grant requests for 
extradition coming from the State in which the crime occurred”). 
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is required to establish jurisdiction over the offence under the treaty, if such an 
approach is necessary for the extradition to proceed. Thus, article 8, paragraph 4, of 
the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally 
protected persons, including diplomatic agents, provides that “[e]ach of the crimes 
shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if it had 
been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories 
of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 
of article 3”.  
66. Notably, the above provision was not included in the Commission’s draft 
articles that served as the basis of the Convention, 106 but was inserted by the Sixth 
Committee in the final text.107 Provisions with substantially similar language may be 
found in the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft;108 the 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil 
aviation;109 the International Convention against the taking of hostages;110 the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment;111 the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel;112 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings.113 A recent formulation may be found in article 11, paragraph 4, the 
__________________ 
 
106
 See Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, pp. 319–320, article 7; Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Twenty-eighth session, Sixth Committee, 1437th meeting (A/C.6/SR.1437), paragraphs 27–28 
(considering that the Commission’s proposed article 7, paragraph 4, dealing with conflicting 
extradition requests “established too rigid a system of priorities”, and noting that it had been 
replaced by text suggested by Japan in document A/C.6/L.934). See also ibid.,1419th meeting 
(A/C.6/SR.1419), paragraphs 15–16 (Japan introduced its amendment to bring article 7, 
paragraph 4 “into line with the corresponding provision of the Conventions of The Hague and 
Montreal” because the “delegation felt that the text of the Conventions of The Hague and 
Montreal in that particular paragraph was essential to enable certain States to put their 
extradition mechanism in motion when they received requests for extradition from States other 
than the State where offences were committed”).  
 
107
 See the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally 
protected persons, including diplomatic agents, article 8, paragraph 4. 
 
108
 Art. 8, para. 4 (“The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting 
States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the 
territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, 
paragraph 1”).  
 
109
 Art. 8 para. 4 (same language as the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
110
 Art. 10, para. 4 (“The offences set forth in article 1 shall be treated, for the purposes of 
extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which 
they occurred but also in the territory of the States required to establish jurisdiction in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of article 5”). 
 
111
 Art. 8, para. 4 (“Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States 
Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in 
the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, 
paragraph 1”). 
 
112
 Art. 15, para. 4 (“Each of those crimes shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between 
States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but als o in 
the territories of the States Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with 
paragraph 1 or 2 of article 10”). 
 
113
 Art. 9, para. 4 (“If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the purposes 
of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in 
which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in 
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: “If 
necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the purposes of 
extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the 
place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have 
established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2. ”  
67. Provisions of this kind refer to “States that have established jurisdiction” on 
the basis of a territorial, nationality or passive personality connection (article 7, 
paragraphs 1 and 2, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism); they do not refer to a State that has established jurisdiction 
on the basis of the presence of the offender (article 7, paragraph 4, of the 
Convention). The reason for not referring to the latter State is that the State 
requesting extradition is never the State in which the alleged offender is present, 
and therefore there is no need for the requested State to deem that the offence at 
issue has occurred in a State that has established jurisdiction on the basis of the 
presence of the offender. 
68. In its commentary to the 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind, which contains a similar provision in article 10, paragraph 4, 114 
the Commission stated that “[p]aragraph 4 secures the possibility for the custodial 
State to grant a request for extradition received from any State party … with respect 
to the crimes” established in the draft code, and that “[t]his broader approach is 
consistent with the general obligation of every State party to establish its 
jurisdiction over [those] crimes”.115 Such an approach also “finds further 
justification in the fact that the Code does not confer primary jurisdiction on any 
particular States nor establish an order of priority among extradition requests”.116  
69. Such a provision, however, has not been included in some recent conventions, 
notably the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption and the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Even so, it appears that 
the provision may still have value in situations where extradition is problematic for 
a requested State because the crime against humanity did not physically occur in the 
requesting State, but where the requesting State has established jurisdiction in 
accordance with draft article 6, paragraph 1 or 2.117 As such, inclusion of such a 
provision in the draft article on extradition, based on the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and with a cross reference to draft 
article 6 of the present draft articles, appears warranted (see draft article 11, 
paragraph 8, below). 
 
  
__________________ 
accordance with article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2”).  
 
114
 Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 32 (“Each of those crimes shall be treated, for the 
purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place 
in which it occurred but also in the territory of any other State Party”).  
 
115
 Ibid., p. 33 (para. (3) of the commentary to article 10).  
 
116
 Ibid. 
 
117
 Thus, this provision would apply to circumstances where the requesting State has established 
national jurisdiction under draft article 6 other than on the basis that the crime against humanity 
occurred in its territory.  
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 8. Extradition of a requested State’s own nationals 
 
70. An eighth element, found in article 16, paragraphs 10 to 12, of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 118 and in article 44, 
paragraphs 11 to 13, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, concerns 
situations where a requested State is limited in its ability to extradite its own 
nationals.  
71. These paragraphs address three issues. First, if a State cannot extradite one of 
its nationals under its national law, it is obligated to submit the case without undue 
delay to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Such a provision appears 
in article 44, paragraph 11, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
Given draft article 9 of the present draft articles, a paragraph of this kind in a draft 
article on extradition appears unnecessary.  
72. Second, these paragraphs deal with the situation where the requested State can 
extradite one of its nationals, but only if the alleged offender will be returned to the 
requested State for the purpose of serving out any sentence imposed by the 
requesting State. In such a situation, the provision makes clear that an extradition 
subject to such a condition is a permissible way of satisfying the requested State ’s 
aut dedere aut judicare obligation. Such a provision appears in article 44, paragraph 
12, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and would appear 
appropriate for a draft article on extradition (see draft article 11, paragraph 9, 
below). 
73. Third, these paragraphs address the situation where extradition of the 
requested State’s national is being sought for the purpose of enforcing a sentence, 
such as in a situation where the offender was tried but has not yet served or fully 
served his or her sentence, and is found in his or her State of nationality. The two 
above-mentioned Conventions provide that the requested State shall, if its national 
law so permits, consider itself enforcing the sentence or the remainder thereof. Such 
a provision appears in article 44, paragraph 13, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, and would appear appropriate for a draft article on extradition 
(see draft article 11, paragraph 10, below).  
 
 9. Refusal to extradite due to possible persecution  
 
74. A ninth element, found in many conventions, is based on the principle “that an 
individual should not be extradited to a State in which he might be persecuted or 
prejudiced for reasons extraneous to his guilt of the charged offence”.119 Such a 
provision appears in article 16, paragraph 14, of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime,120 and in article 44, paragraph 15, of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, which reads as follows: 
__________________ 
 
118
 Art 16, paras. 10–12. 
 
119
 Lambert (see footnote 43 above), p. 211.  
 
120
 Article 16, paragraph 14, reads: “Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 
person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance 
with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons.” 
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 Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to 
extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that 
the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person  
on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or 
political opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to 
that person’s position for any one of these reasons.121  
75. Strictly speaking, this provision does not appear necessary in a treaty 
containing provisions obligating a State to establish jurisdiction when an alleged 
offender is present and to submit the matter to prosecution, unless the individual is 
extradited. Such a treaty does not create any obligation to extradite, let alone an 
obligation where the individual might be at risk of harm. Rather, the State can 
refuse to extradite for whatever reasons it choses, so long as it submits the matter to 
its own competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.  
76. Nevertheless, various multilateral instruments similar in nature to the present 
draft articles contain such a provision, such as: the International Convention against 
the taking of hostages;122 the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances;  123 the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings ;124 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;125 and the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 126 The provision also 
__________________ 
 
121
 For a discussion of what is meant by “substantial grounds” in non-refoulement provisions, 
which cover more than just extradition, see chapter II above.  
 
122
 Article 9 reads, in relevant part: “A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant 
to this Convention, shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for 
believing: (a) that the request for extradition for an offence set forth in article 1 has been made 
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
ethnic origin or political opinion.” 
 
123
 Art. 6, para. 6 (“In considering requests received pursuant to this article, the requested State 
may refuse to comply with such requests where there are substantial grounds leading its judicial 
or other competent authorities to believe that compliance would facilitate the prosecution or 
punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or 
would cause prejudice for any of those reasons to any person affected by the request”).  
 
124
 Art. 12 (“Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite 
… if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for 
extradition for offences set forth in article 2 … has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or 
political opinion”). 
 
125
 Art. 15 (“Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite 
… if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for 
extradition for offences set forth in article 2 … has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or 
political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s 
position for any of these reasons”). 
 
126
 Art. 13, para. 7 (“Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to 
extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has 
been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, 
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions or membership of a particular social 
group, or that compliance with the request would cause harm to that person for any one of these 
reasons”). 
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commonly appears in bilateral extradition agreements127 and in national laws128 and 
is included in the Model Treaty on Extradition.129 
77. The inclusion of such a provision highlights, in particular, the ability of States 
to refuse extradition in cases where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
the individual sought is being or will be persecuted for the reasons outlined. In 
doing so, the provision appears to serve three purposes. First and foremost, it helps 
ensure that individuals will not be extradited when there is a danger that their rights 
__________________ 
 
127
 See, for example, the Extradition Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India 
and the Government of the French Republic, done at Paris on 24 January 2003, available from 
http://cbi.nic.in/interpol/ext_treaties/France.pdf, article 3, paragraph 3 (“Extradition shall also 
not be granted if the Requested State has substantial grounds for believing that a request for 
extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of 
his or her race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that the position of that person 
sought may be prejudiced for any of these reasons”); the Extradition Treaty Between the United 
States of America and South Africa (footnote 65 above), article 4, paragraph 3 (“… extradition 
shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting 
or punishing a person on account of that person’s gender, race, religion, nationality, or political 
opinion”); the Treaty on Extradition Between the Republic of Korea and Australia (footnote 65 
above), article 4, paragraph 1 (b) (“Extradition shall not be granted under this Treaty … if there 
are substantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition has been made for the purpose 
of prosecuting or punishing a person for any reason which would be grounds for refusing 
extradition under the law of the Requested Party [or] that that person’s position may be 
prejudiced for any of those reasons”); and the Treaty of Extradition Between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States (footnote 65 above), article IV 
(“Extradition shall not be granted … if there are substantial grounds for believing that a request 
for extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account 
of that person’s race, religion, nationality or political beliefs or, that in the circumstances of the 
case, extradition would be inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice”).  
 
128
 See, for example, the Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China: Order of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China, No. 42, adopted at the 19th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 28 December 2000, available from 
www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/39776447.pdf, article 8, paragraph 4 (“The 
request for extradition made by a foreign state to the People’s Republic of China shall be 
rejected if … the person sought is one against whom penal proceedings instituted or punishment 
may be executed for reasons of that person’s race, religion, nationality, sex, political opinion or 
personal status, or that person may, for any of those reasons, be subjected to unfair treatment in 
judicial proceedings”); and the United Kingdom Extradition Act (footnote 55 above), section 13 
(“A person’s extradition … is barred by reason of extraneous considerations if (and only if) it 
appears that (a) the Part 1 warrant issued in respect of him (though purporting to be issued on 
account of the extradition offence) is in fact issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing 
him on account of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, 
or (b) if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his 
personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or 
political opinions”). 
 
129
 Model Treaty on Extradition (see footnote 34 above), art. 3, para. (b) (“If the requested State has 
substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition has been made for the purpose 
of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, 
ethnic origin, political opinions, sex or status, or that that person's position may be prejudiced 
for any of those reasons”). See also the Revised Manual on the Model Treaty on Extradition 
(footnote 38 above), paragraph 47 (“Subparagraph (b) … is a non -controversial paragraph, one 
that has been used (sometimes in a modified form) in extradition treaties throughout the 
world”). 
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will be violated. Second, States which already insert a similar provision into their 
extradition treaties or national laws are assured that substantial grounds for 
believing that a person will be subjected to persecution will remain a basis of 
refusal for extradition. Third, States which do not have such a provision explicitly in 
their bilateral arrangements will have a textual basis for refusal if such a case arises.  
78. As such, the inclusion of such a provision in a draft article on extradition 
appears warranted (see draft article 11, paragraph 11, below). Consideration might 
be given to adding the “or membership in a particular social group” at the end of the 
list of factors, as is done in the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. In any event, it is stressed that, in the 
context of the present draft articles, draft article 9 still requires the requested State, 
if it does not extradite, to submit the matter to its own prosecutorial authorities.  
 
 10. Consultation and cooperation 
 
79. A tenth element seeks to promote consultation between States when a reque st 
for extradition is made and encourage general cooperation among States to carry out 
or enhance the effectiveness of extradition.  
80. With respect to consultation, article 44, paragraph 17, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides that, “[b]efore refusing extradition, the 
requested State Party shall, where appropriate, consult with the requesting State 
Party to provide it with ample opportunity to present its opinions and to provide 
information relevant to its allegation”. An identical provision is found in the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 130 
81. With respect to cooperation, article 44, paragraph 18, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, provides that “States Parties shall seek to conclude 
bilateral and multilateral agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the 
effectiveness of extradition”. Similar provisions are included in the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substan ces131 
and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 132  
82. The inclusion of provisions based on article 44, paragraphs 17 and 18, in a 
draft article on extradition appears warranted (see draft article 11, paragraphs 12 
and 13, below). 
 
 
 C. Draft article 11. Extradition 
 
 
83. In light of the sources indicated above, the Special Rapporteur is of the view 
that a draft article on extradition for crimes against humanity should be largely 
modelled on the text used in article 44 of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. At present, 181 States have adhered to the text of that Convention. Its 
__________________ 
 
130
 Art. 16, para. 16 (“Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where 
appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample opportunity to 
present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation”).  
 
131
 Art. 6, para. 11 (“The Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements to 
carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition”). 
 
132
 Ar. 16, para. 17 (“States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or 
arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition”)  
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provisions would provide useful guidance as to all relevant rights, obligations and 
procedures for extradition in the context of crimes against humanity and are well 
understood by States, including through the legislative guides and other resources 
developed by the UNODC.133 Further, although a crime against humanity by its 
nature is quite different from a crime of corruption, the issues arising  in the context 
of extradition are largely the same regardless of the nature of the crime. Finally, the 
provision proposed in this report on mutual legal assistance (see chapter III below) 
is based on the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and certain 
institutional structures called for in that regard — such as national contact points — 
could be harnessed for implementing extradition in the context of crimes against 
humanity. 
84. At the same time, some modifications to the text of article 44 of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption are warranted in the context of crimes 
against humanity. Certain stylistic changes are necessary for consistency with the 
draft articles already provisionally adopted, such as changing: “article” to “draft 
article”; “this Convention” to “the present draft articles”; “domestic law” to 
“national law”; and “State Party” to “State”. Likewise, in various places, additional 
changes are appropriate so as to clarify that the offences in question are those 
referred to in draft article 5.  
85. A few substantive changes are also necessary. First, as explained above, the 
first three paragraphs of article 44 of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption on dual criminality are unnecessary and therefore need not be included 
in the proposed draft article 11.  
86. Second, the political offence exception contained in article 44, paragraph 4, of 
the Convention should be broadened along the lines of article 13, paragraph 1, of 
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, and should be placed in its own subparagraph in draft article 11 (see 
proposed draft article 11, paragraph 2, below). 
87. Third, article 44, paragraph 6 (a), of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption should be reformulated so that the default rule, if a State does not act, is 
that the State shall use the present draft articles as the legal basis for cooperation on 
extradition with other States. The State may avoid such an outcome if it so informs 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time of deposit of its instrument 
of ratification, acceptance or approval of, or accession to the present draft articles 
(see proposed draft article 11, paragraph 4 (a), below). 
88. Fourth, article 44 of the Convention does not contain a paragraph providing 
that, if necessary, the offences shall be treated, for the purposes o f extradition 
between States, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they 
occurred, but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction 
under proposed draft article 6. For reasons previously explained, such a paragraph 
should be added to draft article 11 (see proposed draft article 11, paragraph 8, 
below). 
__________________ 
 
133
 See the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (footnote 35 above). 
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89. Fifth, article 44, paragraph 10, of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption overlaps with current draft article 8, paragraph 1, and therefore should 
not be included in draft article 11.  
90. Sixth, article 44, paragraph 11, of the Convention is subsumed within current 
draft article 9, and therefore should not be included in draft article 11.  
91. Seventh, article 44, paragraph 14, of the Convention overlaps with current 
draft article 10, and therefore should not be included in draft article 11.  
92. Finally, article 44, paragraph 16, of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption contains a provision that precludes a State party from refusing to 
extradite on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal 
matters, which is appropriate in the context of corruption (as well as transnational 
organized crime), where the offence may include issues such as evasion of taxes, 
customs or duties. However, such matters are not part of the offence of crimes 
against humanity, and therefore inclusion of such a provision does not appear 
warranted for a draft article on extradition.  
93. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
   Draft article 11. Extradition 
 
 1. Each of the offences referred to in draft article 5 shall be deemed to be 
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between 
States. States undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in 
every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.  
 2. For the purposes of extradition between States, an offence referred to in 
draft article 5 shall not be regarded as a political offence or as an offence 
connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition based on such an offence may 
not be refused on these grounds alone.  
 3. If a State that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
receives a request for extradition from another State with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may consider the present draft articles as the legal basis 
for extradition in respect of any offence referred to in draft article 5.  
 4. A State that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
shall: 
  (a) use the present draft articles as the legal basis for cooperation on 
extradition with other States, unless it informs the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to the contrary at the time of deposit of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval of, or accession to the present draft 
articles; and 
  (b) if it does not use the present draft articles as the legal basis for 
cooperation on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on 
extradition with other States to the present draft articles in order to implement 
this draft article. 
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 5. States that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall recognize offences to which this draft article applies as 
extraditable offences between themselves.  
 6. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the national 
law of the requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter 
alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition 
and the grounds upon which the requested State may refuse extradition.  
 7. States shall, subject to their national law, endeavour to expedite 
extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating 
thereto in respect of any offence referred to in draft article 5.  
 8. If necessary, the offences set forth in draft article 5 shall be treated, for 
the purposes of extradition between States, as if they had been committed not 
only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States 
that have established jurisdiction in accordance with draft article 6, 
paragraph 1. 
 9. Whenever a State is permitted under its national law to extradite or 
otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon condition that the person 
will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the 
trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the person was 
sought and that State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree 
with this option and other terms that they may deem appropriate, such 
conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the 
obligation set forth in draft article 9.  
 10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused 
because the person sought is a national of the requested State, the requested 
State shall, if its national law so permits and in conformity with the 
requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting State, consider 
the enforcement of the sentence imposed under the national law of the 
requesting State or the remainder thereof.  
 11. Nothing in the present draft articles shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for 
believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting  or 
punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, 
ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would 
cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons.  
 12. Before refusing extradition, the requested State shall, where appropriate, 
consult with the requesting State to provide it with ample opportunity to 
present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation.  
 13. States shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or 
arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.  
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Chapter II 
  Non-refoulement 
 
 
 A. Principle of non-refoulement 
 
 
94. The principle of non-refoulement obligates a State not to return an individual 
to another State when there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she will 
be in danger of persecution or other specified harm, such as torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.134 The principle was incorporated into treaties in 
the twentieth century, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV),135 but is most commonly 
associated with international refugee law and, in particular, article 33 of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which reads:  
 Article 33. Prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) 
 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.  
 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a 
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country.136  
95. Other conventions addressing refugees have incorporated the principle in 
similar terms to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, including the 
1969 OAU [Organization of African Union] Convention governing the specific 
__________________ 
 134 See, generally, F. de Weck, Non-Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the UN Convention against Torture, Leiden, Brill/Nijhoff, 2016. 
 
135
 Article 45 reads, in relevant part: “In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to 
a country where he or she may have a reason to fear prosecution for his or her political opinions 
or religious beliefs.” Recent International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims maintains 
that “[c]ommon Article 3 does not contain an explicit prohibition of refoulement. However, in 
the ICRC’s view, the categorical prohibitions in common Article 3 would also prohibit a transfer 
of persons to places or authorities where there are substantial grounds for believing that they 
will be in danger of being subjected to violence to life and person, such as murder or torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment” (ICRC, Commentary of 2016, Article 3: Conflicts not of an 
international character, available from https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/  
Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC, 
§ 710). 
 
136
 The same obligation applies under the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees by virtue 
of article I, paragraph 1, of that Protocol. Unlike various other provisions in the Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, application of article 33 is not dependent on the lawful 
residence of a refugee in the territory of a contracting State. On whether article 33 governs a 
State Party’s conduct even outside its territory, see Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations 
under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Advisory 
opinion of 26 January 2007, available from www.refworld.org/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf.  
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aspects of refugee problems in Africa,137 as have some non-binding instruments.138 
The principle, as elucidated in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
has also been applied more broadly with respect to aliens (whether or not  they are 
refugees),139 such as in the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of 
San José, Costa Rica”140 and the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights,141 and was addressed in the Commission’s 2014 draft articles on the 
expulsion of aliens.142  
96. The principle of non-refoulement is often reflected in general extradition 
treaties, by stating that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite an alleged offender if the requested State party has 
substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of 
persecuting the alleged offender on specified grounds. The proposed draft article 11, 
paragraph 11, discussed in the preceding chapter is a provision of this type.  
97. The principle of non-refoulement is also incorporated in treaties addressing 
particular crimes, such as torture or enforced disappearance, which may be seen as 
an aspect of prevention of the crime. When this occurs, such treaties prohibit the 
return of any person — whether the person is an alleged offender or not, and 
whether or not the return is in the context of extradition — to another State when 
__________________ 
 
137
 Art. II, para. 3 (“No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection 
at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory 
where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Ar ticle 
I, paragraphs 1 and 2”). 
 
138
 See, for example, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted at the Colloquium on 
the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama: Legal and 
Humanitarian Problems, held in Cartagena, Colombia, 19–22 November 1984, available from 
www.oas.org/dil/1984_Cartagena_Declaration_on_Refugees.pdf, conclusion 5 (“To reiterate the 
importance and meaning of the principle of non-refoulement (including the prohibition of 
rejection at the frontier) as a corner-stone of the international protection of refugees …”).  
 
139
 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967; article III, 
paragraph 1, of the “Final Text of the AALCO’s 1966 Bangkok Principles on the Status and 
Treatment of Refugees”, adopted at the Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization’s 40th 
session held in New Delhi on 24 June 2001, available from 
www.aalco.int/Final%20text%20of%20Bangkok%20Principles.pdf (“No one seeking asylum in 
accordance with these Principles shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier, 
return or expulsion which would result in his life or freedom being threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion”); and Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(84)1 on the 
Protection of persons satisfying the criteria in the Geneva Convention who are not formally 
recognised as refugees, adopted on 25 January 1984 (“the principle of non-refoulement has been 
recognised as a general principle applicable to all persons”). 
 
140
 Art. 22, para. 8 (“In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of 
whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom 
is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status or political 
opinions”).  
 
141
 Art. 12, para. 3 (“Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain 
asylum in other countries in accordance with the law of those countries and international 
conventions”).  
 
142
 Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part Two), art. 23, para. 1 (“No alien shall be expelled to a State 
where his or her life would be threatened on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other 
status, or any other ground impermissible under international law”).  
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there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she will be in danger of being 
subjected to the crime that is the subject matter of the treaty. For example, article 3 
of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment reads: 
 1. No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture.  
 2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, 
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.  
98. Paragraph 1 captures the principle of non-refoulement in the context of the 
subject of the Convention (torture). This Convention modelled its language on the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, but added the additional element of 
extradition so as to “cover all possible measures by which a person is physically 
transferred to another State”.143 A similar article is included in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.144 
99. The Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have 
construed the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
contained in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 145 and the 
1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights), respectively, 146 as implicitly imposing an 
__________________ 
 
143
 D. Weissbrodt and I. Hörtreiter, “The principle of non-refoulement: article 3 of the Convention 
Against Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in comparison with the non-refoulement provisions of other international human 
rights treaties”, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5 (1999), pp. 7–8.  
 
144
 Art. 19, para. 2 (“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”). See also Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted, Official Journal of the European Union, No. L 337, 20 December 2011, p. 9, 
articles 2, paragraph (f), and 15 (indicating that a person is entitled to protection from return 
when “substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned … would 
face a real risk of suffering serious harm”, and “[s]erious harm consists of: (a) the death penalty 
or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in 
the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason 
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”). 
 
145
 See the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 20 (1992) on the prohibition of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh session, Supplement No. 40 
(A/47/40), paragraph 9 (“States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of 
their extradition, expulsion or refoulement”).  
 
146
 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996, 
European Court of Human Rights, para. 80 (“whenever substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 [the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment] if removed to 
another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such 
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obligation of non-refoulement even though these conventions contain no such 
express obligation.  
100. The standard to be applied when implementing such an obligation has been 
addressed by relevant committees and courts. The Committee Against Torture, in 
considering communications alleging that a State violated article 3, has stated that 
in determining whether there are “substantial grounds” for believing that a person 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, it has to determine whether the 
return “would have the foreseeable consequence of exposing him to a real and 
personal risk of being arrested and tortured”.147 The Human Rights Committee 
similarly concluded that States must refrain from exposing individuals to a “real 
risk” of violations of their rights under the Covenant. 148 More recently, the Human 
Rights Committee has held that a State has an obligation “not to extradite, deport, 
expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that 
contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant”.149 The European Court of Human 
Rights has also found that a State’s responsibility exists where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjecte d to 
treatment contrary to article 3.150 
101. There is no precise definition of what constitutes a “real risk”. The Committee 
Against Torture has stated that the risk must be assessed on grounds that “go beyond 
mere theory or suspicion”, though “the risk does not have to meet the test of being 
highly probable”.151 The European Court of Human Rights has also confirmed that a 
real risk is something more than a mere possibility but something less than more 
likely than not.152 
102. The European Court of Human Rights has stressed that the examination of 
evidence of a real risk must be “rigorous”.153 In determining whether substantial 
__________________ 
treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion”).  
 
147
 Aemei v. Switzerland, Communication No. 34/1995, Report of the Committee against Torture, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second session, Supplement No. 44 (A/52/44), 
Annex V.B.2, para. 9.5. See also A. R. J. v. Australia, Communication No. 692/1996, Report of 
the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second session, 
Supplement No. 40 (A/52/40), Annex VI.T, paragraph 6.14 (finding that the risk of torture must 
be “the necessary and foreseeable consequence of deportation”).  
 
148
 Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 40 (A/49/40), 
Annex IX.CC, para. 14.1. 
 
149
 See general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on 
States parties to the Covenant, Report of the Human Rights Committee, vol. I , Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth session, Supplement No. 40 (A/59/40), Annex III, 
paragraph 12. 
 
150
 See Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgement of 7 July 1989, 
European Court of Human Rights, Judgments and Decisions: Series A , vol. 161, paragraph 88; 
and Chahal v. the United Kingdom (footnote 146 above), paragraph 74. 
 
151
 General comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3, Report of the Committee 
Against Torture, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third session, Supplement No. 
44 (A/53/44), Annex IX, para. 6.  
 
152
 Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, Judgment of 28 February 2008, European Court of 
Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2008 , paras. 131 and 140.  
 
153
 Ibid., para. 128.  
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grounds have been shown for believing that a real risk of treatment contrary to 
article 3 exists, the evidence of the risk “must be assessed primarily with reference 
to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting 
State at the time of the expulsion”,154 though regard can be had to information that 
comes to light subsequently.155 Adopting the same approach, the Human Rights 
Committee has further affirmed that there does not need to be “proof of actual 
torture having subsequently occurred although information as to subsequent events 
is relevant to the assessment of initial risk”.156 In determining the risk of such 
treatment, all relevant factors should be considered and “[t]he existence of 
assurances, their content and the existence and implementation of enforcement 
mechanisms are all elements which are relevant to the overall determination of 
whether, in fact, a real risk of proscribed ill-treatment existed”.157 The Committee 
Against Torture has a non-exhaustive list of seven elements to be considered by a 
State when determining if return is permissible.158 
103. Article 16 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance uses virtually the same language as the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
but replaces “torture” with “enforced disappearance”, adds the terms “or she” and 
“surrender”, and adds at the end “or of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law”. It reads: 
 1. No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”), surrender or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance.  
 2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, 
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights or of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. 159 
__________________ 
 
154
 Ibid., para. 133.  
 
155
 El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , Application no. 39630/09, Judgment of 
13 December 2012, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2012, para. 214. 
 
156
 Maksudov and others v. Kyrgyzstan, Communications Nos. 1461/2006, 1462/2006, 1476/2006 
and 1477/2006, Report of the Human Rights Committee, vol. II, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Sixty-third session, Supplement No. 40 (A/63/40), Annex V.W, para. 12.4.  
 
157
 Ibid.  
 
158
 General comment No. 1 (see footnote 151 above), para. 8. The list contains the following 
elements: (a) where the State concerned is one for which there is evidence of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights; (b) whether the individual has been 
tortured or maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity in the past; (c) whether there is medical or 
other independent evidence to support a claim that the individual has been tortured or maltreated 
in the past; (d) whether the internal situation with respect to human rights in the State concerned 
has changed; (e) whether the individual has engaged in political or other activity within or 
outside the State concerned which would make him particularly vulnerable to the risk of being 
placed in danger of torture; (f) whether there is any evidence as to the credibility of the 
individual; and (g) whether there are any factual inconsistencies in the individual’s claim.  
 
159
 For an analysis, see S. McCrory, “The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), pp. 554–555.  
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104. During the drafting of the International Convention for the Protection o f All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, some delegations considered that paragraph 
1 could be written more broadly to address return when there was a danger of any 
serious human rights violation. Yet most “delegations considered that the obligation 
not to return a person … should apply only in cases where a risk of enforced 
disappearance existed rather than a risk of serious human rights violations, which 
was too broad a formula”.160 Consequently, the Convention only seeks to address 
non-refoulement of persons when they face the risk of enforced disappearance; the 
risk that they will face other human rights violations is left to be regulated by other 
treaties and customary international law.  
105. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains exceptions to the 
non-refoulement obligation so as to allow return where the person had committed a 
crime or presented a serious security risk. Treaties since that time, however, have 
not included such exceptions, treating the obligation as absolute in nature.161 Indeed, 
the non-refoulement obligation is viewed as non-derogable.162  
 
 
 B. Draft article 12. Non-refoulement 
 
 
106. In light of the above, a draft article on non-refoulement appears warranted for 
the present draft articles, which could be based on the text contained in the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance quoted in paragraph 103 above. Paragraph 1 would focus on stating 
the principle of non-refoulement in the context of a danger of being subjected to a 
crime against humanity. Notably, use of the phrase “to another State” would not 
limit the provision to situations where an official of a foreign Government may 
commit the crime against humanity; rather, the danger may alternatively exist with 
respect to non-State actors in the other State. Paragraph 2 would instruct States 
parties to look at all relevant considerations, while indicating, on a non -exclusive 
basis, particular considerations of relevance. 
107. The following draft article is proposed:  
 
__________________ 
 
160
 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the inter-sessional open-ended working group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2003/71), para. 49.  
 
161
 See, for example, Maksudov and others v. Kyrgyzstan (footnote 156 above), paragraph 12.4 
(finding that the prohibition on return in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights “should not be subject to any balancing with considerations of national security or the 
type of criminal conduct an individual is accused or suspected of”). See also Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012, 
European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2012, paragraph 185; 
and Gorki Ernesto Tapia Paez v. Sweden, Communication No. 39/1996, Report of the 
Committee Against Torture, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second session, 
Supplement No. 44 (A/52/44), Annex V, paragraph 14.5.  
 
162
 Report of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the work of its forty-seventh session, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No. 12 (A/51/12/Add.1), para. 21 (i) (“recalls 
that the principle of non-refoulement is not subject to derogation”); and General Assembly 
resolution 51/75 of 12 February 1997, para. 3 (“calls upon all States … to respect scrupulously 
the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, which is not subject to derogation”).  
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   Draft article 12. Non-refoulement 
 
 1. No State shall expel, return (refouler), surrender or extradite a person to 
territory under the jurisdiction of another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a 
crime against humanity.  
 2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, 
including, where applicable, the existence in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights or of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.  
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Chapter III 
  Mutual legal assistance 
 
 
108. Following the occurrence of a crime against humanity, a State conducting an 
investigation or prosecution in relation to the offences referred to in draft article 5 
may wish to seek assistance from another State in gathering information and 
evidence, including through documents, sworn declarations and oral testimony by 
victims or witnesses. Cooperation on such matters, which is typically undertaken on 
a basis of reciprocity, is referred to as “mutual legal assistance”.163 
109. At present, there is no global or regional treaty addressing mutual legal 
assistance specifically in the context of crimes against humanity. Rather, to the 
extent that cooperation of this kind occurs with respect to crimes against humanity, 
it takes place through voluntary cooperation by States as a matter of comity or, if 
they exist, bilateral or multilateral treaties addressing mutual legal assistance with 
respect to crimes generally (referred to as mutual legal assistance treaties). Having a 
legal obligation to provide such assistance is considered preferable, as it provides a 
more predictable framework for cooperation and a structure for clarifying the mode 
of cooperation.164 
110. While there are examples of multilateral mutual legal assistance treaties at the 
regional level,165 there is no global mutual legal assistance treaty, and most 
cooperation takes place pursuant to agreements concluded by States on a bilateral 
basis.166 It is common for multilateral mutual legal assistance treaties  to give 
deference to any existing bilateral agreement between the two States concerned, 
because such an agreement is likely to be more detailed and calibrated to take 
account of any peculiarities of the States’ national legal systems.167 
111. Provisions contained in bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties tend to be 
similar, in part due to the approach by States of using the formula contained in 
previously concluded bilateral agreements and in part due to the influence of 
“model” treaties or national laws.168 Notably, in 1990, the General Assembly 
adopted a Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Optional 
Protocol to the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters concerning 
__________________ 
 
163
 See generally M. C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law , 2nd rev. ed., 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 504–506; T. R. Salomon, “Mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (January 2013); and 
J. van der Sanden and W. J. van der Wolf (eds.), Mutual Legal Assistance in International 
Criminal Matters, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012.  
 
164
 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (footnote above), pp. 504–506. 
 
165
 See, for example, the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; the 
1992 Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; the 2000 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union (supplement to the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters and the 1978 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters); and the [ASEAN] Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters.  
 
166
 For a map displaying existing bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties between States, see 
Access Now, “Mutual legal assistance treaties”, available from https://mlat.info.  
 
167
 See Olson (footnote 68 above), p. 338. 
 
168
 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law  (footnote 163 above), p. 506. 
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the proceeds of crime,169 characterizing it “as a useful framework that could be of 
assistance to States interested in negotiating and concluding bilateral agreements 
aimed at improving co-operation in matters of crime prevention and criminal 
justice”.170 In 2007, the UNODC also established a Model Law on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, which could be adopted by States at the national 
level.171  
112. While mutual legal assistance relating to crimes against humanity can occur 
through existing multilateral and bilateral mutual legal assistance treat ies, in many 
instances there is no such treaty between the requesting and requested States. 172 As 
is the case for extradition (discussed above in chapter I), a State often has no treaty 
relationship with a large number of other States on mutual legal assistance, so that 
when cooperation is needed with respect to a crime against humanity there is no 
international legal instrument in place to address the matter.  
113. The absence of multilateral legal obligations for mutual legal assistance with 
respect to crimes against humanity has resulted in calls for a provision on mutual 
legal assistance to be added to a new global convention on crimes against 
humanity.173 During the Sixth Committee debates in 2015 and 2016, States 
expressed the view that provisions on mutual legal assistance for crimes against 
humanity at the international level were lacking and should be included in the 
present topic.174 
114. In developing such a draft article, guidance may be found in existing treaties 
that address a specific type of crime, such as torture or corruption. Generally 
speaking, such treaties either contain a less detailed “short-form” article or a more 
detailed “long-form” article on mutual legal assistance. Both forms establish the 
core obligation to cooperate, but the latter provides much greater detail as to how 
such cooperation is to operate. Indeed, the long-form article contains what might be 
__________________ 
 
169
 Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, General Assembly resolution 45/117 of 
14 December 1990, Annex.  
 
170
 Ibid., para. 1. See also UNODC, Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Extradition and on 
the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Part One: Revised Manual on the 
Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, p. 65, available from 
www.unodc.org/pdf/model_treaty_extradition_revised_manual.pdf.   
 
171
 See UNODC, Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, available from 
www.unodc.org/pdf/legal_advisory/Model%20Law%20on%20MLA%202007.pdf.  
 
172
 See the Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, 1998, done at Vienna on 20 December 1988 (E/CN.7/590), pp. 
184–185, para. 7.22 (finding that “[t]here are still … many States that are not parties to general 
mutual legal assistance treaties and many circumstances in which no bilateral treaty governs the 
relationship between the pair of States concerned in a particular matter”). See also Olson 
(footnote 68 above), p. 336. 
 
173
 Ibid. 
 
174
 See, for example, Switzerland, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth session, 
Sixth Committee, 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), paragraph 20 (“Key elements that future draft 
articles should address included provisions on mutual legal assistance requiring States to 
cooperate while respecting existing constraints in national systems”); and the Netherlands, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventy-first session, Sixth Committee, 26th meeting 
(A/C.6/71/SR.26), paragraph 40 (“Another matter of concern to her delegation was that a 
convention on the prohibition of crimes against humanity should include provisions on mutual 
legal cooperation and assistance between States”).  
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referred to as a “mini mutual legal assistance treaty”, setting forth the key 
provisions for mutual legal assistance which are to be used if the two States 
concerned have no other multilateral or bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in 
force between them.  
 
 
 A. Short-form mutual legal assistance article 
 
 
115. The short-form mutual legal assistance article contained in some treaties  
addressing crimes at the national level is brief. Such an article focuses on requiring 
the greatest measure of cooperation between States, while not providing any details 
as to how such cooperation should operate, and calls for the application of any 
existing mutual legal assistance treaties between the States concerned. For example, 
article 9 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment provides: 
 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance 
in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the 
offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their 
disposal necessary for the proceedings.  
 2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of this 
article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may 
exist between them.  
116. Similarly, article 10 of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings provides: 
 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance 
in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings 
brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in 
obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.  
 2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 in 
conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance 
that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, 
States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their 
domestic law.  
117. The most recent example of this type of provision is found in article 14 of the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons fro m Enforced 
Disappearance, which states: 
 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of mutual 
legal assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of 
an offence of enforced disappearance, including the supply of all evidence at 
their disposal that is necessary for the proceedings.  
 2. Such mutual legal assistance shall be subject to the conditions provided 
for by the domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable treaties 
on mutual legal assistance, including, in particular, the conditions in relation to 
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the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse to grant mutual 
legal assistance or may make it subject to conditions.  175 
118. Treaties with similar short-form articles include: the Convention for the 
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 10); the Convention on the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents (art. 10);176 the 1996 Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption (art. XIV); the 2002 Inter-American Convention against 
Terrorism (art. 9); and the 2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (art. 18).  
 
 
 B. Long-form mutual legal assistance article 
 
 
119. While a short-form article for mutual legal assistance appears in several 
conventions, States have also been attracted to a long -form article for mutual legal 
assistance, which contains much more detail as to how such assistance should 
operate.  
120. Several global treaties contain such a long-form article, including: the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (art. 7); the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
__________________ 
 
175
 The first version of this article appeared in the 1998 draft at article 8, and read as follows:  
“1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of legal assistance in connection 
with any criminal investigation or proceedings relating to the offence of forced disappearance, 
including the supply of all the evidence at their disposal that is necessary for the proceedings. 
2. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, and shall afford one another the greatest 
measure of legal assistance in the search for, location, release and rescue of disappeared persons 
or, in the event of death, in the return of their remains. 3. States Parties shall carry out their 
obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, without prejudice to the obligations arising 
from any treaties on mutual legal assistance that may exist between them” (Commission on 
Human Rights, Report of the sessional working group on the administration of justice, 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/19, Annex), p. 25). A number of delegations supported the deletion of 
paragraph 3 of draft article 8, which was considered vague and duplicative of language in 
paragraph 2 (see the Report of the inter-sessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft 
legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced 
disappearance (footnote 44 above), p. 19 (paragraph 3 dealt with “refusal to provide legal 
assistance on grounds related to sovereignty, security, public order or other essential interests of 
the requested State”)). The phrase “judicial assistance” was replaced with “legal assistance” to 
accord with evolving usage (Commission on Human Rights, Report of the inter-sessional open-
ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection 
of all persons from enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2005/66), para. 69; see also the Revised 
Manual on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 170 above), 
paragraphs 6–7 (discussing the use of “mutual assistance” instead of “judicial assistance” to 
avoid problems resulting from differences in legal systems)).  
 
176
 Article 10 of this convention was substantially based, with some modification, on article 10 of 
the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft . See Yearbook … 1972, vol. 
II, p. 321, paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 10 (“Article 10 substantially reproduces 
the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention …  the phrase ‘including the supply of all 
evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings’ has been added in order to ensure that 
the article is not given a limited construction on the basis of the narrow technical meaning 
sometimes attributed to the expression ‘mutual judicial assistance’”).  
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Financing of Terrorism;177 the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (art. 18); and the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(art. 46).  
121. The move towards use of the long-form article is apparent from the drafting 
history of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
Initially, the article on mutual legal assistance was a two -paragraph provision 
similar to a short-form article.178 States decided early on, however, that this short-
form article should be replaced with a much more detailed article based on article 7 
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances.179 The drafters of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption similarly opted to use a detailed provision and reproduced, nearly in its 
entirety, article 18 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. Article 46 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
on mutual legal assistance, consists of 30 paragraphs and reads as fol lows: 
 1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation 
to the offences covered by this Convention.  
 2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible 
under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested 
State Party with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held 
liable in accordance with article 26 of this Convention in the requesting State 
Party. 
 3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may 
be requested for any of the following purposes:  
  (a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; 
   (b) Effecting service of judicial documents;  
   (c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing;  
   (d) Examining objects and sites; 
  (e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;  
  (f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and 
records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records;  
__________________ 
 
177
 Art. 7, para. 5, and arts. 12–16. The mutual legal assistance provisions in the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism are scattered among several 
articles and mutual legal assistance is addressed in several provisions which concern both 
mutual assistance and extradition. The trend in more recent conventions, such as the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, is to consolidate mutual legal assistance provisions into a single article (see 
articles 18 and 46, respectively). 
 
178
 See Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Question of the elaboration of an 
international convention against transnational organized crime (E/CN.15/1997/7/Add.1), p. 15; 
and McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 201.  
 
179
 See Question of the elaboration of an international convention against transnational organized 
crime (footnote above), p. 15 (suggestions of Australia and Austria).  
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  (g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities 
or other things for evidentiary purposes;  
  (h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting 
State Party; 
  (i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law 
of the requested State Party;  
  (j) Identifying, freezing and tracing proceeds of crime in accordance 
with the provisions of chapter V of this Convention; 
  (k) The recovery of assets, in accordance with the provisions of  
chapter V of this Convention. 
  4. Without prejudice to domestic law, the competent authorities of a State 
Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to criminal 
matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe that 
such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully 
concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings or could result in a request 
formulated by the latter State Party pursuant to this Convention.  
 5. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 4 of this article 
shall be without prejudice to inquiries and criminal proceedings in the State of 
the competent authorities providing the information. The competent authorities 
receiving the information shall comply with a request that said information 
remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on its use. However, 
this shall not prevent the receiving State Party from disclosing in its 
proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a 
case, the receiving State Party shall notify the transmitting State Party prior to 
the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting Stat e Party. If, 
in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving State Party 
shall inform the transmitting State Party of the disclosure without delay.  
 6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any 
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or 
in part, mutual legal assistance.  
 7. Paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to 
this article if the States Parties in question are not bound by a tr eaty of mutual 
legal assistance. If those States Parties are bound by such a treaty, the 
corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the States Parties 
agree to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article in lieu thereof. States Parties 
are strongly encouraged to apply those paragraphs if they facilitate 
cooperation. 
 8. States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant 
to this article on the ground of bank secrecy.  
 9. (a)  A requested State Party, in responding to a request for assistance 
pursuant to this article in the absence of dual criminality, shall take into 
account the purposes of this Convention, as set forth in article 1;  
  (b) States Parties may decline to render assistance pursuant to this 
article on the ground of absence of dual criminality. However, a requested 
State Party shall, where consistent with the basic concepts of its legal system, 
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render assistance that does not involve coercive action. Such assistance may 
be refused when requests involve matters of a de minimis nature or matters for 
which the cooperation or assistance sought is available under other provisions 
of this Convention; 
  (c) Each State Party may consider adopting such measures as may be 
necessary to enable it to provide a wider scope of assistance pursuant to this 
article in the absence of dual criminality.  
 10. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of 
one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for 
purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in 
obtaining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in 
relation to offences covered by this Convention may be transferred if the 
following conditions are met: 
   (a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent; 
  (b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to 
such conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.  
  11. For the purposes of paragraph 10 of this article:  
  (a) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall have the 
authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless 
otherwise requested or authorized by the State Party from which the person 
was transferred; 
  (b) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall without 
delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State 
Party from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as 
otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States Parties;  
  (c) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall not require 
the State Party from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition 
proceedings for the return of the person;  
  (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the 
sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for 
time spent in the custody of the State Party to which he or she was transferred.  
 12. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in 
accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this article so agrees, that person, 
whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or 
subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory 
of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or 
convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from 
which he or she was transferred.  
 13. Each State Party shall designate a central authority that shall have the 
responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and 
either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for 
execution. Where a State Party has a special region or territory with a separate 
system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority 
that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities 
shall ensure the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests 
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received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent 
authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of 
the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at 
the time each State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval of or accession to this Convention. Requests for mutual legal 
assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the 
central authorities designated by the States Parties. This requirement shall be 
without prejudice to the right of a State Party to require that such requests and 
communications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent 
circumstances, where the States Parties agree, through the International 
Criminal Police Organization, if possible.  
 14. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means 
capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the 
requested State Party, under conditions allowing that State Party to establish 
authenticity. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of 
the language or languages acceptable to each State Party at the time it deposits 
its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this 
Convention. In urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States Parties, 
requests may be made orally but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.  
 15. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:  
  (a) The identity of the authority making the request; 
  (b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of 
the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;  
  (c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for 
the purpose of service of judicial documents;  
  (d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular 
procedure that the requesting State Party wishes to be followed;  
  (e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person 
concerned; and 
  (f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is 
sought. 
 16. The requested State Party may request additional information when it 
appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its 
domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution.  
 17. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of the 
requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the 
requested State Party and where possible, in accordance with the procedures 
specified in the request. 
 18. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of 
domestic law, when an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to 
be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State 
Party, the first State Party may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing 
to take place by videoconference if it is not possible or desirable for the 
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individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting 
State Party. States Parties may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a 
judicial authority of the requesting State Party and attended by a judicial 
authority of the requested State Party. 
 19. The requesting State Party shall not transmit or use information or 
evidence furnished by the requested State Party for investigations, 
prosecutions or judicial proceedings other than those stated in the request 
without the prior consent of the requested State Party. Nothing in this 
paragraph shall prevent the requesting State Party from disclosing in its 
proceedings information or evidence that is exculpatory to an accused person. 
In the latter case, the requesting State Party shall notify the requested State 
Party prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the requested 
State Party. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the 
requesting State Party shall inform the requested State Party of the disclosure 
without delay. 
 20. The requesting State Party may require that the requested State Party 
keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent 
necessary to execute the request. If the requested State Party cannot comply 
with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting 
State Party. 
 21. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:  
  (a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this 
article; 
  (b) If the requested State Party considers that execution of the request 
is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential 
interests; 
  (c) If the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited 
by its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any 
similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceedings under their own jurisdiction;  
  (d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State 
Party relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted. 
 22. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the 
sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.  
 23. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.  
 24. The requested State Party shall execute the request for mutual legal 
assistance as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any 
deadlines suggested by the requesting State Party and for which reasons are 
given, preferably in the request. The requesting State Party may make 
reasonable requests for information on the status and progress of measures 
taken by the requested State Party to satisfy its request. The requested State 
Party shall respond to reasonable requests by the requesting State Party on the 
status, and progress in its handling, of the request. The requesting State Party 
shall promptly inform the requested State Party when the assistance sought is 
no longer required. 
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 25. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State Party 
on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceeding. 
 26. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 21 of this article or 
postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 25 of this article,  the requested 
State Party shall consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether 
assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems 
necessary. If the requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those 
conditions, it shall comply with the conditions.  
 27. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 12 of this article, a 
witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State 
Party, consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an 
investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the 
requesting State Party shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected 
to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect 
of acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory 
of the requested State Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, 
expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days or 
for any period agreed upon by the States Parties from the date on which he or 
she has been officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required 
by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless 
remained voluntarily in the territory of the requesting  State Party or, having 
left it, has returned of his or her own free will.  
 28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested 
State Party, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned. If 
expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to 
fulfil the request, the States Parties shall consult to determine the terms and 
conditions under which the request will be executed, as well as the manner in 
which the costs shall be borne. 
 29. The requested State Party: 
  (a) Shall provide to the requesting State Party copies of government 
records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law 
are available to the general public;  
  (b) May, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State Party in 
whole, in part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of 
any government records, documents or information in its possession that under 
its domestic law are not available to the general public.  
 30. States Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would 
serve the purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this 
article. 
122. Such a long-form article would appear best suited for draft articles on crimes 
against humanity, for several reasons. First, it provides much more guidance to 
States with respect to mutual legal assistance and allows them to rely upon the 
provisions of the article in the absence of any mutual legal assistance treaty between 
the States concerned. Second, long-form articles have been viewed by States as 
necessary in the context of crime prevention and punishment in important areas of 
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transnational criminal law.180 Third, long-form articles have been accepted in 
practice by States. For example, the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime has 187 States parties and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption has 181 States parties. No State party has filed a 
reservation objecting to the language or content of the mutual legal assistance 
article in either convention.181 Additionally, the provisions of long-form mutual 
legal assistance treaty articles are well understood by States with the aid of 
numerous guides and other resources, such as those by UNODC, that have been 
developed to aid in the implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption.182  
123. To that end, the draft article proposed at the conclusion of this chapter is 
largely modelled on article 46 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
with some changes as noted below. The following subsections discuss the provisions 
of article 46 of that Convention, grouped into three categories: (1) the general 
obligation to afford mutual legal assistance; (2) cooperation when a mutual legal 
assistance treaty exists between the two States concerned; and (3) cooperation when 
a mutual legal assistance treaty does not exist between the two States concerned. 
 
 1. General obligation to afford mutual legal assistance  
 
124. Article 46, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
establishes a general obligation for States parties to “afford one another the widest 
__________________ 
 
180
 The Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was 
negotiated within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at the request of the General Assembly 
and the Economic and Social Council. The International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism was developed by an ad hoc committee established by the General 
Assembly pursuant to its resolutions 53/108 of 8 December 1998 and 51/210 of 17 December 
1996. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption were negotiated within the Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, which was established by the Economic and Social Council in 
its resolution 1992/1 of 6 February 1992 according to the request of the General Assembly in its 
resolution 46/152 of 18 December 1991, as one of its functional commissions. This Commission 
acts as the principal policymaking body of the United Nations in the field of crime prevention 
and criminal justice. 
 
181
 States parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime made 
declarations to article 18, paragraphs 13 and 14, to notify the Secretary-General of the 
designated central authority and the preferred language of requests. States similarly made 
declarations to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, as required under article 46, 
paragraphs 13 and 14. 
 
182
 See, for example, the Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (footnote 35 
above); the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (ibid.); the Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(ibid.); the Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiation for the Elaboration of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (ibid.); and the Interpretative notes for the official records 
(travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto (ibid.).  
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measure of mutual legal assistance”183 with respect to offences arising under that 
Convention. States parties are obligated to afford each other such assistance not just 
in “investigations” but also in “prosecutions” and “judicial proceedings”. Such an 
obligation is intended to ensure that the broader enforcement goal of the treaty is 
furthered by comprehensive cooperation among all States parties that might possess 
relevant information and evidence with respect to the offence. 184 Paragraph 1 
provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal 
assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 1, below).   
125. Article 46, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
establishes a general obligation upon States parties also to afford such cooperation 
with respect to offences for which a “legal person” may be held liable, but only “to 
the fullest extent possible under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and 
arrangements of the requested State Party”.185 This qualification is a recognition that 
national legal systems differ considerably in their treatment of legal persons in 
relation to crimes, and therefore mutual legal assistance in this context must be 
contingent on the extent to which such cooperation is possible under the requested 
State party’s national law in a criminal case.186 Paragraph 2 provides a suitable basis 
for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft 
article 13, paragraph 2, below).  
__________________ 
 
183
 See also the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, article 9, paragraph 1 (“States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure 
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences 
referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the 
proceedings”); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
article 12, paragraph 1 (“States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure  of 
assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings in 
respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their 
possession necessary for the proceedings”); and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 1 (“States Parties shall afford one another 
the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in relation to the offences covered by this Convention”).  
 
184
 Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 321, paragraph (2) of the commentary to article 10 (“Clearly if the 
alleged offender is to be tried in a State other than that in which the crime was committed it will 
be necessary to make testimony available to the court hearing the case and in such form as the 
law of that State requires. In addition, part of the required evidence may be located in third 
States. Consequently the obligation is imposed upon all States party”).  
 
185
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 2 (identical language). During the drafting of that Convention, there was general 
support for the inclusion of a provision on mutual legal assistance concerning legal per sons, 
even though some delegations considered that the matter was already covered under paragraph 
1. See McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 207–208. By contrast, the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism does not obligate States to afford assistance in 
cases involving legal persons, but does provide in article 12, paragraph 4 that “[e]ach State 
Party may give consideration to establishing mechanisms to share with other States Parties 
information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability pursuant to 
article 5 [on liability of legal persons]”.  
 
186
 In this regard, reference might be made to the differences in national legal systems identified 
with respect to draft article 5, paragraph 7.  
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126. Article 46, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
lists several broad types of assistance that may be requested by a State party. 187 
These types of assistance are drafted in broad terms and, in most respects, replicate 
types of assistance listed in other multilateral188 and many bilateral189 extradition 
treaties. Indeed, such terms are broad enough to encompass the range of assistance 
that might be relevant for the investigation and prosecution of a crime against 
humanity, including the seeking of police and security agency records; court files; 
__________________ 
 
187
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraphs 2–3 (containing substantially similar language to 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption); the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 3 (identical language); and the Model 
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 above), article 1, paragraph 2 
(substantially similar language to the United Nations Convention against Corruption). For 
discussion, see McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 208–212; and the Legislative Guides for the 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the Protocols Thereto (footnote 35 above), paragraph 475 (“Generally, mutual legal assistance 
treaties provide for such forms of cooperation [as are included in article 18, paragraph 3]”).  
 
188
 See, for example, the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
article 7 (“The assistance envisaged under this convention shall include the following 
Procedures among others: a. notification of rulings and judgments; b. taking of testimony or 
statements from persons; c. summoning of witnesses and expert witnesses to provide testimony ; 
d. immobilization and sequestration of property, freezing of assets, and assistance in procedures 
related to seizures; e. searches or seizures; f. examination of objects and places; g. service of 
judicial documents; h. transmittal of documents, reports, information, and evidence; i. transfer 
of detained persons for the purpose of this convention; and j. any other procedure provided there 
is an agreement between the requesting state and the requested state”); and the [ASEAN] Treaty 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, article 1, paragraph 2 (“Mutual assistance to be 
rendered in accordance with this Treaty may include: (a) taking of evidence or obtaining 
voluntary statements from persons; (b) making arrangements for persons to give evidence or to 
assist in criminal matters; (c) effecting service of judicial documents; (d) executing searches and 
seizures; (e) examining objects and sites; (f) providing original or certified copies of relevant 
documents, records and items of evidence; (g) identifying or tracing property derived from the 
commission of an offence and instrumentalities of crime; (h) the restraining of dealings in 
property or the freezing of property derived from the commission of an offence that may be 
recovered, forfeited or confiscated; (i) the recovery, forfeiture or confiscation of property 
derived from the commission of an offence; (j) locating and identifying witnesses and suspects; 
and (k) the provision of such other assistance as may be agreed and which is consistent with the 
objects of this Treaty and the laws of the Requested Party”).  
 
189
 See, for example, the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 
above), article 1, paragraph 2 (“Mutual assistance to be afforded in accordance with the present 
Treaty may include: (a) Taking evidence or statements from persons; (b) Assisting in the 
availability of detained persons or others to give evidence or assist in investigations; 
(c) Effecting service of judicial documents; (d) Executing searches and seizures; (e) Examining 
objects and sites; (f) Providing information and evidentiary items; (g) Providing originals or 
certified copies of relevant documents and records, including bank, financial, corporate or 
business records”); the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation, done at Moscow on 17 June 1999, available from 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/123676.pdf, article 2 (“Legal assistance under this 
Treaty shall include: (1) obtaining testimony and statements; (2) providing documents, records, 
and other items; (3) serving documents; (4) locating and identifying persons and items; 
(5) executing requests for searches and seizures; (6) transferring persons in custody for 
testimony or other purposes under this Treaty; (7) locating and immobilizing assets for purposes 
of forfeiture, restitution, or collection of fines; and (8) providing any other legal assistance not 
prohibited by the laws of the Requested Party”).  
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citizenship, immigration, birth, marriage, and death records; health records; forensic 
material; and biometric data. Further, the list is not exhaustive, as it provides in 
subparagraph (i) a catch-all provision relating to “[a]ny other type of assistance that 
is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party”. Any existing 
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between States parties that lack the forms of 
cooperation listed in article 46, paragraph 3, are generally considered “as being 
automatically supplemented by those forms of cooperation”.190 In light of the above, 
paragraph 3 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual 
legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 3, below).  
127. Article 46, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
encourages each State party to transmit information to another State party, even in 
the absence of a request, if doing so could assist the latter in undertaking or 
successfully concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings, or could result in a 
request from the latter for mutual legal assistance. 191 Such a provision was viewed 
as innovative when first used in the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, though it “declares what must always have been the 
case, that the authorities of one State may take the initiative in providing 
information to another”.192 At the same time, this provision is stated in discretionary 
terms, providing that a State party “may” transmit information, and is further 
conditioned by the clause “[w]ithout prejudice to domestic law”, making clear that 
States parties are not obliged to transmit information. Paragraph 4 provides a 
suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see 
proposed draft article 13, paragraph 6, below).  
128. Article 46, paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
relates to paragraph 4 by addressing a situation where the State party providing t he 
information requires that the information be kept confidential or otherwise restricts 
its use. Such restrictions are to be honoured, unless disclosure to the alleged 
offender is necessary because the information is exculpatory. 193 The drafters of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime decided to 
include an “interpretative note” in the travaux préparatoires on this issue so as to 
provide further guidance: 
 The travaux préparatoires should indicate that (a) when a State Party is 
considering whether to spontaneously provide information of a particularly 
sensitive nature or is considering placing strict restrictions on the use of 
information thus provided, it is considered advisable for the State Party 
concerned to consult with the potential receiving State beforehand; (b) when a 
State Party that receives information under this provision already has similar 
__________________ 
 
190
 Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(footnote 35 above), p. 170, para. 605 (advising also that under some national legal systems, 
amending legislation may be required to incorporate additional bases of cooperation).  
 
191
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 4 (identical language); and the Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (footnote 35 above), p. 165 (“The aim of these provisions is to encourage 
States Parties to exchange information on criminal matters voluntarily and proactively”).  
 
192
 McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 212. 
 
193
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 5 (identical language); and McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 213. 
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information in its possession, it is not obliged to comply with any restrictions  
imposed by the transmitting State.194  
Paragraph 5 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on 
mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 7, below).  
129. Article 46, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
provides that “States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance 
pursuant to this article on the ground of bank secrecy”. The Legislative Guide to the 
Convention states: 
 It is significant that this paragraph is not included among the paragraphs that 
only apply in the absence of a mutual legal assistance treaty. Instead, States 
parties are obliged to ensure that no such ground for refusal may be invoked 
under their mutual legal assistance laws or treaties. … Thus, where a State 
party’s laws currently permit such ground for refusal, amending legislation 
will be required. Where such a ground for refusal is included in any State 
party’s mutual legal assistance treaties, the act of that State becoming party to 
the Convention against Corruption should as a matter of treaty law 
automatically invalidate the contrary provisions of an earlier treaty. Should a 
State party’s legal system provide that treaties are not applied directly, 
domestic legislation may be required.195 
Similar language appears in other multilateral and bilateral treaties on mutual legal 
assistance.196 Arguably such a provision, however, is not needed for the present draft 
articles, given that the offences at issue are not financial in nature. Yet given that a 
crime against humanity might entail a situation where assets have been stolen in the 
course of the crime, and where mutual legal assistance regarding those assets might 
be valuable for proving the crime, such a provision may have some value even in 
this context. As such, paragraph 8 appears to provide a suitable basis for a 
paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft  
article 13, paragraph 4, below).  
130. Finally, article 46, paragraph 30, of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption calls upon States parties to consider “the possibility of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes 
__________________ 
 
194
 Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
(see footnote 35 above), para. 37. 
 
195
 Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption  
(footnote 35 above), p. 171, paras. 611–612. 
 
196
 See the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 8 (“States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this 
article on the ground of bank secrecy”); the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, article12, paragraph 2 (“States Parties may not refuse a request for 
mutual legal assistance on the ground of bank secrecy”); the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 above), article 4, paragraph 2 (“Assistance shall not be 
refused solely on the ground of secrecy of banks and similar financial institutions”); and the 
[ASEAN] Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, article 3, paragraph 5 
(“Assistance shall not be refused solely on the ground of secrecy of banks and similar financial 
institutions or that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters”). For discussion, see 
McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 215–216. 
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of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this article”.197 Paragraph 30 
provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal 
assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 5, below).  
 
 2. Cooperation when a mutual legal assistance treaty exists between the  
States concerned 
 
131. Article 46, paragraph 6, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
makes clear that “[t]he provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations 
under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole 
or in part, mutual legal assistance”. In other words, any other mutual legal 
assistance treaty in place between the two States parties, whether concluded before 
or after entry into force of the Convention for those parties, continues to apply. 198 
Identical wording is found in article 18, paragraph 6, of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and substantially identical 
wording is found in article 7, paragraph 6, of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.199 
132. While this provision preserves obligations under existing mutual legal 
assistance treaties, it does not automatically give those treaties priority over the 
provisions contained in the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 200 
Rather, the provision is interpreted as requiring States parties to satisfy the highest 
level of assistance to which they have agreed, whether found in the Convention or in 
another bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance treaty. 201 The commentary to 
the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances makes this clear:  
 Paragraph 6 embodies an important provision dealing with potential conflict 
with existing or future mutual legal assistance treaties. It does not give those 
treaties a general priority over the provisions of the 1988 Convention. Its 
effect, instead, is to preserve the obligations incurred under general mutual 
legal assistance treaties from any diminution as a result of the specific 
provisions of the Convention. This means that where the Convention requires 
the provision of a higher level of assistance in the context of illicit trafficking 
than is provided for under the terms of an applicable bilateral or multilateral 
mutual legal assistance treaty, the provisions of the Convention will prevail. In 
__________________ 
 
197
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 20 (identical language); and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 18, para. 30 (identical language). For 
discussion, see the Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (footnote 172 above), p. 199, paragraph 7.59.  
 
198
 Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 321, paragraph (1) of the commentary to article 10 (regarding a 
similar provision in draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic 
agents and other internationally protected persons: “Mutual assistance in judicial matters has 
been a question of constant concern to States and is the subject of numerous bilateral and 
multilateral treaties. The obligations arising out of any such treaties existing between States 
party to the present draft are fully preserved under this article”).  
 
199
 Art. 7, para. 6 (“The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any other 
treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters”).  
 
200
 See McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 214.  
 
201
 Ibid.  
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the converse case, where the treaty provides for a higher level of assistance, 
this paragraph comes into play and the treaty provisions will prevail with 
respect to the extent of the requested party’s obligations.202 
133. At the same time, article 46, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption provides that paragraphs 9 to 29 of article 46 do not apply in the 
event that there exists a mutual legal assistance treaty between the States parties 
concerned.203 Rather, the corresponding provisions of that treaty alone apply, 
leaving only paragraphs 1 to 8 and 30 of the Convention to apply as between the 
States parties concerned.  
134. Even so, paragraph 7 indicates that, in such a situation, States parties “are 
strongly encouraged to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 if they facilitate cooperation”. The 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime uses identical 
language in article 18, paragraph 7, and similar language is used in article 7, 
paragraph 7, of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.204 The Commentary to the latter Convention 
states: 
 Where there is no applicable mutual legal assistance treaty, the Convention 
supplies the necessary provisions in paragraphs 8-19. Where there is an 
applicable treaty, its provisions will be followed in place of those set out in 
paragraphs 8-19; this enables pairs of States to follow the procedures with 
which they have become familiar in the general context of mutual legal 
assistance … . Parties to a general mutual legal assistance treaty concerned in 
a particular matter may, however, choose to agree that the provisions of the 
Convention should apply in that context.205 
__________________ 
 
202
 Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narco tic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (see footnote 172 above), p. 184, para. 7.20.  
 
203
 Whether the other instrument must be a treaty or can be some other form of arrangement is 
disputed. Compare the Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illic it Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ibid.), p. 185, para. 7.24 (“There are a number of 
parties whose general mutual legal assistance practice is governed by some instrument, such as 
the Commonwealth Scheme, which lacks the formality of a full treaty. The text of paragraph 7 
uses the term ‘a treaty of mutual legal assistance’, and that has become a term of art. It does not 
appear to include the less formal agreements or arrangements, where the provisions of 
paragraphs 8–19 will apply for all cases falling within the scope of the Convention, unless the 
parties agree otherwise”), with McClean (see footnote 81 above), p. 215 (maintaining that it has 
been assumed the reference to “a treaty of mutual legal assistance” in article 7, paragraph 7, of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime encompasses multilateral 
conventions and “it would be unfortunate if it did not also cover certain arrangements such as 
the Commonwealth Scheme which are not technically ‘treaties’” in addition to bilateral mutual 
legal assistance treaties).  
 
204
 Art. 7, para. 7 (“Paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article shall apply to requests made pursuant to this 
article if the Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal assistance. If t hese 
Parties are bound by such a treaty, the corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless 
the Parties agree to apply paragraphs 8 to 19 of this article in lieu thereof”).  
 
205
 Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (see footnote 172 above), p. 185, para. 7.23. See also the Legislative 
Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption  (footnote 35 
above), p. 171, paragraph 608 (“If a treaty is in force between the States parties concerned, the 
rules of the treaty will apply instead, unless the States agree to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of 
article 46 of the Convention”); and McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 215 (discussing article 18, 
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135. The result of article 46, paragraphs 6 and 7, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption is that there are some provisions applicable to all States parties 
(paragraphs 1 to 8 and 30) and there are some provisions (the “mini mutual legal 
assistance treaty” provisions in paragraphs 9 to 29) that apply among States parties 
unless there is a bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the 
States parties concerned206 (even then, those States parties are encouraged to use 
some or all of the “mini mutual legal assistance treaty” provisions to better facilitate 
cooperation). Paragraphs 6 and 7 provide a suitable basis for two paragraphs within 
a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraphs 8 
and 9, below). 
 
 3. Cooperation when a mutual legal assistance treaty does not exist between the 
States concerned 
 
136. As set out above, article 46, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption provides that when there is no mutual legal assistance treaty in 
place between the States parties concerned, the “mini mutual legal assistance treaty” 
provisions of paragraphs 9 to 29 apply.  
137. Article 46, paragraph 9, of the Convention addresses the issue of  a request for 
mutual legal assistance in the absence of dual criminality. 207 As noted above in the 
section on dual criminality, the present draft articles on crimes against humanity are 
designed to ensure the existence of dual criminality in the requesting and requested 
States, such that paragraph 9 does not appear necessary or indeed appropriate for the 
present draft articles. 
138. Article 46, paragraphs 10 to 12, of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption addresses the situation where a person being detained or serving a 
sentence in one State party is needed in another State party for purposes of 
identification, testimony or other assistance. As a general matter, these provisions 
set forth the basic conditions under which such a person might be transferred to the 
other State party for these purposes and then returned. 208 Paragraphs 10 to 12 
__________________ 
paragraph 7, of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and 
noting that “where there is an applicable multilateral convention or a bilateral [mutual legal 
assistance treaty], its provisions will be followed in place of those set out in paragraphs 9 to 29” 
and that supplanting provisions “negotiated with close regard to the principles of the national 
legal systems of the two States involved . . . would have created serious difficulties in 
determining, in particular cases, which set of rules was to be followed”). 
 
206
 McClean (footnote 81 above), p. 215 (discussing article 18, paragraph 7, of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: “Particularly in the case of bilateral 
treaties, the provisions will have been negotiated with close regard to the principles of the 
national legal systems of the two States involved. There was no wish to supplant those 
provisions, and to have done so would have created serious difficulties in determining, in 
particular cases, which set of rules was to be followed”). 
 
207
 For a discussion of this issue, see McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 216–217. 
 
208
 Ibid.; see also the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
article 16 (substantially similar language to the United Nations Convention against Corruption); 
and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime , article 18, 
paragraphs 10–12 (language identical to the United Nations Convention against Corruption). 
McClean notes that “[i]t is one of the oddities of the text that the topic of the transfer of persons 
in custody appears so early in the mini-[mutual legal assistance treaty], before provisions 
dealing with the content for the request or the procedure for dealing with it” (McClean (foot note 
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provide a suitable basis for paragraphs within a draft article on mutual legal 
assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraphs 25 to 27, below).  
139. Article 46, paragraphs 13 to 17, of the Convention addresses in some detail the 
procedures for sending a request from one State to another. Among other things, 
paragraphs 13 and 14 require States parties to: designate a central authority 
responsible for handling incoming and outgoing requests for assistance;209 stipulate 
that requests must generally be written; call upon each State party to designate the 
language(s) the State party finds acceptable for incoming requests; and require 
States parties to notify the depositary of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (the Secretary-General of the United Nations) of the chosen central 
authority and acceptable languages.210 Paragraph 15 designates what must be 
included in any request for mutual legal assistance, such as an indication of the 
subject matter and nature of the inquiry, and a statement of the relevant facts. 211 
Paragraph 16 essentially allows the requested State to request supplemental 
information when that is either necessary to carry out the request under its national 
law, or when additional information would prove helpful in doing so. 212 Paragraph 17 
__________________ 
81 above), p. 218).  
 
209
 Designation of a central authority “is a feature of many mutual legal assistance treaties and 
agreements” and thus is an obligation with which States are accustomed to complying 
(Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (see footnote 172 above), p. 186, para. 7.25).  
 
210
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraphs 8–9 (“8. Parties shall designate an authority, or 
when necessary authorities, which shall have the responsibility and power to execute requests 
for mutual legal assistance or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. The 
authority or the authorities designated for this purpose shall be notified to the Secretary -
General. Transmission of requests for mutual legal assistance and any communication related 
thereto shall be effected between the authorities designated by the Parties; this requiremen t shall 
be without prejudice to the right of a Party to require that such requests and communications be 
addressed to it through the diplomatic channel and, in urgent circumstances, where the Parties 
agree, through channels of the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible. 9. 
Requests shall be made in writing in a language acceptable to the requested Party. The language 
or languages acceptable to each Party shall be notified to the Secretary -General. In urgent 
circumstances, and where agreed by the Parties, requests may be made orally, but shall be 
confirmed in writing forthwith”); and the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, article 18, paragraphs 13–14 (language identical to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption).  
 
211
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 10 (identical language); the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 15 (identical 
language); the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 above), 
article 5, paragraph 1 (substantially similar language to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, but with the additional requirement that requests include: “(f) Specification of any 
time-limit within which compliance with the request is desired”); and the Revised Manual on 
the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 170 above), para. 106 
(“Most instruments and schemes including the [United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances], the [United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime], the [United Nations Convention against Corruption] and the 
Commonwealth Scheme [relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters] contain a list of 
contents of requests. While there are some differences in terms of detail and language, in 
general terms the lists in all of these instruments are very similar”).  
 
212
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
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provides that the request is to be executed in accordance with the law of the requested  
State, and in line with the procedures specified by the requesting Sta te so far as they 
do not conflict with the requested State’s law.213 The first clause of paragraph 17 
helps preserve the integrity of the requested State’s legal system, as the requested 
acts will occur in its territory, while the second clause emphasizes the desirability of 
complying with specific requests of the requesting State so that, for example, 
evidence collected is admissible under the procedural rules of its courts. 214 
140. Paragraphs 13 to 17 provide a suitable basis for paragraphs within a draft 
article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraphs 10 to 14, 
below). 
141. Article 46, paragraph 18, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
addresses testimony by witnesses through videoconferencing, a cost -effective 
technology that is becoming increasingly common. While testimony by 
videoconference is not mandatory, States are expected “to make provision wherever 
possible and consistent with the fundamental principles of domestic law for the use 
of videoconferencing as a means of providing viva voce evidence in cases where it 
is impossible or undesirable for a witness to travel”.215 Inclusion of this novel 
provision in article 18 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime216 led to the adoption by the diplomatic conference of an 
interpretative note, which reads as follows:  
 The travaux préparatoires should indicate that the delegation of Italy made a 
proposal on the matter covered by this paragraph (see A/AC.254/5/Add.23). 
During the debate on the proposal, it was pointed out that the following part of 
it, not reflected in the text of the Convention, could be used by States Parties 
as guidelines for the implementation of article 18, paragraph 18:  
  “(a)  The judicial authority of the requested State Party shall be 
responsible for the identification of the person to be heard and shall, on 
conclusion of the hearing, draw up minutes indicating the date and place of the 
__________________ 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 11 (identical language); the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 16 (identical 
language); and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 
above), article 5, paragraph 3. 
 
213
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 12 (identical language); and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 17 (identical 
language). 
 
214
 See the Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (footnote 172 above), p. 190, paragraphs 7.35–7.36. 
 
215
 Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption  
(footnote 35 above), p. 174, paras. 628–629. 
 
216
 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 
18, reads: “Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of domestic law, when 
an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to be heard as a witness or expert by the 
judicial authorities of another State Party, the first State Party may, at the request of the other, 
permit the hearing to take place by video conference if it is not possible or desirable for the 
individual in question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting State Party. States 
Parties may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of the requesting 
State Party and attended by a judicial authority of the requested State Party.”  
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hearing and any oath taken. The hearing shall be conducted without any 
physical or mental pressure on the person questioned;  
  “(b)  If the judicial authority of the requested State considers that during 
the hearing the fundamental principles of the law of that State are infringed, he 
or she has the authority to interrupt or, if possible, to take the necessary 
measures to continue the hearing in accordance with those principles;  
  “(c)  The person to be heard and the judicial authority of the requested 
State shall be assisted by an interpreter as necessary;  
  “(d)  The person to be heard may claim the right not to testify as 
provided for by the domestic law of the requested State or of the requesting 
State; the domestic law of the requested State applies to perjury;  
  “(e)  All the costs of the video conference shall be borne by the 
requesting State Party, which may also provide as necessary for technical 
equipment.”217 
Paragraph 18 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on 
mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 24, below).  
142. Article 46, paragraph 19, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
provides that the requesting State party is generally restricted in its ability to use or 
transmit information provided to it by the requested State party for purposes other 
than those set forth in its request, without prior consent of the requested State 
party.218 There is an exception to this general obligation, however, when the 
information is exculpatory (in which case, the information can be disclosed to the 
alleged offender, but advance notice must be given to the requested State whenever 
possible). Paragraph 19 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft 
article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 21, 
below). 
143. Article 46, paragraph 20, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
allows the requesting State to require the requested State to keep the fact and 
substance of the request confidential, except to the extent necessary to execute the 
request.219 Paragraph 20 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft 
__________________ 
 
217
 Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
(see footnote 35 above), para. 41. See also McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 226–227. 
 
218
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 13 (“The requesting Party shall not transmit nor 
use information or evidence furnished by the requested Party for investigations, prosecutions or 
proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested 
Party”); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, article 
12, paragraph 3 (identical language to the United Nations Convention against Ill icit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances); and the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 19 (identical language to the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption).  
 
219
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 20 (identical language); and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (footnote 169 above), article 9 (“Upon request: (a) The requested State shall use its best 
endeavours to keep confidential the request for assistance, its contents and its supporting 
documents as well as the fact of granting of such assistance. If the request cannot be executed 
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article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 22, 
below). 
144. Article 46, paragraphs 21 to 23, of the Convention address the circumstances 
under which a request for mutual legal assistance may or may not be refused. 
Paragraph 21 lists a series of grounds for which refusal is permitted: (a) when the 
request does not conform to requirements of the article; (b) if the requested State 
considers that the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public 
or other essential interests; (c) when the authorities of the requested State party 
would be prohibited by its national law from carrying out the action requested with 
regard to any similar offence; and (d) when granting the request would be contrary 
to the requested State’s legal system.220 With respect to this last ground, an 
interpretative note was agreed upon during the drafting of the comparable paragraph 
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which 
reads as follows: 
 The travaux préparatoires should indicate that the provision of paragraph 21 (d) 
of this article is not intended to encourage refusal of mutual assistance for any 
reason, but is understood as raising the threshold to more essential principles 
of domestic law of the requested State. The travaux préparatoires should also 
indicate that the proposed clauses on grounds for refusal relating to the 
prosecution or punishment of a person on account of that person’s sex, race, 
religion, nationality or political opinions, as well as the political offence 
__________________ 
without breaching confidentiality, the requested State shall so inform the requesting State, 
which shall then determine whether the request should nevertheless be executed; (b) The 
requesting State shall keep confidential evidence and information provided by the requested 
State, except to the extent that the evidence and information is needed for the investigation and 
proceedings described in the request”).  
 
220
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 15 (identical language); the Uni ted Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 21 (identical 
language); the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 above), 
article 4, paragraph 1 (“Assistance may be refused if: (a) The requested State is of the opinion 
that the request, if granted, would prejudice its sovereignty, security, public order (ordre public) 
or other essential public interest; (b) The offence is regarded by the requested State as being of a 
political nature; (c) There are substantial grounds for believing that the request for assistance 
has been made for the purpose of prosecuting a person on account of that person’s race, sex, 
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions or that that person’s position may be 
prejudiced for any of those reasons; (d) The request relates to an offence that is subject to 
investigation or prosecution in the requested State or the prosecution of which in the requesting 
State would be incompatible with the requested State's law on double jeopardy (ne bis in idem); 
(e) The assistance requested requires the requested State to carry out compulsory measures that 
would be inconsistent with its law and practice had the offence been the subject of investigation 
or prosecution under its own jurisdiction; (f) The act is an offence under military law, which is 
not also an offence under ordinary criminal law”); and the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, article 2 (“Assistance may be refused: (a) if the request 
concerns an offence which the requested Party considers a political offence, an offence 
connected with a political offence, or a fiscal offence; (b) if the requested Party considers that 
execution of the request is likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other 
essential interests of its country”). 
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exception, were deleted because it was understood that they were sufficiently 
covered by the words “essential interests” in paragraph 21(b).221 
Paragraph 23 requires the requested State to give reasons for any refusal of mutual 
legal assistance.222 Paragraphs 21 and 23 provide a suitable basis for paragraphs 
within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, 
paragraphs 16 and 17, below). 
145. By contrast, article 46, paragraph 22, of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption indicates a ground upon which a request may not be refused, 
stating that “States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual  legal assistance on 
the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters”.223 Such 
a provision is appropriate in the context of corruption (as well as transnational 
organized crime), where the offence may include issues such as evas ion of taxes, 
customs or duties. Yet such matters are not part of the offence of crimes against 
humanity and therefore inclusion of such a provision does not appear warranted for 
a draft article on mutual legal assistance.  
146. Article 46, paragraph 24, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
provides that the request shall be expeditiously addressed, stating, inter alia, that 
the requested State party “shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance as 
soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines 
suggested by the requesting State Party”.224 Paragraph 24 provides a suitable basis 
for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft 
article 13, paragraph 15, below).  
147. At the same time, paragraph 25 provides that mutual legal assistance “may be 
postponed by the requested State Party on the ground that it interferes with an 
ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding”.225 Paragraph 25 provides 
__________________ 
 
221
 Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto  
(see footnote 35 above), para. 42. 
 
222
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 16 (“Reasons shall be given for any refusal of 
mutual legal assistance”); the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, article 18, paragraph 23 (language identical to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption); and the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 
above), article 4, paragraph 5 (“Reasons shall be given for any refusal or postponement of 
mutual assistance”). 
 
223
 See also the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, article 
13 (“None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition 
or mutual legal assistance, as a fiscal offence. Accordingly, States Parties may not refuse a 
request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that it concerns a fiscal 
offence”); and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 
18, paragraph 22 (identical language to the United Nations Convention against Corruption).  
 
224
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 24 (identical language). For discussion, see McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 231–
232. 
 
225
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 25 (identical language); the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in  Criminal Matters 
(footnote 169 above), article 4, paragraph 3 (“The requested State may postpone the execution 
of the request if its immediate execution would interfere with an ongoing investigation or 
prosecution in the requested State”); and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
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a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see 
proposed draft article 13, paragraph 18, below).  
148. Article 46, paragraph 26, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
attempts to help avoid situations of complete refusal or extended delay of response 
to a request for mutual legal assistance by calling upon the requested State party 
first to “consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether assistance may 
be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems necessary. If the 
requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those conditions, it shall comply 
with the conditions”.226 Paragraph 26 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph 
within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, 
paragraph 19, below). 
149. Article 46, paragraph 27, of the Convention is essentially a “safe conduct” 
provision, which gives individuals traveling to the requesting State’s territory a 
measure of protection from prosecution, detention or punishment while they are in 
the territory for the purpose of testifying.227 Paragraph 27 provides a suitable basis 
__________________ 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 17 (“Mutual legal assistance 
may be postponed by the requested Party on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing 
investigation, prosecution or proceeding. In such a case, the requested Party shall consult with 
the requesting Party to determine if the assistance can still be given subject to such terms and 
conditions as the requested Party deems necessary”).  
 
226
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 26 (identical language). For discussion, see McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 232 –
233. 
 
227
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 18 (identical language); the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 27 (identical 
language); the Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (the Harare Scheme), 
article 25 (“(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 24, witnesses appearing in the requesting 
country in response to a request under paragraph 23 or persons transferred to that country in 
response to a request under paragraph 24 shall be immune in that country from prosecution, 
detention or any other restriction of personal liberty in respect of criminal acts, omissions or 
convictions before the time of their departure from the requested country. (2) The immunity 
provided for in that paragraph shall cease: (a) in the case of witnesses appearing in response to a 
request under paragraph 23, when the witnesses having had, for a period of 15 consecutive days 
from the dates when they were notified by the competent authority of the requesting country that 
their presence was no longer required by the court exercising jurisdiction in the criminal matter, 
an opportunity of leaving have nevertheless remained in the requesting country, or having left 
that country have returned to it; (b) in the case of persons transferred in response to a request 
under paragraph 24 and remaining in custody when they have been returned to the requested 
country”); the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, article 12, 
paragraph 1 (“A witness or expert, whatever his nationality, appearing on a summons before the 
judicial authorities of the requesting Party shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to 
any other restriction of his personal liberty in the territory of that Party in respect of acts or 
convictions anterior to his departure from the territory of the requested Party”); and the Model 
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (footnote 169 above), article 15 (“1. Subject to 
paragraph 2 of the present article, where a person is in the requesting State pursuant to a request 
made under article 13 or 14 of the present Treaty: (a) That person shall not be detained, 
prosecuted, punished or subjected to any other restrictions of personal liberty in the requesting 
State in respect of any acts or omissions or convictions that preceded the person's departure 
from the requested State; (b) That person shall not, without that person's consent, be required to 
give evidence in any proceeding or to assist in any investigation other than the proceeding or 
investigation to which the request relates. 2. Paragraph 1 of the present article shall cease to 
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
67/165 17-00990 
 
for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft 
article 13, paragraph 23, below).  
150. Article 46, paragraph 28, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
addresses the issue of costs, stating, inter alia, that “[t]he ordinary costs of 
executing a request shall be borne by the requested State Party, unless otherwise 
agreed by the States Parties concerned”.228 An interpretative note for the identical 
provision in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
provides some guidance: 
 The travaux préparatoires should indicate that many of the costs arising in 
connection with compliance with requests under article 18, paragraphs 10, 11 
and 18, would generally be considered extraordinary in nature. Further, the 
travaux préparatoires should indicate the understanding that developing 
countries may encounter difficulties in meeting even some ordinary costs and 
should be provided with appropriate assistance to enable them to meet the 
requirements of this article.229 
Paragraph 28 provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on 
mutual legal assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 28, below).  
151. Article 46, paragraph 29, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
addresses the provision of government records, documents and information from the 
requested State to the requesting State and indicates that such information “shall” be 
provided, while non-public information “may” be provided.230 Paragraph 29 
provides a suitable basis for a paragraph within a draft article on mutual legal 
assistance (see proposed draft article 13, paragraph 20, below).  
 
 
 C. Draft article 13. Mutual legal assistance 
 
 
152. In light of the sources indicated above, the Special Rapporteur is of the view 
that a draft article on mutual legal assistance for crimes against humanity should be 
modelled largely on the text used in article 46 of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption. At present, 181 States have adhered to the text of the 
__________________ 
apply if that person, being free to leave, has not left the requesting State within a period of [15] 
consecutive days, or any longer period otherwise agreed on by the Parties, after that person has 
been officially told or notified that his or her presence is no longer required or, having left, has 
voluntarily returned. 3 A person who does not consent to a request pursuant to article 13 or 
accept an invitation pursuant to article 14 shall not, by reason thereof, be liable to any penalty 
or be subjected to any coercive measure, notwithstanding any contrary statement in the request 
or summons”). For discussion, see the Commentary on the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (footnote 172 above), pp. 197–
198, paragraph 7.55; and McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 233–234.  
 
228
 See also the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, article 7, paragraph 19 (identical language); and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, paragraph 28 (identical 
language). 
 
229
 Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
(see footnote 35 above), para. 43. See also McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 234–236. 
 
230
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 18, 
paragraph 29 (identical language).  
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Convention, its provisions provide ample guidance as to all relevant rights, 
obligations and procedures for mutual legal assistance that may arise in the context 
of crimes against humanity (including in situations where there is no mutual legal 
assistance treaty between the States concerned), and its provisions are well 
understood by States, especially through detailed guides and resources developed by 
the UNODC.231 Further, although a crime against humanity by its nature is quite 
different from a crime of corruption, the issues arising in the context of mutual legal 
assistance are largely the same regardless of the nature of the crime.  
153. At the same time, some modifications are warranted. Certain stylistic changes 
are necessary for consistency with the draft articles already provisionally adopted, 
such as changing: “article” to “draft article”; “this Convention” to “the present draft 
articles”; “in the territory” of the State to “in territory under the jurisdiction” of the 
State; “domestic law” to “national law”; and “State Party” to “State”. Likewise, in 
various places, additional changes are appropriate so as to clarify that the offences 
at issue are “crimes against humanity” rather than “criminal matters” generally. The 
clarity of article 46, paragraph 7, might be improved by replacing “the 
corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply” with “the provisions of that 
treaty shall apply instead”, for purposes of draft article 13, paragraph 9. Further, 
article 46, paragraphs 4 and 5, refer to “inquiries and criminal proceedings”, 
whereas most other paragraphs (for example, paragraphs 1, 2, 10, 19) refer to 
“investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings”. For purposes of 
harmonization, the latter phrase is used for draft article 13, paragraphs 6 and 7.  
154. A few structural or substantive changes are also desirable. First, with respect 
to structural changes, several of the paragraphs are reordered so as to group 
paragraphs that address comparable issues together. Subheadings are added to assist 
the reader in identifying these groupings.  
155. Second, with respect to substantive changes, in article 46, paragraph 3, the list 
of types of assistance might be altered given its application in relation to crimes 
against humanity, rather than corruption. To that end, the illustrative listing in 
subparagraph (f) (“including government, bank, financial, corporate or business 
records”) is deleted as it unduly stresses financial records. The last two types of 
assistance listed — in subparagraphs (j) and (k)232 — are uniquely tied to the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, as they expressly refer to the detailed 
provisions of chapter V of that Convention on asset recovery. As such, they are not 
appropriate for the purposes of the present draft articles and have been deleted. Yet, 
given that a crime against humanity might entail situations where assets have been 
stolen in the course of the crime, and where mutual legal assistance regarding those 
assets might be valuable for proving the crime, subparagraph (g) is retained. To 
improve the drafting, the word “freezing” is moved from subparagraph (c) to 
subparagraph (g), so as to reformulate subparagraph (g) to read: “identifying, 
tracing or freezing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or other things for 
evidentiary purposes”. 
__________________ 
 
231
 See footnote 35 above. 
 
232
 Art. 46, para. 3 (j)–(k) (“(j) Identifying, freezing and tracing proceeds of crime in accordance 
with the provisions of chapter V of this Convention; (k) The recovery of assets, in accordance 
with the provisions of chapter V of this Convention”). 
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
69/165 17-00990 
 
156. Article 46, paragraph 9, addresses the issue of a request for mutual legal 
assistance in the absence of dual criminality. Since the present draft articles are 
designed to ensure the existence of dual criminality for the offence of crimes against 
humanity, paragraph 9 is deleted as unnecessary.  
157. Finally, article 46, paragraph 22, contains a provision that precludes a State 
party from refusing to provide mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that the 
offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters. As previously noted, such 
matters are not part of the offence of crimes against humanity, and therefore 
inclusion of such a provision does not appear warranted for a draft article on mutual 
legal assistance. 
158. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
   Draft article 13. Mutual legal assistance 
 
   General cooperation 
 
   1. States shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation 
to the offences referred to in draft article 5 in accordance with this draft 
article. 
 2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible 
under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested 
State with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in 
relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held liable in 
accordance with draft article 5, paragraph 7, in the requesting State.  
 3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this draft 
article may be requested for any of the following purposes:  
  (a) taking evidence or statements from persons;  
  (b) effecting service of judicial documents;  
  (c) executing searches and seizures; 
  (d) examining objects and sites; 
  (e) providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;  
  (f) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and 
records; 
  (g) identifying, tracing or freezing proceeds of crime, property, 
instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes;  
  (h) facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting 
State; or 
  (i) any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the national law 
of the requested State. 
 4. States shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this 
draft article on the ground of bank secrecy.  
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 5. States shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the 
purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this draft 
article. 
 
   Transmission of information without a prior request  
 
 6. Without prejudice to national law, the competent authorities of a State 
may, without prior request, transmit information relating to crimes against 
humanity to a competent authority in another State where they believe that 
such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully 
concluding investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings or could 
result in a request formulated by the latter State pursuant to the present draft 
articles. 
 7. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 6 of this draft 
article shall be without prejudice to investigations, prosecutions  and judicial 
proceedings in the State of the competent authorities providing the 
information. The competent authorities receiving the information shall comply 
with a request that said information remain confidential, even temporarily, or 
with restrictions on its use. However, this shall not prevent the receiving State 
from disclosing in its proceedings information that is exculpatory to an 
accused person. In such a case, the receiving State shall notify the transmitting 
State prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting 
State. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving 
State shall inform the transmitting State of the disclosure without delay.  
 
   Relationship to treaties on mutual legal assistance between the  
States concerned 
 
 8.  The provisions of this draft article shall not affect the obligations under 
any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole 
or in part, mutual legal assistance.  
 9. Paragraphs 10 to 28 of this draft article shall apply to requests made 
pursuant to this draft article if the States in question are not bound by a treaty 
of mutual legal assistance. If those States are bound by such a treaty, the 
provisions of that treaty shall apply instead, unless the States agree to apply 
paragraphs 10 to 28 of this draft article in lieu thereof. States are strongly 
encouraged to apply those paragraphs if they facilitate cooperation.  
 
   Designation of a central authority 
 
 10. Each State shall designate a central authority that shall have the 
responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and 
either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for 
execution. Where a State has a special region or territory with  a separate 
system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority 
that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities 
shall ensure the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests 
received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent 
authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of 
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the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at 
the time each State deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval of or accession to the present draft articles. Requests for mutual legal 
assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the 
central authorities designated by the States. This requirement shall be without 
prejudice to the right of a State to require that such requests and 
communications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent  
circumstances, where the States agree, through the International Criminal 
Police Organization, if possible.  
 
   Procedures for making a request 
 
 11. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means 
capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the 
requested State, under conditions allowing that State to establish authenticity. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the language 
or languages acceptable to each State at the time it deposits it s instrument of 
ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to the present draft articles. 
In urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States, requests may be made 
orally, but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.  
 12. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain: 
  (a) the identity of the authority making the request;  
  (b) the subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of 
the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;  
  (c) a summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for 
the purpose of service of judicial documents;  
  (d) a description of the assistance sought and details of any particular 
procedure that the requesting State wishes to be followed;  
  (e) where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person 
concerned; and 
  (f) the purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.  
 13. The requested State may request additional information when it appears 
necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its national law 
or when it can facilitate such execution.  
 
   Response to the request by the requested State 
 
 14. A request shall be executed in accordance with the national law of the 
requested State and, to the extent not contrary to the national law of the 
requested State and where possible, in accordance with the procedures 
specified in the request. 
 15. The requested State shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance 
as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines 
suggested by the requesting State and for which reasons are given, preferably 
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in the request. The requested State shall respond to reasonable requests by the 
requesting State on progress of its handling of the request. The requesting 
State shall promptly inform the requested State when the assistance sought is 
no longer required. 
 16. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:  
  (a) if the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this 
draft article; 
  (b) if the requested State considers that execution of the request is 
likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential 
interests; 
  (c) if the authorities of the requested State would be prohibited by its 
national law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar 
offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceedings under their own jurisdiction;  
  (d) if it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State 
relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.  
 17. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.  
 18. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State on the 
ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding. 
 19. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 16 of this draft article or 
postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 18 of this draft article, the 
requested State shall consult with the requesting State to consider whether 
assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems 
necessary. If the requesting State accepts assistance subject to those 
conditions, it shall comply with the conditions.  
 20. The requested State: 
  (a) shall provide to the requesting State copies of government records, 
documents or information in its possession that under its national law are 
available to the general public; and  
  (b) may, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State in whole, in 
part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any 
government records, documents or information in its possession that under its 
national law are not available to the general public. 
 
   Use of information by the requesting State 
 
 21. The requesting State shall not transmit or use information or evidence 
furnished by the requested State for investigations, prosecutions or judicial 
proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of 
the requested State. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the requesting 
State from disclosing in its proceedings information or evidence that is 
exculpatory to an accused person. In the latter case, the requesting State shall 
notify the requested State prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult 
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with the requested State. If, in an exceptional case, advance notice is not 
possible, the requesting State shall inform the requested State of the disclos ure 
without delay. 
 22. The requesting State may require that the requested State keep 
confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent 
necessary to execute the request. If the requested State cannot comply with the 
requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State.  
 
   Testimony of person from the requested State 
 
 23. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 27 of this draft article, 
a witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State, 
consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, 
prosecution or judicial proceeding in territory under the jurisdiction of the 
requesting State shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to 
any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect of 
acts, omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from territory under 
the jurisdiction of the requested State. Such safe conduct shall cease when the 
witness, expert or other person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive 
days or for any period agreed upon by the States from the date on which he or 
she has been officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required 
by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless 
remained voluntarily in territory under the jurisdiction of the requesting State 
or, having left it, has returned of his or her own free will.  
 24. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of national 
law, when an individual is in territory under the jurisdiction of a State and has 
to be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State, 
the first State may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take place 
by videoconference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in 
question to appear in person in territory under the jurisdiction of the 
requesting State. States may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a 
judicial authority of the requesting State and attended by a judicial authority of 
the requested State. 
 
   Transfer for testimony of person detained in requested State  
 
 25. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in territory under 
the jurisdiction of one State whose presence in another State is requested for 
purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in 
obtaining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in 
relation to offences referred to in draft article 5, may be transfer red if the 
following conditions are met: 
  (a) the person freely gives his or her informed consent; and  
  (b) the competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such 
conditions as those States may deem appropriate.  
 26. For the purposes of paragraph 25 of this draft article:  
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  (a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority 
and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise 
requested or authorized by the State from which the person was transferred; 
  (b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay 
implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from 
which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise 
agreed, by the competent authorities of both States; 
  (c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the 
State from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings 
for the return of the person; and  
  (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the 
sentence being served from the State from which he or she was transferred for 
time spent in the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.  
 27. Unless the State from which a person is to be transferred in accordance 
with paragraphs 25 and 26 of this draft article so agrees, that person, whatever 
his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected 
to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in territory under the 
jurisdiction of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, 
omissions or convictions prior to his or her departure from territory under the 
jurisdiction of the State from which he or she was transferred.  
 
   Costs 
 
 28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested 
State, unless otherwise agreed by the States concerned. If expenses of a 
substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil the request, 
the States shall consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the 
request will be executed, as well as the manner in which the costs shall be 
borne. 
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Chapter IV 
  Victims, witnesses and other affected persons 
 
 
 A. Overview 
 
 
159. In the aftermath of the commission of a crime against humanity, issues relating 
to victims, witnesses and other affected persons invariably arise. Yet, at present, 
there is no global treaty addressing the rights of such persons under national law in 
the context of crimes against humanity.  
160. First, victims, witnesses and others may wish to come forward with 
information pertaining to the commission of a crime, which may be of assistance in 
preventing further crimes, apprehending alleged offenders and prosecuting or 
extraditing those offenders. When this occurs, however, the person coming forward 
may be exposed to threats or intimidation by those who do not wish such 
information to be made available.  
161. Second, victims may wish to participate in the proceedings brought against the 
alleged offender for a variety of reasons, including the ability to express their views 
and concerns, to verify facts and to secure recognition as victims. 233 
162. Third, victims may be interested in reparation from those responsible for the 
crime, which may take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or some 
other form of reparation.234 
163. International norms relating to the rights of victims have developed relatively 
recently, most notably since the 1980s.235 As a result, many treaties addressing 
crimes under national law prior to this period contain no provisions with respect to 
victims or witnesses, such as: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide; the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft; the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid; the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; and the 
International Convention against the taking of hostages.  
__________________ 
 
233
 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision 
on victims’ participation, 18 January 2008, Trial Chamber I, International Criminal Court, 
paragraph 39. 
 
234
 Some commentators have noted the interrelationship between the “purpose of participation” and 
reparation. See, for example, A. Cassese, et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law , 3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 387. 
 
235
 Fernández de Casadevante Romani observes that “[t]hese international norms related to victims 
are also recent. The most ancient were born in the 1980s. The most recent belong to 2006”, and 
further states that “[p]reviously, both international and domestic law had ignored the victim. 
Domestic law because the state’s ius puniendi embodied in criminal law has traditionally had 
the criminal as the exclusive reference without considering the victim. International law because 
its approaches on the matter of responsibility have always been focused upon the author of the 
wrongful act: the state (in international law of human rights), the individual or states (in 
international humanitarian law) or the individual (in international criminal law), but always 
ignoring the victim” (C. Fernández de Casadevante Romani, International Law of Victims, 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2012, pp. 5–6).  
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164. Further, even after the 1980s, most global treaties concerned with terrorism 
did not address the rights of victims or witnesses,236 including: the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; the 1999 OAU 
[Organization of African Unity] Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism; the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism; and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. 
165. On the other hand, there are treaties adopted since the 1980s concerning 
particular crimes that do address issues relating to victims and witnesses in national 
law, including some concerning crimes that might apply when crimes against 
humanity occur, such as torture or enforced disappearance.  For example, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment addresses the rights of victims and witnesses to protection, as well as 
the right of victims to redress and compensation (arts. 13-14). More recent treaties 
on corruption and transnational organized crime similarly include provisions on the 
rights of victims and witnesses.237 Further, the statutes of international courts and 
tribunals that have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity have included 
provisions addressing victims and witnesses in the context of the operation of those 
courts and tribunals.238 
166. The General Assembly has also provided guidance for States with respect to 
the rights of victims of crimes, including victims of crimes against humanity. The 
1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power addressed issues such as access to justice, fair treatment, restitution, 
compensation and assistance.239 The 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
while not entailing “new international or domestic legal obligations”, nevertheless 
__________________ 
 
236
 See C. Fernández de Casadevante Romani, “International law of victims”, in von Bogdandy and 
Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 14 (2010), pp. 219–272. 
There are, however, exceptions. See the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, article 8, paragraph 4 (“Each State Party shall consider establishing 
mechanisms whereby the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized 
to compensate the victims of offences referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or 
(b), or their families”); and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Ter rorism, 
article 13 (“Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to protect and support the 
victims of terrorism that has been committed within its own territory. These measures may 
include, through the appropriate national schemes and subject  to domestic legislation, inter alia, 
financial assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism and their close family 
members”). See also the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights, Guidelines on 
the protection of victims of terrorist acts, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 
2005, in Human rights and the fight against terrorism: the Council of Europe Guidelines , 2005. 
 
237
 See the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, articles 24 and 25; 
and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, articles 32 and 33.  
 
238
 See, for example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See also the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, rule 86 (“A Chamber in making 
any direction or order, and other organs of the Court in performing their functions under the 
Statute or the Rules, shall take into account the needs of all victims and witnesses in accordance 
with article 68, in particular, children, elderly persons, persons with disabilities and victims of 
sexual or gender violence”), available from www.icc-cpi.int/.../legal-texts/RulesProcedure 
EvidenceEng.pdf. 
 
239
 General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985, Annex.  
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identified “mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation 
of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to their norms”.240 
167. Most treaties that address “victims”, such as the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 241 do not provide 
a definition of that term, and instead allow States parties latitude for addressing its 
scope under their national laws. There are, however, some exceptions, such as the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (article 24, paragraph 1, provides that “‘victim’ means the 
disappeared person and any individual who has suffered as the direct result of an 
enforced disappearance”)242 or the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which 
provides an even more expansive definition.243 Under some treaties, only natural 
persons are covered, whereas under other treaties legal persons may be “victims” as 
well.244 Rule 85, sub-rule (a), of the International Criminal Court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence defines “victims” as “natural persons who have suffered 
harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court”.245 Rule 85, sub-rule (b), extends the definition of victims to legal persons 
__________________ 
 
240
 General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, Annex, preamble. 
 
241
 While the Convention itself provides no definition, the Committee Against Torture observed: 
“Victims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute violations of the Convention. 
…The term ‘victim’ also includes affected immediate family or dependants of the victim as well 
as persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims or to prevent victimization” 
(Committee Against Torture, general comment No. 3 on the implementation of article 14 
(CAT/C/GC/3), para. 3). Further, the Committee stated: “A person should be considered a victim 
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the violation is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or 
convicted, and regardless of any familial or other relationship between the perpetrator and the 
victim” (ibid). The Committee’s approach builds upon the Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (see footnote above), 
para. 8. See also the draft declaration of international law principles on reparation for victims of 
armed conflict, International Law Association, The Hague Conference (2010), article 4, 
available from www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1018.  
 
242
 See also D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law , 3rd ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2015, pp. 241–242. 
 
243
 Art. 2, para. 1 (“‘Cluster munition victims’ means all persons who have been killed or suffered 
physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial 
impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include 
those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and 
communities”). 
 
244
 Compare article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica” (which only ensures the human rights of natural persons) with article 34 of  the European 
Convention on Human Rights (which includes both natural and legal persons as the “victim of a 
violation”). 
 
245
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (see footnote 238 above), 
Rule 85, sub-rule (a). Pre-Trial Chamber I held that “[r]ule 85, sub-rule (a), “establishes four 
criteria that have to be met in order to obtain the status of victim: the victim must be a natural 
person; he or she must have suffered harm; the crime from which the harm ensued must fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; and there must be a causal link between the crime and the 
harm suffered” (Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Case No. ICC-01/04, 
Decision on the applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, 
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suffering direct harm, providing that “[v]ictims may include organizations or 
institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is 
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their 
historic monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian 
purposes”.246 
168. Though the term “victim” is generally understood as including, at a minimum, 
the person who directly experienced the harm and immediate family members in the 
event that the victim has lost his or her life, most treaties have not sought to develop 
a definition, and instead have left the matter to specification within national legal 
systems, which already address the concept of “victim” in various contexts. Indeed, 
some participants in the inter-sessional open-ended working group that elaborated 
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance noted that national courts should be given a certain amount of 
latitude in the designation of beneficiaries of reparations. 247 For the purposes of the 
present draft articles, it is appropriate to give States latitude in determining exactly 
which persons qualify as “victims” of a crime against humanity. 
169. The remainder of this chapter discusses the three principal issues that arise 
with respect to victims, witnesses and others: protection of victims, witnesses and 
others; participation of victims in legal proceedings; and reparation for victims.  
 
 
 B. Complaints by and protection of victims and others 
 
 
170. As noted above, many treaties addressing crimes under national law contain no 
provision with respect to victims or witnesses. Treaties that do contain such 
provisions typically address: (a) the right of individuals to complain to relevant 
authorities; and (b) protection by the State party of the complainant and witnesses, 
thereby allowing them to come forward without fear of ill-treatment or intimidation.  
171. For example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides in article 13:  
 Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he  has been 
subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to 
complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its 
competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and 
__________________ 
VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I, International Criminal 
Court, para. 79). 
 
246
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (see footnote 238 above), 
Rule 85, sub-rule (b). Pursuant to Rule 85, sub-rule (b), of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Criminal Court (see footnote 238 above), a legal person must have suffered 
“direct harm”. There is no such limitation for natural persons under Rule 85, sub -rule (a). The 
Appeals Chamber held, however, that only persons who have suffered personal harm would be 
considered victims for the purposes of Rule 85, sub-rule (a). See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 9 OA 10, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and 
the Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008 , 
11 July 2008, Appeals Chamber International Criminal Court, paragraphs 32–39. 
 
247
 See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the inter-sessional open-ended working group 
(footnote 160 above), paragraph 83.  
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witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a 
consequence of his complaint or any evidence given. 248 
172. With respect to the action of State authorities once a complaint has been filed, 
it should be noted that draft article 7 of the present draf t articles currently provides 
that “[e]ach State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and 
impartial investigation whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that acts 
constituting crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction”. 
173. With respect to protection, later treaties have expanded the category of persons 
beyond complainants and witnesses to other persons. For example, the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provide for the protection of witnesses “who give 
testimony concerning offences” established in accordance with the Conventions 
and, “as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them”.249 
Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that:  
 Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges that a person has 
been subjected to enforced disappearance has the right to report the facts to the 
competent authorities, which shall examine the allegation promptly and 
impartially and, where necessary, undertake without delay a thorough and 
impartial investigation. Appropriate steps shall be taken, where necessary, to 
ensure that the complainant, witnesses, relatives of the disappeared person and 
their defence counsel, as well as persons participating in the investigation, are 
protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of the 
complaint or any evidence given.250 
174. By contrast, statutes of international criminal tribunals have been less 
expansive with respect to the types of persons to be protected. The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court,251 the Updated Statute of the International 
__________________ 
 
248
 See also Nowak and McArthur (footnote 67 above), p. 450.  
 
249
 Article 24 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and article 
32 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The phrase “and other persons close to 
them” is intended to cover persons who may be subject to danger by virtue of a particularly 
close relationship with the witness, but who are not relatives, such as a cohabiting partner or 
business partner (see McClean (footnote 81 above), pp. 260–261). 
 
250
 See also the Basic Principles and Guidelines … (footnote 240 above), paragraph 12 (b) (States 
should “[t]ake measures to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their representatives, 
protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as appropriate and ensure their safety 
from intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during 
and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the interests of victims”). 
 
251
 Art. 68, para. 1 (“The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses … particularly during 
the investigation and prosecution of such crimes”). 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,252 the Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda253 and the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea254 provide only for the protection of 
“victims” and “witnesses”.255 
175. Most treaties do not differentiate between the type of witness or victim for 
whom protective measures should be adopted. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court also emphasizes the position of children and victims of sexual or 
gender violence (art. 68, para. 2),256 though one commentator has asserted that 
“[t]hese statements, which generally begin with the words ‘in particular’, are not 
much more than admonishments”.257 
176. Some treaties provide a list of specific measures that “may” be taken or that 
the State “shall consider” taking with respect to the protection of victims, witnesses 
and others.258 For example, article 32, paragraph 2, of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides:  
__________________ 
 
252
 See the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
adopted by Security Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, article 22 (“The International 
Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the protection of victims and 
witnesses”). See also the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IT/2/Rev.50), rules 69 and 75, available from 
www.icty.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-evidence. 
 
253
 Article 21 reads: “[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda shall provide in its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses”. See also International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (13 May 2015) (ITR/3/REV.1), 
Rules 69 and 75. 
 
254
 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 33 (“The 
Extraordinary Chambers of the trial court shall ensure that trials are fair and expeditious and are 
conducted in accordance with existing procedures in force, with full respect for the rights of the 
accused and for the protection of victims and witnesses”). See also Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev.9), Rule 12 bis. 
 
255
 By contrast, article 16 of the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (available from 
www.rscsl.org/documents.html), refers to protective measures for “witnesses, victims who 
appear before the Court and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such 
witnesses”. Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Security 
Council resolution 1757 (2007), attachment) provides for “measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses, and such 
other appropriate assistance for witnesses who appear before the Special Tribunal and others 
who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses”.  
 
256
 See also International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on children, available 
from www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_Eng.PDF, and 
Policy paper on sexual and gender-based crimes, available from www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf. 
 
257
 W. A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome Statute , 2nd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 1059. 
 
258
 See the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, article 8, paragraphs 1 (f) and 5; the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 24, paragraph 2; and the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
article 6, paragraph 3. 
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 2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this article may include, inter 
alia, without prejudice to the rights of the defendant, including the right to  due 
process: 
  (a) Establishing procedures for the physical protection of such persons, 
such as, to the extent necessary and feasible, relocating them and permitting, 
where appropriate, non-disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of 
information concerning the identity and whereabouts of such persons;  
  (b) Providing evidentiary rules to permit witnesses and experts to give 
testimony in a manner that ensures the safety of such persons, such as 
permitting testimony to be given through the use of communications 
technology such as video or other adequate means.  
177. Other detailed measures259 mentioned in some treaties include: presenting 
evidence by electronic or other special means; 260 protecting the privacy and identity 
of witnesses and victims;261 in camera proceedings;262 withholding of evidence or 
information if disclosure may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a 
witness or his or her family;263 and relocating victims or witnesses.264  
__________________ 
 
259
 For detailed measures outlined in the Rules of Procedures of international criminal courts and 
tribunals, see the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (footnote 252 above), Rule 75; the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (footnote 253 above), Rule 69; the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (footnote 238 above), Rules 87 and 
88; and the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (footnote 
254 above), Rule 29.  
 
260
 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 68, paragraph 2 (“the Court 
may … allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means”); the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 24, paragraph 2 (b) 
(“Providing evidentiary rules to permit witness testimony to be given in a manner that ensures 
the safety of the witness, such as permitting testimony to be given through the use of 
communications technology such as video links or other adequate means”); and the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, article 32, paragraph 2 (b) (almost identical language to 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime). 
 
261
 See the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography, article 8, paragraph 1 (e) (“Protecting, as appropriate, 
the privacy and identity of child victims and taking measures in accordance with national law to 
avoid the inappropriate dissemination of information that could lead to the identification of 
child victims”); and the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, article 33 (“Such protection measures shall include, but not be limited to … the 
protection of the victim’s identity”) (footnote 254 above).  
 
262
 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 68, paragraph 2 (“the Court 
may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in 
camera”); and the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, article 33 (“Such protection measures shall include, but not be limited to, the 
conduct of in camera proceedings”) (footnote 254 above).  
 
263
 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 68, paragraph 5 (“Where the 
disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may lead to the grave 
endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the 
purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such 
evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be 
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178. While suggesting or listing measures that might be taken has some benefits, 
ultimately the central obligation remains simply that the State must protect victims 
and witnesses, and the particular measures for doing so will inevitably vary 
according to the circumstances at issue, the capabilities of the relevant Sta te and the 
preferences of the victims, witnesses and complainants. As such, the core provision 
as set forth in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (quoted above at paragraph  173) would appear suitable in 
the context of crimes against humanity.265  
179. At the same time, measures of protection taken by the State may affect the 
rights of a defendant, such as limiting disclosure of the identity of the witnesses. 
Consequently, some treaties, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court,266 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, 267 the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 268 and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption,269 also provide that any measures taken shall be 
without prejudice to the rights of the accused.270 
180. In light of the above, there would appear to be merit in including in a draft 
article on victims, witnesses and others a provision addressing the right of 
individuals to complain to relevant authorities, and protection by the State of the 
complainant and others, drawing upon the text from the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, taking into account 
draft article 7 and that any protective measures taken shall be without prejudice to 
the rights of the accused (see proposed draft article 14, paragraph 1, below).  
__________________ 
exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused 
and a fair and impartial trial”). 
 
264
 See the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 24, 
paragraph 2 (a) (“Establishing procedures for the physical protection of such persons, such as, 
to the extent necessary and feasible, relocating them and permitting, where appropriate, non-
disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of information concerning the identity and 
whereabouts of such persons”); and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, article 
32, paragraph 2 (a) (identical language).  
 
265
 Article 12, paragraph 1, reads, in relevant part: “Appropriate steps shall be taken, where 
necessary, to ensure that the complainant, witnesses, relatives of the disappeared person and 
their defence counsel, as well as persons participating in the inves tigation, are protected against 
all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of the complaint or any evidence given.”  
 
266
 Art. 68, para. 1 (“These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial”). 
 
267
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography, art. 8, para. 6 (“Nothing in the present article shall be 
construed to be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused to a fair and 
impartial trial”). 
 
268
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,  art. 24, para. 2 (“The 
measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this article may include, inter alia, without prejudice to 
the rights of the defendant…”). 
 
269
 Art. 32, para. 2 (almost identical language to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime). 
 
270
 See also the Basic Principles and Guidelines … (footnote 240 above), para. 27 (“Nothing in this 
document is to be construed as derogating from internationally or nationally protected rights of 
others, in particular the right of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due 
process”).  
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 C. Participation of victims in criminal proceedings 
 
 
181. The right of victims to participate in criminal proceedings against an alleged 
offender usually is not included in treaties addressing crimes under national law, 
even in those (discussed in the previous subsection) containing provisions on the 
complaints by, and protection of, victims and witnesses.271  
182. Some treaties addressing crimes under national law, however, do contain a 
provision on the participation of victims in the proceedings against the alleged 
offender. When this occurs, the relevant provision accords to States considerable 
flexibility as to the implementation of the obligation. For example, article 32, 
paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption provides that the 
right is subject to the State party’s national law: “Each State Party shall, subject to 
its domestic law, enable the views and concerns of victims to be presented and 
considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders in a 
manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence.” As suggested by the clause 
“subject to its domestic law”, when the right to participate is included, States are 
given considerable flexibility as to the implementation of the obligation. Similar 
examples to this provision may be found in: the Optional Protocol to  the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography;272 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime;273 and the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.274 Providing such flexibility 
__________________ 
 
271
 For example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment contains no such provision. The Committee Against Torture, however, has 
emphasized the importance of victim participation in processes for remedy and reparation. See 
general comment No. 3 (footnote 241 above), paragraph 4. The International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, while not providing expressly for the 
participation of victims in legal proceedings, has provisions relating to a victim’s right to have 
access to information (art. 18) and right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the 
enforced disappearance (art. 24). For an overview of national practices on victim participation, 
see Redress and Institute for Security Studies, “Victim participation in criminal law 
proceedings: survey of domestic practice for application to international crimes prosecutions”, 
September 2015, available from www.redress.org/downloads/1508victim-rights-report.pdf. 
 
272
 Art. 8 (“States parties shall adopt appropriate measures to protect the rights and interests of 
child victims of the practices prohibited under the present Protocol at all stages of the criminal 
justice process, in particular by: … (c) Allowing the views, needs and concerns of child victims 
to be presented and considered in proceedings where their personal interests are affected, in a 
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law”). See also the Convention on the 
rights of the child, article 12, paragraph 2. 
 
273
 Art. 25, para. 3 (“Each State Party shall, subject to its domestic law, enable views and concerns 
of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against 
offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence”).  
 
274
 Art. 6, para. 2 (“Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal or administrative system 
contains measures to provide victims or trafficking in persons, in appropriate cases: … 
(b) Assistance to enable their views and concerns to be presented and considered at appropriate 
stages of criminal proceedings against offenders, in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the 
defence”). The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime provides extensive 
obligations to protect migrants subject to conduct covered by the Convention but does not 
provide separately for participation.  
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allows States to tailor the requirement for the participation of victims in a manner 
most suitable to their national systems. 
183. The issue of participation by victims in legal proceedings was not addressed in 
the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia or the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The Law on the  
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 
however, allows for extensive participation of victims, who can even participate in 
legal proceedings as civil parties,275 though it requires participants to meet relatively 
strict criteria.276 Further, this approach reflects Cambodian national law, influenced 
by the French civil law system, which allows for victims to participate as civil 
parties in criminal proceedings.277 The issue of participation was also addressed in 
article 68, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
which provides: 
 Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which 
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair 
and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 278 
__________________ 
 
275
 See the Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (footnote 254 
above), Rule 23 (“1. The purpose of Civil Party action before the [Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia] is to: a) Participate in criminal proceedings against those responsible 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the [Extraordinary Chambers in the Court s of Cambodia] by 
supporting the prosecution; and b) Seek collective and moral reparations, as provided in Rule 23 
quinquies. 2. The right to take civil action may be exercised without any distinction based on 
criteria such as current residence or nationality. 3. At the pre-trial stage, Civil Parties participate 
individually. Civil Parties at the trial stage and beyond shall comprise a single, consolidated 
group, whose interests are represented by the Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers as described in IR 
12 ter. The Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers are supported by the Civil Party Lawyers described in 
IR 12 ter (3). Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers shall file a single claim for collective and moral 
reparations. 4. The Civil Party cannot be questioned as a simple witness in the same case and, 
subject to Rule 62 relating to Rogatory Letters, may only be interviewed under the same 
conditions as a Charged Person or Accused”).  
 
276
 Ibid., Rule 23 bis (“1. In order for Civil Party action to be admissible, the Civil Party applicant 
shall: a) be clearly identified; and b) demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the 
crimes alleged against the Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered physical, material 
or psychological injury upon which a claim of collective and moral reparation might be based. 
When considering the admissibility of the Civil Party application, the Co -Investigating Judges 
shall be satisfied that facts alleged in support of the application are more likely than not to be 
true”). 
 
277
 See Co-Prosecutors’ submission on civil party participation in provisional detention appeals, 22 
February 2008, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 01), Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, available from 
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/documents/court/co-prosecutors-submission-civil-party-participation. 
 
278
 See also the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (footnote 238 
above), Rules 89–93 and 131, sub-rule 2; and Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on 
victims’ participation (footnote 233 above), paragraph 85 (“the Trial Chamber has borne in mind 
that proceedings before the Court are sui generis and the Court must develop trial procedures 
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184. One commentator notes that “[w]hen the Rome Statute was being drafted, few 
could have imagined the importance that this short and rather obscure provision 
would have upon proceedings at the Court”279 as a result of the growth in 
participation. In August 2015, the Registry reported that in the years 2014 to 2 015, 
4,002 victims were admitted to participate in proceedings before the Court. During 
the same period, the Court also received 1,669 new applications for the participation 
of victims.280  
185. In light of the above, there would appear to be merit in includ ing in a draft 
article on victims, witnesses and others a provision addressing the right of victims 
to participate in criminal proceedings against an alleged offender, modelled on the 
text from the United Nations Convention against Corruption (see proposed  draft 
article 14, paragraph 2, below).  
 
 
 D. Reparation for victims 
 
 
186. Treaties that address crimes under national law and that contain a provision 
with respect to victims and witnesses typically also address the issue of reparation  
for victims. Such provisions appear inspired by provisions on the right to an 
“effective remedy” found in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 281 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights282 and regional human rights 
treaties.283 
__________________ 
that meet the particular exigencies of the international case that it will have to decide”). 
 
279
 Schabas, The International Criminal Court (see footnote 257 above), p. 1062. Professor Schabas 
notes that the language for article 68, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court is drawn from the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power (see footnote 239 above), which provide at paragraph 6 (b) that the 
responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be 
facilitated by “[a]llowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without 
prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system”. By  
contrast, the 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (see footnote 240 above) do not contain a principle or guideline 
on the right to participation. 
 
280
 Report of the International Criminal Court on its activities in 2014/15 (A/70/350), para. 27. 
 
281
 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 
10 December 1948, article 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law”). For an overview of the institutions and regimes on remedies for victims, see C. 
McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court , Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, chapter 2, and Shelton (footnote 242 above), chapter 3.  
 
282
 Art. 2, para. 3 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective 
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other 
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted”).  
  See also the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 31 (footnote 149 above), 
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187. The term “remedy”, however, has not generally been used in treaties 
addressing crimes under national law. Instead emphasis has been placed on a right 
to pursue reparation, using either the term “reparation” itself or terms such as 
“compensation”, “rehabilitation” or “restitution”. For example, the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
provides in article 14: 
 1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act 
of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate 
compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the 
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents 
shall be entitled to compensation.  
 2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons 
to compensation which may exist under national law.  
188. While article 14, paragraph 1, refers to “redress”, “compensation” and 
“rehabilitation”, the Committee Against Torture considers that paragraph 1 
embodies a “comprehensive reparative concept”.284 According to the Committee: 
 The obligations of States parties to provide redress under article 14 are two -
fold: procedural and substantive. To satisfy their procedural obligations, States 
parties shall enact legislation and establish complaints mechanisms, 
investigation bodies and institutions, including independent judicial bodies, 
capable of determining the right to and awarding redress for a victim of torture 
__________________ 
paragraphs 16–17. (“16. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to 
individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose 
Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is 
central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit 
reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee considers that 
the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where 
appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such 
as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws 
and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations. 17. In 
general, the purposes of the Covenant would be defeated without an obligation integral to article 
2 to take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the Covenant. Accordingly, it has 
been a frequent practice of the Committee in cases under the Optional Protocol to include in its 
Views the need for measures, beyond a victim-specific remedy, to be taken to avoid recurrence 
of the type of violation in question. Such measures may require changes in the State Party’s 
laws or practices”). 
 
283
 See the European Convention on Human Rights, article 13 (“Everyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity”); and the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica”, article 25 (“1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other 
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his 
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this 
Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the 
course of their official duties. 2. The States Parties undertake: a. To ensure that any person 
claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for 
by the legal system of the state; b. To develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and c. To 
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted”).  
 
284
 See the Committee Against Torture’s general comment No. 3 (footnote 241 above), paragraph 2.  
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and ill-treatment, and ensure that such mechanisms and bodies are effective 
and accessible to all victims. At the substantive level, States parties shall 
ensure that victims of torture or ill-treatment obtain full and effective redress 
and reparation, including compensation and the means for  as full rehabilitation 
as possible.285 
189. In particular, it should be noted that article 14, paragraph 1, provides that each 
“State Party shall ensure in its legal system*”. Such a phrase stresses that the 
obligation of the State party is to have necessary effective laws, regulations, 
procedures or mechanisms enabling victims to pursue adequate and appropriate 
redress for the harm they have suffered against those who are responsible. In 
implementing such an obligation, States parties may be guided by the provisions on 
access to justice set forth in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Huma n 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.286 
190. Many treaties concerned with crimes under national law focus solely on 
“compensation” as the relevant form of reparation. Examples of such treaties 
include: the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism;287 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; 288 the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;289 the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime;290 and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. 291 While the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment emphasizes “fair and adequate compensation” (see the text quoted at 
paragraph 187 above), the Committee Against Torture has emphasized that 
__________________ 
 
285
 Ibid., para. 5. 
 * Emphasis added. 
 
286
 Basic Principles and Guidelines … (see footnote 240 above), paras. 12–14. 
 
287
 Art. 8, para. 4 (“Each State Party shall consider establishing mechanisms whereby the funds 
derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized to compensate the victims … 
or their families”). 
 
288
 Art. 9, para. 4 (“States parties shall ensure that all child victims of the offences described in the 
present Protocol have access to adequate procedures to seek, without discrimination, 
compensation for damages from those legally responsible”).  
 
289
 Article 25, paragraph 2 (“Each State Party shall establish appropriate procedures to provide 
access to compensation and restitution for victims of offences covered by this Convention”) and 
also article 14, paragraph 2 (“When acting on the request made by another State Party in 
accordance with article 13 of this Convention, States Parties shall, to the extent permitted by 
domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning the confiscated 
proceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so that it can give compensation to 
the victims of the crime or return such proceeds of crime or property to their legitimate 
owners”). 
 
290
 Art. 6, para. 6 (“Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal system contains measures 
that offer victims of trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage 
suffered”). 
 
291
 Art. 35 (“Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with 
principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a 
result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those 
responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation”).  
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compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a victim of torture or  
ill-treatment.292 
191. The Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda contained 
provisions exclusively addressing the possibility of restitution of property,293 not 
compensation or other forms of reparation. Yet, in the establishment of other 
international criminal courts and tribunals, there appears to be recognition that 
focusing solely on restitution is inadequate (instead, the more general term 
“reparation” is used) and that establishing an individual right to reparation for each 
victim may be problematic in the context of a mass atrocity. Consequently, 
allowance is made for the possibility of reparation for individual victims or for 
reparation on a collective basis.294 For example, the International Criminal Court’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that in awarding reparation to victims 
pursuant to article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,295 
“the Court may award reparations on an individualized basis or, where it deems it 
appropriate, on a collective basis or both”, taking into account the scope and extent 
__________________ 
 
292
 See general comment No. 3 (footnote 241 above), paragraph 9; see also Kepa Urra Guridi v. 
Spain, Communication No. 212/2002, Report of the Committee Against Torture, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth session, Supplement No. 44  (A/60/44), Annex VIII.A, 
paragraph 6.8 (“article 14 of the Convention not only recognizes the right to fair and adequate 
compensation but also imposes on States the duty to guarantee compensation for the victim of 
an act of torture. The Committee considers that compensation should cover all the damages 
suffered by the victim, which includes, among other measures, restitution, compensation, and 
rehabilitation of the victim, as well as measures to guarantee the non -repetition of the 
violations, always bearing in mind the circumstances of each case”). 
 
293
 See the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
article 24, paragraph 3 (“In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return 
of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to 
their rightful owners”) (footnote 252 above); and the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (footnote 253 above), article 23, paragraph 3 (identical language).  
 
294
 See Basic Principles and Guidelines … (footnote 240 above), paragraph 13 (“In addition to 
individual access to justice, States should endeavour to develop procedures to allow groups of 
victims to present claims for reparation and to receive reparation, as appropriate”); and 
International Law Association, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, Report of The Hague 
Conference (2010), paragraph (2) o and s of the commentary to article 6 (“The concept of 
collective reparation has been even less explored than the right to individual reparation. Still, 
there are some developments that indicate that international law endorses collective reparation. 
… Collective reparations also receive support from the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court”) (available from www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/ 
cid/1018). 
 
295
 Art. 75 (“1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the 
Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the 
scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the 
principles on which it is acting. 2. The Court may make an order directly against a convict ed 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for 
reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in article  79”). The Appeals Chamber 
considered the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations in Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, Judgement [of 3 March 2015] on the appeals 
against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” 
of 7 August 2012, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Court. 
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of any damage, loss or injury.296 In the context of the atrocities in Cambodia under 
the Khmer Rouge, only “collective and moral reparations” are envisaged under the 
Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 297 
192. Perhaps under the influence of both the Commission’s 2001 articles on 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts298 and the General 
Assembly’s 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,299 the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance uses the 
broad term “reparation” but also provides a list of forms of reparation. Article 24, 
paragraphs 4 and 5, provides that: 
 4. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victims of 
enforced disappearance have the right to obtain reparation and prompt, fair 
and adequate compensation. 
 5. The right to obtain reparation referred to in paragraph 4 of this article 
covers material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms of 
reparation such as: 
  (a) Restitution; 
  (b) Rehabilitation; 
  (c) Satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and reputation;  
  (d) Guarantees of non-repetition. 
193. All the traditional types of reparation would appear potentially relevant in the 
aftermath of the commission of crimes against humanity. 300 Restitution, or the return 
to the status quo ex ante, may be an appropriate form of reparation, including the 
ability for a victim to return to his or her home, the return of moveable property or 
the reconstruction of infrastructure. Compensation may be appropriate with respect 
to both material and moral damages. Rehabilitation programs for large numbers of 
persons in certain circumstances may be required, such as programmes for medical 
treatment, provision of prosthetic limbs, trauma -focused therapy or reconstruction 
of public or private buildings, including schools, hospitals and places of religious 
worship. Satisfaction may also be a desirable form of reparat ion, such as issuance of 
a statement of apology or regret. Likewise, reparation for a crime against humanity 
might consist of assurances or guarantees of non-repetition. 
__________________ 
 
296
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (see footnote 238 above), 
Rule 97, sub-rule 1. See, generally, McCarthy (footnote 281 above). 
 
297
 Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (see footnote 254 
above), Rules 23 and 23 quinquies. 
 
298
 See Yearbook…2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, p. 26, para. 76.  
 
299
 Basic Principles and Guidelines … (see footnote 240 above), paras. 15 and 18–23. 
 
300
 The Special Rapporteur on truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non -recurrence has 
stressed the importance of adopting a “broad array of coherently organized measures” for 
victims of massive violations, distinguishing between reparation programmes with material and 
symbolic measures and those that distribute benefits to individuals or collectivities (report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees o f non-
recurrence (A/69/518), para. 84). 
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194. Moreover, while reparation specific to each of the victims may be warranted, 
such as through the use of regular civil claims processes in national courts or 
through a specially designed process of mass claims compensation, 301 in some 
situations only collective forms of reparation may be feasible or preferable, such as 
the building of monuments of remembrance or the reconstruction of schools, 
hospitals, clinics and places of worship. In still other situations, a combination of 
individual and collective reparations may be appropriate.  
195. As such, there would appear to be value in a draft  article that addresses 
reparation for victims, which builds upon the text used in the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, while 
allowing for flexibility as to the exact nature and form that such reparation should 
take (see proposed draft article 14, paragraph 3, below).  
 
 
 E. Draft article 14. Victims, witnesses and others 
 
 
196. Based on the aforementioned considerations, the following draft article is 
proposed:  
 
   Draft article 14. Victims, witnesses and others 
 
 1. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:  
  (a) any individual who alleges that a person has been subjected to a 
crime against humanity has the right to complain to the competent authorities; 
and  
  (b) complainants, witnesses, and their relatives and representatives, as 
well as other persons participating in any investigation, prosecution, 
extradition or other proceeding within the scope of the present draft articles, 
shall be protected against ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of any 
complaint, information, testimony or other evidence given. These measures 
__________________ 
 
301
 See, for example, M. Frigessi di Rattalma and T. Treves (eds.), The United Nations 
Compensation Commission: a Handbook, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999; H. van 
Houtte, “Mass property claim resolution in a post-war society: the Commission for Real 
Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in The International Bureau of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (ed.), Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement 
Systems, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 23–42; The International Bureau of 
the the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), Redressing Injustices through Mass Claims 
Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges , Oxford University Press, 2006; H. M. 
Holtzmann and E. Kristjánsdóttir, International Mass Claims Processes: Legal and Practical 
Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2007; H. van Houtte, B. Delmartino and I. Yi, Post-War 
Restoration of Property Rights under International Law, Volume I: Institutional Features and 
Substantive Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008; H. Das and H. van Houtte, Post-War 
Restoration of Property Rights under International Law, Volume II: Procedural Aspects , 
Cambridge University Press, 2008; C. R. Payne and P. H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and 
the UN Compensation Commission: Environmental Liability , Oxford University Press, 2011; R. 
P. Alford, “The Claims Resolution Tribunal”, in C. Giorgetti (ed.), The Rules, Practice, and 
Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals , Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2012, pp. 575–
590; and S. D. Murphy, W. Kidane and T. R. Snider, Litigating War: Mass Civil Injury and the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
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shall be without prejudice to the rights of the alleged offender referred to in 
draft article 10. 
 2. Each State shall, subject to its national law, enable the views and 
concerns of victims of a crime against humanity to be presented and 
considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against alleged 
offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights referred to in draft article 10.  
 3. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure in its legal system 
that the victims of a crime against humanity have the right to obtain 
reparation, on an individual or collective basis, consisting of one or more of 
the following forms: restitution; compensation; rehabilitation; satisfaction; 
guarantees of non-repetition. 
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Chapter V 
  Relationship to competent international criminal tribunals 
 
 
 A. Potential for conflicts 
 
 
197. In considering the Commission’s work on this topic, several States in the Sixth 
Committee have stressed that the draft articles on crimes against humanity should 
avoid any conflict with the rights or obligations of States with respect to competent 
international criminal tribunals,302 with many States specifically mentioning the 
need to avoid any conflict with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.303 
__________________ 
 
302
 See, for example, Austria, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth session, Sixth 
Committee, 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), paragraph 30 (“it would be useful if the legal 
relationship [between the draft articles and the constituent instruments of international or hybrid 
criminal courts] was explicitly reflected in the final draft articles, otherwise, the lex posterior 
regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could generate different  results”); 
Germany, ibid., 22nd Meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), paragraph 15 (“To ensure its success, this 
project must be compatible with existing rules and institutions of international criminal law”); 
Hungary, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), paragraph 83 (“recognizing the need to avoid 
conflict with other existing legal regimes in the field”); India, ibid., paragraph 65 (“in view of 
the existing legal regimes and mechanisms, it would require in-depth study and thorough 
discussion in the Commission. The proposed obligations should not conflict with existing treaty 
obligations and should not duplicate existing regimes”); Italy, ibid., 17th meeting 
(A/C.6/70/SR.17), paragraph 58 (“[Italy] endorsed the Commission’s view that the draft articles 
would avoid any conflicts with obligations of States arising under the constituent instruments of 
international or ‘hybrid’ criminal courts or tribunals”); Japan, ibid., 22nd meeting 
(A/C.6/70/SR.22), paragraph 130 (“The current work should avoid any legal conflicts with the 
obligations of States arising under the constituent instruments of international courts or 
tribunals”); Malaysia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), paragraph 47 (“the draft 
convention on crimes against humanity should be drafted in such a way as to ensure that any 
further work complemented, and did not overlap with, existing regimes”); Mexico, ibid., 21st 
meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), paragraph 51 (“The Commission’s work on the topic should 
complement the relevant existing instruments”); Portugal, ibid., 22nd meeting 
(A/C.6/70/SR.22), paragraph 61 (“the topic should be addressed with caution, taking into 
account the existing legal framework concerning crimes against humanity. It was important to 
avoid entering into conflict with regimes already in place”); and the Republic of Korea, ibid., 
23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), paragraph 56 (“In drafting a convention on crimes against 
humanity, the relevant provisions in existing treaties and the interrelationship of those 
provisions should be examined in detail to avoid conflicts with other treaty regimes”). 
 
303
 See, for example, the Netherlands, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), paragraph 42 (“It 
would also be pertinent to address the relation between the draft articles on crimes against 
humanity and the Rome Statute [of the International Criminal Court]. States parties to the … 
Statute were obliged to implement its provisions, including those on crimes against humanity, in 
their respective national legal systems. Any subsequent instrument on the  same topic should 
build on that existing practice”); Slovenia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), paragraph 4 
(“any new convention on crimes against humanity should be consistent with, and complement, 
the provisions [of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]”); the United Kingdom, 
ibid., paragraph 36 (“Any additional regime would need to complement rather than compete 
with the Rome Statute [of the International Criminal Court]”); Spain, ibid., Sixty-ninth session, 
21st meeting (A/C.6/69/SR.21), paragraph 42 (“it would be necessary to consider carefully … 
[the draft convention’s] precise relationship with the [Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court] and the International Criminal Court”); Trinidad and Tobago, ibid., 26th 
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198. With that in mind, the draft articles have been written to avoid any such 
conflicts.304 For example, draft article 9 allows a State to fulfil its aut dedere aut 
judicare obligation through surrender to a “competent international criminal 
tribunal”. Thus, where a State has an obligation to surrender, it can do so without 
encountering any conflict with draft article 9. Moreover, the draft articles generally 
have been designed to promote harmony with the constituent instruments of 
competent international criminal tribunals, such as by using in draft article 3 the 
definition of “crimes against humanity” found in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. 
199. As such, there do not appear to be any conflicts between the rights or 
obligations of States set forth in the draft articles and their rights and obligations 
with respect to competent international criminal tribunals. Even so, there would 
appear to be value in expressly addressing an unforeseen situation where a conflict 
might arise. Otherwise, in the event that a convention is adopted based on the draft 
articles, a conflict between a State’s rights or obligations under that convention and 
its rights or obligations under a treaty establishing an international criminal tribunal 
might depend on which instrument is more recent.305  
200. There are various examples of provisions that attempt to address potential 
conflicts, whereby rights or obligations under one treaty supersede those arising 
under another. Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations provides: “In the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. ” The Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides: “In the event of a 
conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the 
extent of the conflict” (art. XVI, para. 3). In light of such examples, and in light of 
the reference in draft article 9 to “competent international criminal tribunal”, one 
possible formulation for the present draft articles might be: “In the event of a 
conflict between the rights or obligations of a State under the present draft articles 
and its rights or obligations under the constitutive instrument of a competent 
international criminal tribunal, the latter shall prevail.” 
__________________ 
meeting (A/C.6/69/SR.26), paragraph 118 (“The project should not detract from, but rather 
complement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”); and the United Kingdom, 
ibid., 19th meeting (A/C.6/69/SR.19), paragraph 160 (“It was important that the work of the 
International Criminal Court in that area should not be affected”). 
 
304
 There are, of course, a variety of tribunals that have been constituted to address international 
crimes of a serious nature, ranging from tribunals established exclusively under international 
law, under a mixture of international and national law (sometimes referred to as “hybrid 
tribunals”), and exclusively under national law. Whether a particular tribunal is an “international 
criminal tribunal” will depend on how the tribunal was constituted. Further, the obligations of 
States with respect to any given tribunal will also vary. For example, the agreement of the 
United Nations with Sierra Leone creating the Special Court for Sierra Leone places no express 
obligations on other States to cooperate with the tribunal. See the Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (footnote 255 above); and United Nations Security Council resolution 1315 
(2000) of 14 August 2000 (requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the 
Government of Sierra Leone to create the Special Court).  
 
305
 See the 1969 Vienna Convention, article 30.  
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201. Consideration might also be given as to whether it is necessary to include an 
even broader provision in the present draft articles relating to any conflict with 
other international or national law or instruments. As a general matter, treaties 
concerning crimes in national law, as well as human rights treaties, do not address 
the broad possibility of conflicts with other sources of rights or obligations. As 
such, most treaties are drafted provision-by-provision to take account of any such 
conflicts, and leave any other possible conflicts to be resolved through the law of 
treaties, as contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(hereinafter “1969 Vienna Convention”) and customary international law, or other 
rules of international law addressing conflicts.306  
202. Even so, some treaties do contain provisions addressing in a broad fashion the 
possibility of conflicts between the treaty and other rules. For example, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment contains a “without prejudice” clause with respect to other treaties and 
national laws on torture, extradition or expulsion. Specifically, article 16, paragraph 2,  
of the Convention provides: “The provisions of this Convention are without 
prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law 
which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which 
relates to extradition or expulsion.” While such a provision addresses both 
international and national law, it does not expressly address a situation where such 
law provides lesser protection than contained in the Convention. 307  
203. Some other treaties focus solely on the treaty’s relationship with international 
law, asserting that nothing in the treaty “shall affect other rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of States under international law”. Thus, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings provides in article 19, 
paragraph 1, that “[n]othing in this convention shall affect other rights, obligations 
and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international 
humanitarian law”. The International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism similarly provides in article 21 that “[n]othing in this 
Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States an d 
individuals under international law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the 
United Nations, international humanitarian law and other relevant conventions ”. 
__________________ 
 
306
 See Yearbook … 2006, vol. II (Part Two), chapter XII, on “Fragmentation of international law: 
difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law”.  
 
307
 According to Nowak and McArthur, “[a]rticle 16(2) makes it clear that any wider protection 
mechanism relating to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in national or international law is 
not affected by the provisions of the Convention. Accordingly, in so far as other international 
instruments or national laws provide better protection to individuals, they are entitled to benefit 
from it; however, other international instruments or national laws can never restrict the 
protection which the individual enjoys under the Convention. A typical example of the 
application of the savings clause in Article 16(2) is the non-refoulement principle derived from 
Article 3 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] and Article 7 [of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] which, according to the jurisprudence of the relevant 
treaty bodies, applies not only to the danger of being subjected to torture (as in Article 3 [of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment]), 
but also to the danger of being subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” (Nowak and 
McArthur (see footnote 67 above), p. 575, para. 78). 
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Here, too, such a provision does not expressly address a situation where other 
instruments provide lesser protection than the relevant convention.  
204. In contrast, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance specifically addresses the situation where either 
international or national law provides lesser protection than the Convention. 
Article 37 of that Convention states: “Nothing in this Convention shall affect any 
provisions which are more conducive to the protection of all persons from enforced 
disappearance and which may be contained in: (a)  The law of a State Party; 
(b) International law in force for that State.” Thus, in a situation where other 
international or national law is less “conducive to the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance”, the relevant provisions of the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance take precedence. 
205. Such a broad provision addressing potential conflicts might be included in the 
present draft articles, but these draft articles have been crafted so as generally to 
prevail over conflicting national law, except as otherwise specified in the context of 
particular draft articles. For example, draft article 3, which contains a definition of 
crimes against humanity, provides in paragraph 4 that the draft article is without 
prejudice to any broader definition provided for in “any international instrument or 
national law”. Draft article 5, paragraph 7, provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions 
of its national law,* each State shall take measures, where appropriate, to establish 
the liability of legal persons”. Draft article 6, paragraph 3, provides that “[t]he 
present draft articles do not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction 
established by a State in accordance with its national law*”. Draft article 8 states in 
its paragraph 1 that “custody and legal measures shall be as provided in the law of 
that State,* but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any 
criminal, extradition or surrender proceedings to be instituted”. Draft article 9 
provides that the authorities of a State shall take the decision regarding whether to 
prosecute “in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature 
under the law of that State”. Draft article 10, paragraph 1, provides for the ful l 
protection of an alleged offender ’s rights “under applicable national and 
international law”, while paragraph 3 provides that rights of consular access “shall 
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations” of the host State, 
provided that those laws and regulations enable full effect to be given to such rights. 
Though not yet considered by the Commission, several provisions proposed in this 
report also seek to calibrate the relationship between the present draft articles and 
other sources of law, such as in proposed draft article 11 on extradition, proposed 
draft article 13 on mutual legal assistance and proposed draft article 14 on victims, 
witnesses and others.  
206. One difficulty with crafting a broad provision on potential conflicts is that  it 
might inadvertently undermine the present draft articles anytime they conflict with 
national law. For example, a provision allowing for the operation of national law 
whenever it is more conducive to the protection of persons from crimes against 
humanity might be viewed as allowing a State to deviate from the protections 
accorded to the alleged offender under draft article 10.  Consequently, in light of the 
attention already given in the present draft articles to addressing possible conflicts 
in context of specific issues, a broader provision is not recommended in this report.  
__________________ 
 * Emphasis added. 
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 B. Draft article 15. Relationship to competent international  
criminal tribunals 
 
 
207. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
   Draft article 15. Relationship to competent international criminal tribunals  
 
  In the event of a conflict between the rights or obligations of a State 
under the present draft articles and its rights or obligations under the 
constitutive instrument of a competent international criminal tribunal, the 
latter shall prevail. 
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Chapter VI 
  Federal State obligations 
 
 
 A. Overview 
 
 
208. Article 29 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides: “Unless a different 
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding 
upon each party in respect of its entire territory.”308 Thus, normally a treaty binds a 
State with respect to its entire territory, including States  that are “federal” in nature, 
in which significant autonomy is accorded to the constituent parts of the State. 309 
Yet “a different intention” may be expressed either in the treaty itself or by States, 
through reservations or declarations, when signing or ratifying a treaty. 310 When the 
latter occurs, other States may react by accepting or rejecting such reservations or 
declarations.311 To address such circumstances, treaties that address a specific 
subject matter, such as criminal jurisdiction, sometimes seek to address the scope 
and application of that treaty to different levels of national jurisdiction.312 
__________________ 
 
308
 For commentary, see O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: a Commentary, Berlin, Springer, 2012, pp. 489–503; O. Corten and P. Klein (eds.), The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: a Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2011; and 
M. E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 389–394. 
 
309
 See D. B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 314; and 
Dörr and Schmalenbach (footnote above), p. 493. See also Yearbook…1966, vol. II 
(A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l), p. 213, paragraph (4) of the commentary to article 25 (“One 
Government proposed that a second paragraph should be added to the article providing 
specifically that a State, which is composed of distinct autonomous parts, should have the right 
to declare to which of the constituent parts of the State a treaty is to apply. Under this proposal 
the declaration was not to be considered a reservation but a limitation of the consent to certain 
parts only of the State. The Commission was of the opinion that such a provision, however 
formulated, might raise as many problems as it would solve. It further considered that the words 
‘unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established’ in the text now 
proposed give the necessary flexibility to the rule to cover all legitimate requirements in regard 
to the application of treaties to territory”).  
 
310
 Dörr and Schmalenbach (see footnote 308 above), p. 493. See also A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law 
and Practice, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 189 (noting that “only in the last 
forty or so years … federations have sought to use reservations to deal with their problems in 
participating in treaties”). 
 
311
 See Hollis (footnote 309 above), p. 719 (“it is important to recognize that where a treaty neither 
prohibits nor permits federalism accommodations, several federal States have made reservations 
to limit their obligations to those areas of legislative jurisdiction that the federal government has 
assumed. On occasion, other States have objected to such reservations”). The Secretary -
General’s practice with respect to federal clauses is that “[d]eclarations of territorial application 
are to be distinguished from declarations made under ‘federal clauses’ in treaties whose subject -
matter falls within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or other t erritorial 
units” (United Nations, Summary of practice of the Secretary-General as depositary of 
multilateral treaties (United Nations publication, Sales No. E/F.94.V.15, document 
ST/LEG/7/Rev.1), para. 272). Where declarations are made pursuant to federal clauses, the 
Secretary-General “duly circulates and records such declarations” (ibid.). 
 
312
 Dörr and Schmalenbach (see footnote 308 above), pp. 492–493. 
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209. There are different ways that treaties have sought to address the issue of 
federal State obligations.313 Some treaties “include a ‘territorial clause’ where the 
treaty may apply to some of a State’s sub-federal territorial units but not others” or 
“may include a ‘federal State clause’ that limits the scope of the treaty’s obligations 
to those that the federal State’s government has constitutional authority to 
assume”.314 For example, the 1980 United Nations Convention on contracts for the 
international sale of goods contains a “territorial clause” which provides: “If a 
Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which, according to its 
constitution, different systems of law are applicable in relation to matters dealt with 
in this Convention, it may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, declare that this Convention is to extend to all its territorial 
units or only to one or more of them, and may amend its declaration by submitting 
another declaration at any time” (art. 93, para. (1)). Although territorial clauses are 
“mostly confined to treaties on commercial law, private law or private international 
law”,315 federal State clauses have been used in a range of treaties. Yet in recent 
years there has been less enthusiasm for federal State clauses, especially in the 
context of human rights obligations, where differentiated obligations within a State 
are viewed as inappropriate.316 Indeed, “[t]he serious complications to which the 
‘federal clause’ has given rise are probably responsible for the growing distrust 
levelled against it”.317  
210. As a result, some treaties include clauses that expressly deny any 
accommodation to federal States.318 For example, article 50 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that its “provisions … shall extend 
to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions”.319 The 1989 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty contains the same provision in 
__________________ 
 
313
 Hollis (see footnote 309 above), p. 719 (indicating that States may opt to include “clauses that: 
(a) authorize limited exceptions to a treaty’s obligations for federal States; (b) differentiate 
implementation among federal and non-federal States; (c) limit treaty obligations to the 
‘national’ level; or (d) reject any accommodation for federal States”). For examples of each type 
of clause, see ibid., pp. 720–723. 
 
314
 Hollis (see footnote 309 above), p. 719. See also R. B. Looper, “‘Federal State’ clauses in 
multilateral instruments”, The British Yearbook of International Law 1995–6, vol. 32 (1957), pp. 
162–203, at p. 164 (“The 'federal State' clause, then, is a method of qualifying multilateral 
treaty obligations at their inception. Such a clause is a concession granted to federal States in 
view of their peculiar constitutional structure. Concession it certainly is, for its main effect is to 
create a disparity of obligations between federal and unitary signatories to multilateral 
instruments”).  
 
315
 Aust (see footnote 310 above), p. 188.  
 
316
 See, for example, Hollis (footnote 309 above), p. 316 (“In recent years, there seems to be less 
enthusiasm for federal clauses … especially where human rights treaties are designed to 
establish universal minimum standards”).  
 
317
 Corten and Klein (see footnote 308 above), p. 745, para. 41. 
 
318
 Hollis (see footnote 309 above), p. 316.  
 
319
 There are 168 States parties to the Covenant, including several States with federal systems 
(Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States of America). For analysis, see 
M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary , 2nd rev. ed., 
Kehl, Germany, N.P. Engel, 2005, p. 809 (noting that “the express rule that the provisions of the 
Covenant extend to all parts of federal States without limitation or exception only serves to 
make clear that which in the absence of a federal clause in any event applies under international 
law”). 
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its article 9.320 Similarly, article 41 of the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that its 
“provisions … shall apply to all parts of federal States without any limitations or 
exceptions”. 
 
 
 B. Draft article 16. Federal State obligations 
 
 
211. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft article: 
 
   Draft article 16. Federal State obligations 
 
  The provisions of the present draft articles shall apply to all parts of 
federal States without any limitations or exceptions.  
  
__________________ 
 
320
 Art. 9 (“The provisions of the present Protocol shall extend to all parts of federal States without 
any limitations or exceptions”). There are 84 States parties to the Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty, including several States with federal systems (Australia, Canada, Germany and 
Switzerland). 
A/CN.4/704 
 
 
17-00990 100/165 
 
Chapter VII 
  Monitoring mechanisms and dispute settlement 
 
 
212. In the event that the present draft articles are used as a basis for a convention, 
consideration may be given to the value of one or more mechanisms for monitoring 
a State’s implementation of and compliance with the convention.  
213. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse existing monitoring mechanisms with 
respect to crimes against humanity, supplemental monitoring mechanisms that might 
be considered by States for a convention, and the issue of inter -State dispute 
settlement. 
 
 
 A. Existing monitoring mechanisms 
 
 
214. Currently there are numerous mechanisms that monitor potential situations of 
crimes against humanity, which can only briefly be surveyed. In the United Nations 
system, the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat regularly identify 
and respond to potential crimes against humanity. Subsidiary bodies or offices of the 
United Nations, including the Human Rights Council and the Office of the Special 
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, also monitor situations that involve crimes 
against humanity. Treaty bodies established by human rights instruments have 
addressed crimes against humanity to the extent that they relate to the body’s 
mandate. Finally, international tribunals and regional tribunals have helped identify 
and address crimes against humanity.  
215. Under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is 
tasked with determining the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression, as well as making recommendations and deciding on measures to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. As such, situations of crimes 
against humanity can fall within the Council’s mandate. The Security Council can 
receive information regarding potential crimes against humanity from numerous 
sources, including letters from States,321 groups of States322 and the Secretary-
__________________ 
 
321
 See, for example, the letter dated 14 January 1994 from the Permanent Respresentative of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (S/1994/45, Annex) (presenting a letter from the Mayor of the city of Tuzla reporting 
crimes against humanity in his city); the letter dated 15 April 1994 from the Permanent 
Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (S/1994/453) (informing the Security Council of reports that the safe area of Gorazde in 
Bosnia was about to fall as part of an ongoing campaign of crimes against humanity); the letter 
dated 30 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1997/96, Annex) (reporting mass 
deportation of ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan by the Taliban and stating that the State strongly 
believed such acts were crimes against humanity); the letter dated 16 January 1999 from the 
Permanent Representative of Albania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council (S/1999/50*) (calling for immediate action of the Security Council to address 
crimes against humanity in Kosovo); and the letter dated 16 January 2003 from the Permanent 
Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council (S/2003/52) (reporting that mass rape and other atrocities had 
occurred in the the Democratic Republic of the Congo and calling on the Security Counc il to act 
to punish those responsible for crimes against humanity).  
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General,323 and reports from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 324 In 
response to this information, the Security Council can adopt resolutions, 325 call for a 
commission of inquiry to be carried out by the Secretariat326 or issue a Statement of 
the President, on behalf of all 15 members of the Council. 327 
216. The General Assembly also has identified potential situations of crimes against 
humanity and called on States to respond. Under Article 10 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the General Assembly may discuss any questions or matters within 
the scope of the Charter of the United Nations, one of which is to maintain 
international peace and security (Art. 1). Similar to the Security Council, when 
information regarding crimes against humanity is brought to the attention of the 
__________________ 
 
322
 See, for example, the letter dated 26 January 1999 from the Chargé D’affaires a.i. of the 
Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council (S/1999/76*) (statement of the Islamic Group at the United Nations condemning crimes 
against humanity being committed in Kosovo).  
 
323
 See, for example, the letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of 
the Security Council (S/1994/674), paragraphs 72–86 (transmitting the results of a commission 
of inquiry into crimes in the former Yugoslavia, specifically identifying acts that occurred which 
constitute crimes against humanity); and the letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Secretary -
General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/928) (transmitting the results 
of the commission of inquiry into the Central African Republic, which concluded that crimes 
against humanity occurred). 
 
324
 See, for example, International Criminal Court, Sixteenth Report of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 
available from http://iccforum.com/media/background/general/2012 -12_ICC_OTP-
16th_Report_of_Prosecutor_to_UNSC.pdf (stating that the Office of the Prosecutor is 
continuing to monitor alleged attacks against civilians in Darfur that could be a part of ongoing 
crimes against humanity).  
 
325
 See, for example, Security Council resolution 556 of 23 October 1984 (condemning the 
apartheid system in South Africa and acknowledging that the system has been characterized as a 
crime against humanity); Security Council resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011 (considering 
that widespread attacks in Libya against civilians may amount to crimes against humanity); 
Security Council resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011 (considering that acts committed in Cote 
d’Ivoire could amount to crimes against humanity); Security Council resolution 2165 of 14  July 
2014 (expressing grave alarm at indiscriminate attacks in populated areas of Syria and stati ng 
that such acts may amount to crimes against humanity); Security Council resolution 2187 of 
25 November 2014 (expressing grave concern that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
crimes against humanity have been committed in South Sudan); and Security Council resolution 
2217 of 28 April 2015 (stating that acts of violence in the Central African Republic may amount 
to crimes against humanity).  
 
326
 See, for example, Security Council resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013 (calling for the 
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into the Central African Republic).  
 
327
 See, for example, the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 5 November 2014 
(S/PRST/2014/22) (calling on the Great Lakes Region to neither harbour nor provide protection 
of any kind to persons accused of human rights abuses, in particular crimes against humanity); 
the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 11 June 2015 (S/PRST/2015/12) 
(reiterating the Security Council’s condemnation of attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
the Central African Republic, including acts that may constitute crimes against humanity); and 
the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 9 November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/20) 
(urging the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue efforts to bring to 
justice perpetrators of human rights abuses, in particular those that may amount to crimes 
against humanity).  
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General Assembly, it can respond by passing resolutions328 as well as by calling for 
commissions of inquiry to be administered by the Secretariat.  
217. The Secretariat monitors crimes against humanity in conjunction with the 
other United Nations organs. It administers commissions of inquiry on crimes 
against humanity as requested by the Security Council, the General Assembly and 
subsidiary bodies, such as the Human Rights Council. Upon completion of the 
inquiry, the Secretariat reports its findings to the body that requested the inquiry. 329 
The Secretariat can also monitor the implementation of Security Council 330 and 
General Assembly resolutions.331 Additionally, the Secretary-General can bring to 
the attention of the Security Council any matter which may threaten international 
peace and security, including potential situations of crimes against humanity. 332 
218. In particular, the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
located within the Secretariat, is tasked with collecting information on massive and 
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The Office acts as an early 
warning system for the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council, to 
address situations that could potentially result in genocide.333 The Office of the 
Special Adviser collects information on potential atrocities, often from within the 
United Nations system, and identifies situations of concern using the Office ’s 
Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes,334 which specifically aims to identify 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Special Adviser then uses 
this information to issue statements335 and brief the Security Council.336 
__________________ 
 
328
 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 48/143 of 20 December 1993 (condemning 
sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia and affirming that perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity are individually responsible for such crimes); General Assembly resolution 53/156 of 
9 February 1999 (strongly condemning the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity that 
were committed in Rwanda in 1994); General Assembly resolution 66/253/B of 3 August 2012 
(recalling that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights had stated that 
violence in Syria may amount to crimes against humanity); and General Assembly resolution 
67/262 of 15 May 2013 (recalling statements that crimes against humanity have likely occurred 
in Syria and expressing concern at incidents of gender-based violence which could amount to 
crimes against humanity).  
 
329
 See, for example, the letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council (S/1994/1125) (updating the Security Council on conclusions 
reached by a Commission of Experts on their inquiry into Rwanda, concluding that individuals 
from both sides of the armed conflict had perpetrated crimes against humanity).  
 
330
 See, for example, the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 2139 (2014) (S/2014/208) (finding that crimes against humanity were 
committed in Syria). See also Security Council resolution 2139 of 22 February 2014.  
 
331
 See, for example, the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General 
Assembly resolution 51/115 of 12 December 1996 (A/52/497). 
 
332
 See Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations.  
 
333
 See the letter dated 12 July 2004 from the Secrtary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council (S/2004/567).  
 
334
 United Nations, Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes: a tool for prevention (2014),  
available from www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis% 
20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf.  
 
335
 See, for example, United Nations press release, Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Adviser of 
the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser of the 
Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, on the situation in Yarmouk, Syria, 9 April 
2015, available from www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/9%20April%202015_ 
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219. Subsidiary bodies of the United Nations also monitor the occurrence of crimes 
against humanity. For example, the Human Rights Council will often receive 
information from non-governmental organizations (NGOs)337 or special 
rapporteurs338 that identifies potential crimes against humanity. The Human Rights 
Council may respond to such reports by establishing a commission of inquiry, 339 
mandating the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct an 
investigation into a situation340 or adopting resolutions.341 Further, through its 
__________________ 
%20Special%20Advisers'%20statement%20on%20the%20situation%20in%20Yarmouk%20-
%20Syria (noting that all parties to the conflict in Syria have reportedly committed grave 
violations and abuses of human rights that may amount to crimes against humanity). See also 
United Nations press release, Statement by Adama Dieng, Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide and Jennifer Welsh, Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, on the situation 
in Yemen, 16 February 2016, available from www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/2016-
02-16%20OSAPG%20Statement%20on %20Yemen%20final.pdf (“Evidence gathered suggests 
that some of these actions may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity”).  
 
336
 See, for example, the statement of Under-Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention 
of Genocide Mr. Adama Dieng to the Meeting of the Security Council in Arria format on Inter -
communities Dialogue and prevention of crimes in Central African Republic on 14 March 2014 
(“Such widespread and systematic targeting of civilians based on their religion or ethnicity 
indicates that crimes against humanity are being committed”).  
 
337
 See, for example, the joint written statement submitted by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, a non-governmental organization in general consultative status, the Arab NGO 
Network for development, a non-governmental organization on the roster (A/HRC/S-15/NGO/1) 
(urging the Human Rights Council to call upon the Security Council to create a Commission of 
Inquiry into potential crimes against humanity in Libya); and the written statement submitted by 
Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status 
(A/HRC/S-19/NGO/2) (calling on the Human Rights Council to take a strong stand on the 
crimes against humanity and human rights abuses taking place in Syria, included recommending 
that the Security Council refer the situation to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court).  
 
338
 See, for example, the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/31/70) (concluding that crimes against 
humanity continue to occur in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and stressing the need 
for a framework on accountability measures for crimes against humanity).  
 
339
 See, for example, Human Rights Council resolution 22/13 of 21 March 2013, on the situation of 
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/RES/22/13) (establishing a 
Commission of Inquiry into potential human rights violations and crimes against humanity in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); Human Rights Council resolution S -17/1 of 
22 August 2011 on the the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/ 
S-17/1) (establishing a Commission of Inquiry into potential human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity in Syria); and Human Rights Council resolution 22/24 of 20 March 2013 on 
the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/RES/22/24) (same).  
 
340
 See, for example, Human Rights Council resolution 25/1 of 26 March 2014, promoting 
reconcilliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka (A/HRC/RES/25/1) (requesting 
that the Office of the High Commissioner monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and 
undertake a comprehensive investigation into the human rights abuses). See also the 
comprehensive report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on Sri Lanka (A/HRC/30/61) (identifying numerous human rights abuses that occurred in Sri 
Lanka, including gender-based violence, forced recruitment, torture, enforced disappearance and 
unlawful killings which may amount to crimes against humanity).  
 
341
 See, for example, Human Rights Council resolution 19/22 of 22 March 2012 on the situation of 
human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/RES/19/22) (acknowledging that human 
rights violations in Syria may amount to crimes against humanity and recommending that the 
main bodies of the United Nations urgently act to address crimes against humanity that may 
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universal periodic review, the Council assesses the human rights records of all 
Member States of the United Nations.342  
220. Human rights treaty bodies will often identify situations of crimes against 
humanity and provide recommendations for response, when the crimes against 
humanity intersect with the subject matter of the treaty. For example, when 
receiving reports from States parties, the Human Rights Committee addresses 
violations of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights such as 
violations of the right to life or the right not to be subjected to torture, which 
include circumstances where those violations rise to the level of crimes against 
humanity.343 Thus, while the mandates of the Human Rights Committee and other 
subsidiary bodies do not specifically include monitoring crimes against humanity, 
these bodies can identify and recommend appropriate State responses to crimes 
against humanity. 
221. Crimes against humanity are also monitored and addressed through 
international courts and tribunals. Such crimes were included within the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court,344 the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,345 the International Tribunal for Rwanda346 and other special courts and 
tribunals.347 Additionally, regional human rights courts identify and speak to crimes 
against humanity when such crimes intersect with human rights violations under 
their constitutive instruments,348 similarly to human rights treaty bodies.  
 
 
  
__________________ 
have been committed); and Human Rights Council resolution 25/25 of 26 March 2014 on the 
situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (A/HRC/RES/25/25*) 
(acknowledging that information received by the Commission of Inquiry provided reasonable 
grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed and recommends that the 
General Assembly submit the report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Security Council to 
consider appropriate international criminal justice mechanisms to ensure perpetrators are held to 
account).  
 
342
 General Assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006, para. 5 (e). 
 
343
 See, for example, the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the fifth 
periodic report of Colombia (CCPR/CO/80/COL) (identifying as a subject of concern proposed 
legislation on alternate penalties to imprisonment and recommending that such legislation does 
not apply to persons who commited crimes against humanity). See also Decision 2 (66) of the 
Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination on the Situation in Darfur 
(CERD/C/DEC/SDN/1) (recommending to the Secretary-General, and through him, the Security 
Council, the enlargement of the African Union force in Darfur with a mandate to protect 
civilians against crimes against humanity).  
 
344
 See article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
 
345
 See the Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(footnote 252 above), article 5.  
 
346
 See the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (footnote 253 above), 
article 3.  
 
347
 See the Special Rapporteur’s first report on crimes against humanity (A/CN.4/680 and Corr.1), 
chapter III, section C. 
 
348
 See A. Huneeus, “International criminal law by other means: the quasi-criminal jurisdiction of 
the human rights courts”, American Journal of International Law , vol. 107, No. 1 (January 
2013), pp. 1–44, at pp. 14–15 and 18. 
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 B. Potential monitoring mechanisms under a convention 
 
 
222. There are a range of supplemental monitoring mechanisms that might be 
considered by States for a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against humanity. A particularly useful resource in this regard is the secretariat ’s 
2016 study on information on existing treaty-based monitoring mechanisms which 
may be of relevance to the future work of the International Law Commission on the 
topic of crimes against humanity.349 Among other matters, the study surveys 
institutional structures and procedures under existing treaties,350 which indicate a 
range of possible options for States. The following provides a summary of those 
institutions and procedures. 
 
 1. Types of institutions 
 
223. Existing treaties have created different institutional structures to assist in the 
monitoring of, implementation of and compliance with the relevant treaty. 
Generally, these structures may be grouped into four categories: (a) committees;  
(b) commissions; (c) courts; and (d) meetings of States parties.351 
224. First, committees typically consist of independent experts who are nationals of 
the States parties to the treaty and are nominated and elected by States parties. 352 
Requirements for committee membership often include high moral standing or 
character, competence in the field relevant to the treaty and impartiality, which is 
accomplished by having such experts serve in their personal capacity. 353 Such 
requirements may also call for equitable geographical distribution, representation of 
the principal legal systems or balanced gender representation.354 
225. The specific mandate of a committee varies depending on the instrument. 
Some instruments will create committees with a general mandate, to consider 
__________________ 
 
349
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat on information on existing treaty-based monitoring 
mechanisms which may be of relevance to the Commission’s future work on the topic “Crimes 
against humanity” (A/CN.4/698). 
 
350
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the rights of 
the child; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance; and the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination.  
 
351
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 5.  
 
352
 Ibid. Committees are established by the following conventions: the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 8, para. 1; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 28, para. 2; the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 17, para. 1; the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 17, para. 1; the Convention 
on the rights of the child, art. 43, para. 2; the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of 
Discrimination, art. 27; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, art. 26, para. 2; and the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art.  6.  
 
353
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 7.  
 
354
 Ibid. 
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progress made “in the implementation of”355 or “in achieving the realization of the 
obligations undertaken in”356 their respective treaty. Other treaties will list specific 
functions for the committee, such as: examining reports submitted by States 
parties;357 adopting general comments or recommendations;358 considering 
individual complaints;359 assessing inter-State complaints;360 undertaking inquiries 
and/or visits;361 considering urgent action requests;362 and providing information to 
an assembly of the States parties.363 A committee can also have a limited mandate, 
focused on a single function or on a particular region, such as the Committee 
Against Torture’s Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Torture, which monitors 
places of detention within States parties,364 or the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region Committee for the prevention and the punishment of the crime 
__________________ 
 
355
 See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
article 17, paragraph 1. 
 
356
 See the Convention on the rights of the child, article 43, paragraph 1.  
 
357
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 9; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 40; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, article 18; the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
article 19; the Convention on the rights of the child, article 44; and the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 29. 
 
358
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 9, paragraph 2; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
article 40, paragraph 4; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, article 21; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 19, paragraph 4; and the Convention on the rights 
of the child, article 45 (d).  
 
359
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 14; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, article 1; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 22; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, article 1; the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 31; and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, 
article 5. 
 
360
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 11; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article  41; 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, article 21; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, article 32; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on a communications procedure, article 12.  
 
361
 See, for example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, article 20, paragraph 3; the Optional Protocol to the Convention for 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, article 8, paragraph 2; the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
article 33; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure, article 13.  
 
362
 See, for example, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, article 30.  
 
363
 Ibid., art. 27. 
 
364
 The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other  Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5.  
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of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and all forms of 
discrimination, whose work is limited to the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 365 
226. Second, commissions are typically panels of independent experts, usually 
elected by States parties for a set number of years.366 They are sometimes convened 
with similar functions to committees but are often focused on a particular dispute or 
type of treaty violation.367 Commissions can be permanent bodies368 or may be 
convened ad hoc.369 The mandate of any given commission varies. For example, ad 
hoc conciliation commissions typically have a limited mandate to resolve inter -State 
disputes that could not be satisfactorily resolved through negotiation, 370 while other 
commissions may be called upon only to address alleged breaches of the 
constitutive treaty.371 Other commissions have much more general mandates, such as 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which has broad “competence 
with respect to matters relating to the fulfilment of the commitments made by the 
States Parties”.372 
227. Commissions may also have an obligation periodically to report to an 
international body. Currently this practice is specific to regional commissions, with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reporting to the Organization of 
American States and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
reporting to the African Union.373 
__________________ 
 
365
 The Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination, art. 26, para. 1, and art. 38.  
 
366
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 11–17.  
 
367
 See, for example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, created by the American 
Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 33; the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, created by the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, article 30; and the International Fact-Finding Commission, created by the 
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the pro tection 
of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), article 90. Under the Fact -Finding 
Commission associated with Protocol I, States parties must declare their acceptance of 
article 90; to date, only 76 of 174 States parties have done so. While that Commission is capable 
of being operational, it has never been used.  
 
368
 See, for example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples' Rights; and the International Fact-Finding Commission.  
 
369
 See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 12, paragraph 1 (a); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 42, paragraph 1 (a).  
 
370
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 19. See, for example, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
article 12, paragraph 1 (a); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
42, paragraph 1 (a). 
 
371
 See the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), article 90, paragraph 2  (c). 
 
372
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 20–23, at para. 20. 
See the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 41; and 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, article 45.  
 
373
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 24. See also the 
American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 41, 
subparagraph g; and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, articles 54 and  59, 
paragraph 3. 
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228. Third, the treaty may establish a court. This is a particular feature of the 
regional human rights conventions.374 Such courts are permanent judicial 
institutions charged with monitoring the conduct of the States parties in the 
implementation of the treaty.375 The court typically has jurisdiction over matters 
relating to the interpretation and application of the treaty establishing the court, 
though the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights also extends its jurisdiction 
to “any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned ”.376 
Each court has a different process for cases to be brought before it, with some courts 
allowing individuals or even NGOs to bring cases, 377 while others limit standing to 
States parties and the treaty’s commission.378 
229. Fourth, the treaty may establish a meeting of the States parties, during which 
the States parties perform various monitoring functions.379 Such a meeting might 
occur on a regular basis,380 such as annually or biennially, or only when convened 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,381 by the depositary of the treaty382 
or upon the request of one or more States parties (if then approved by the majority 
of States parties).383 Meetings of States parties will generally have broad mandates, 
such as with the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, which gives a mandate “to review the implementation of the Convention, 
and any problems encountered with regard to its application” (art. 23).384 
 
  
__________________ 
 
374
 See the European Convention on Human Rights, article 19; the American Convention on Human 
Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 33; and the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. 
 
375
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 25.  
 
376
 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 7. See also the European Convention on 
Human Rights, article 32; and the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, 
Costa Rica”, article 62, paragraph 3. 
 
377
 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment o f an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 5; and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 34. 
 
378
 See the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 61.  
 
379
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 32–33. See, for 
example, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, article 23; 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 112; the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 32; and the Protocol additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), article 7.  
 
380
 See, for example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 112, paragraph 6; 
and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 32.  
 
381
 See, for example, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
article 23. 
 
382
 See, for example, the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), article 7.  
 
383
 See, for example, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
article 23.  
 
384
 See also the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, article 23; 
and the memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paragraphs 35–37.  
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 2. Types of procedures  
 
230. Monitoring mechanisms can entail a range of procedures, including: 
(a) reports by States parties; (b) complaints, applications or communications by 
individuals; (c) inter-State complaints; (d) inquiries or visits; (e) urgent action; and 
(f) presentation of information for meetings of States parties. 385 
231. First, reports by States parties may be required on a regular basis by the 
treaty’s committee, commission or other body.386 Reports will typically include 
measures undertaken by the State party to implement the treaty, such as the 
enactment of any necessary national laws and regulations, as well as any difficulties 
the State is experiencing with respect to implementation or compliance. 387 In 
response to the report by a State party, the monitoring institution may provide 
“recommendations” or “comments” to the State party,  388 and in some instances to 
the United Nations or other international body.389 
232. Second, treaties also may provide for complaints, applications or 
communications by individuals.390 Individual complaint mechanisms typically take 
effect if a State either declares that it recognizes the competence of the respective 
__________________ 
 
385
 Ibid., para. 38.  
 
386
 Ibid., paras. 39–46. See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 9; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 40; the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” , 
article 42; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
article 18; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 62; the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 19; the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, article 17; the Convention on the rights of 
the child, article 44; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, article 29.  
 
387
 Ibid.  
 
388
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 47. See, for example, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 40, paragraph 4; the 
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 9, 
paragraph 2; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, article 19, paragraph 3; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, article 21, paragraph 1; and the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,  article 29, paragraph 3. 
 
389
 See, for example, the Convention on the rights of the child, article 45 (b) (the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child transmits reports of States parties to specialized agencies, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund and other competent bodies, as it considers appropriate).  
 
390
 See the European Convention on Human Rights, article 34; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 14; the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 1–2; the American Convention on 
Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 44; the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, article 55; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 22; the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty, article 5; the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, 
article XIII; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, article 2; the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 31; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, article 5.  
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institution to assess individual complaints391 or signs an optional protocol,392 but 
may also be designed to operate without such State action. 393 
233. Depending on the treaty, such complaints may be filed by individuals, group s 
of persons or non-governmental entities.394 Typically local remedies must first be 
exhausted, there must be no local remedy available to provide effective redress or 
there must be undue delay in the remedial process before an individual complaint 
can be submitted.395 Specific monitoring mechanism institutions may also have 
additional admissibility criteria.396 Once the relevant body receives an individual 
__________________ 
 
391
 See the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
article 14, paragraph 2; the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica”, article 44; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, article 22, paragraph 1; and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 31, paragraph 1.  
 
392
 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications 
procedure.  
 
393
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 49–56. 
 
394
 Ibid. See, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, article 14, paragraph 2 (permitting complaints from individuals and groups of 
individuals); the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, 
article 44 (permitting complaints from any person, group of persons or legally recognized non -
governmental entity); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, article 22, paragraph 1 (permitting complaints from individuals); the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article  1 
(permitting complaints from individuals); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, article 2 (permitting complaints 
from individuals and groups of individuals); the International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 31, paragraph 1 (permitting complaints from 
or on behalf of victims); and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on a communications procedure, article 5 (permitting complaints by or on behalf of an 
individual or group of individuals).  
 
395
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), para. 57. See, for example, 
the European Convention on Human Rights, article 35, paragraph 1; the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 14, paragraph  7 
(a); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, article 22, paragraph 5 (b); the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, articles 2 and 5, paragraph 2 (b); the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, article 4, 
paragraph 1; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, article 31, paragraph 2 (d); and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, article 7, paragraph 5.  
 
396
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 58–65. See, for 
example, the European Convention on Human Rights, article 35 (requiring that the  application 
cannot be anonymous, the matter cannot be substantially the same as another matter addressed 
by the court, the application cannot be manifestly ill founded and the applicant cannot abuse the 
right of the individual application); and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on a communications procedure, article 7 (considering communications 
inadmissible if: “1. The communication is anonymous; 2. The communication is not in writing; 
3. The communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission of such communications 
or is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention and/or the Optional Protocols thereto; 
4. The same matter has already been examined by the Committee or has been or is being 
examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; 5. All available 
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
111/165 17-00990 
 
complaint, a procedure will be initiated whereby, ultimately, suggestions, 
recommendations or views are given by the body to the State party concerned, after 
which the State may be required to provide a written response, indicating any 
remedies that it has taken to resolve the situation. 397 
234. Third, the treaty may provide for inter-State complaints.398 Some treaties allow 
for such complaints with respect to all States parties, while others only permit inter -
State complaints if the respondent State has made a declaration accepting such a 
complaint procedure.399 Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights and the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, if a complaint is not resolved to the satisfaction of the States parties 
involved, their respective committees will create an ad hoc conciliation commission 
for further proceedings.400 
235. Fourth, the treaty may establish a process for inquiries or visits.401 For treaties 
with inquiries, the relevant body can initiate an inquiry upon receipt of reliable 
information indicating that a serious breach by a State par ty has occurred.402 This 
__________________ 
domestic remedies have not been exhausted. This shall not be the rule where the application of 
the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief; 6. The  
communication is manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated; 7. The facts that are 
the subject of the communication occurred prior to the entry into force of the present Protocol 
for the State party concerned, unless those facts continued after that date; 8. The communication 
is not submitted within one year after the exhaustion of domestic remedies, except in cases 
where the author can demonstrate that it had not been possible to submit the communication 
within that time limit”).  
 
397
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 66–69 and 71–78.  
 
398
 See, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, article 33; the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 11; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 41; the American Convention on 
Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, article 45; the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, article 47; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 21; the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty, article 4; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, article 32; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications procedure, article 12.  
 
399
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 41, para. 1; the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 21, 
para. 1; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure, art. 12, para. 1.  
 
400
 See the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
article 12, paragraph 1 (a); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
article 42, paragraph 1 (a).  
 
401
 See the European Convention on Human Rights, article 52; the Protocol additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), article 90, paragraph 2; the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment article 20; the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, article 8; the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 4; the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 33; and the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, article 13.  
 
402
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 88–89. See, for 
example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
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inquiry may include a visit to the State party if warranted and if the State party 
agrees.403 The findings of the inquiry are then transmitted to the State party, along 
with comments, suggestions or recommendations.404 Alternatively, the treaty may 
provide for regular visits to a State party. For example, the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment establishes “a system of regular visits undertaken by independent 
international and national bodies to places where people are deprived of their 
liberty, in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” (art. 1). 
236. Fifth, the treaty may provide procedures for urgent action. However, such a 
procedure has only been established by the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance to trace disappeared 
persons. An urgent action can be initiated via request to the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances by relatives of a disappeared person. The urgent action will only be 
considered by the Committee if the request: (a) is not manifestly unfounded;  
(b) does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission; (c) has already been duly 
presented to the competent bodies of the State party concerned; (d) is not 
incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; and (e) the same matter is not 
being examined under another procedure of international investigation (art. 30). The 
Committee can then transmit recommendations to the State party concerned, which 
can include a request for the State party to take all necessary measures to locate and 
protect the person concerned (art. 30, para. 3). The urgent action remains in place 
“for as long as the fate of the person sought remains unresolved” (art. 30, para. 4). 
237. Sixth, and finally, the treaty may provide for a procedure for the presentation 
of information to meetings of States parties.405 For example, the treaty may allow 
the treaty’s committee or commission to bring a matter to the urgent attention of the 
States parties (or another international body) in “special cases” where the committee 
or commission has received one or more communications that reveal widespread or 
systematic violations of the treaty.406 That, in turn, may lead to a further study of the 
situation with findings.407  
238. In the event that the present draft articles are transformed into a convention on 
the prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, there exists a possibility 
__________________ 
Punishment, article 20, paragraph 3; the Optional Protocol to Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, article 8, paragraph 2; and the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, article 13, 
paragraph 2.  
 
403
 Ibid.  
 
404
 See, for example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, article 20, paragraph 4; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, article 8, paragraph 3; and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, 
article 13, paragraph 4. 
 
405
 Memorandum prepared by the secretariat (see footnote 349 above), paras. 105–107. 
 
406
 Ibid. See, for example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, article 58, paragraph 
1; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
article 34; and the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination, article 38, 
paragraph 2 (c).  
 
407
 Ibid. 
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for the selection of one or more of the above mechanisms to supplement existing 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms might help ensure that States parties fulfil their 
commitments under the convention, such as with respect to adoption of national 
laws, pursuing appropriate preventive measures, engaging in prompt and impartial 
investigations of alleged offenders and complying with their aut dedere aut judicare 
obligation. Selection of a particular mechanism or mechanisms, however, turns less 
on legal reasoning and more on policy factors, the availability of resources and the 
relationship of any new mechanism with those that already exist. 408 Further, choices 
would need to be made with respect to structure: a new monitoring mechanism 
might be incorporated immediately in a new convention or might be developed at a 
later stage,409 such as occurred with the creation of a committee for the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.410 Finally, such a monitoring 
mechanism might be developed in tandem with a monitoring mechanism for the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for which 
there have been periodic calls.411 
 
 
 C. Inter-State dispute settlement 
 
 
239. This section explores inter-State dispute settlement.412 The basic methods for 
peaceful settlement of disputes, of course, are captured in Article 33, paragraph 1, of 
the Charter of the United Nations, which requires that Member States “shall, first of 
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice” for disputes that may endanger international peace and 
security.413 
240. There is currently no obligation upon States to resolve inter -State disputes 
specifically in relation to crimes against humanity. To the extent that such disputes 
can be resolved, it will occur in the context of a broader obligation for inter -State 
__________________ 
 
408
 States recently engaged in extensive discussions regarding a possible new mechanism for 
monitoring compliance with international humanitarian law, which revealed a range of views as 
to the best means for doing so. See J. Pejic, “Strengthening compliance with IHL: the ICRC–
Swiss Initiative”, International Review of the Red Cross (2016), available from 
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross/article/ 
div-classtitlestrengthening-compliance-with-ihl-the-icrc-swiss-initiativediv/ 
415157E58381E77C13BBEEC63A85EDC3.  
 
409
 See J. Galbraith, “Treaty options: towards a behavioral understanding of treaty design”, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, vol. 53 (2013), pp. 309–364, at p. 341 (empirical and behavioural 
economics study finding that States are much more willing on average to embrace monitoring 
mechanisms when they are presented in optional protocols, which are separate documents from 
the main treaty, than when these commitments are presented in “opt-in” clauses). 
 
410
 See Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985. 
 
411
 See W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: the Crime of Crimes , 2nd ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 649–651. 
 
412
 See, generally, C. Gray and B. Kingsbury, “Developments in dispute settlement: Inter-State 
arbitration since 1945”, British Yearbook of International Law , vol. 63, No. 1 (1993), pp. 97–
134. 
 
413
 See also F. Cede, “The settlement of international disputes by legal means — arbitration and 
judicial settlement”, in J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk and I. W. Zartman (eds.),  The SAGE 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution, London, SAGE, 2009, pp. 358–360. 
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dispute settlement,414 which may (or may not) include disputes with respect to 
crimes against humanity. 
241. Disputes concerning, inter alia, crimes against humanity may also be 
channelled into a mechanism relating to a different crime, such as genocide or 
torture, for which there exists a means for inter -State dispute settlement. For 
example, the claims brought by Bosnia and Hezegovina and by Croatia against 
Serbia before the International Court of Justice, as well as the counterclaims by 
Serbia, focused on violation of the obligation to prevent or punish genocide, 415 as 
there was no treaty providing for the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to crimes 
against humanity. The case brought by Belgium before the Court focused on 
whether Senegal had violated its obligations to extradite or prosecute Hissène Habré 
for torture, as, again, there was no treaty providing for the Court’s jurisdiction with 
respect to crimes against humanity.416 In both these cases, there were also 
allegations of crimes against humanity.  
242. Crimes against humanity have been mentioned in the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights when evaluating 
issues such as fair trial rights,417 ne bis in idem,418 nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
praevia lege poenali419 and the legality of amnesty provisions.420 
243. Treaties addressing crimes in national law often include dispute settlement 
provisions and, in recent decades, have established an increasingly detailed process 
__________________ 
 
414
 For example, crimes against humanity arose before the International Court of Justice in the 
context of counter-claims filed by Italy in the case brought by Germany under the 1957 
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Jurisdictional Immunities of the 
State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 310, at 
pp. 311–312, para. 3). In that instance, however, the Court found that since the counterclaims by 
Italy predated the entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights, they fell 
outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction (ibid., pp. 320–321, para. 30).  
 
415
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 , p. 43; and 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015, ICJ, 2015 General List No. 118, p. 118.  
 
416
 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422. 
 
417
 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Application nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, 
Judgment of 22 March 2001, Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2001-II (concurring opinion of Judge Loucaides); and K.-H. W. v. 
Germany, Application no. 37201/97, Judgment of 22 March 2001, Grand Chamber, European 
Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-II (concurring opinion of 
Judge Loucaides).  
 
418
 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Series C, No. 154, p. 62, para. 154. 
 
419
 Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia, Application nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, Decision on admissibility 
of 17 January 2006, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
2006-I. 
 
420
 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Series C, No. 75, concurring opinion of Judge Sergio García-Ramírez, para. 13; Gelman v. 
Uruguay, Judgment of 24 February 2011, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, 
No. 221, paras. 198 and 210; and Marguš v. Croatia, Application no. 4455/10, Judgment of 
27 May 2014, Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2014, paras. 130–136.  
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for dispute settlement.421 For example, article IX of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide allows part ies to bring a 
dispute to the International Court of Justice but does not provide for any other 
dispute settlement process: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those 
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at 
the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”422 
244. Similarly, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination provides solely for dispute settlement by the International 
Court of Justice, although it also makes reference to the possibility of negotiation or 
of some other mode of settlement. Article 22 reads: “Any dispute between two or 
more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly 
provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the 
dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the 
disputants agree to another mode of settlement.” 
245. More recent treaties set out a process for dispute settlement that begins with 
negotiation, then calls for arbitration, and finally resort to the International Court of 
Justice. For example, article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention for the suppression 
of unlawful seizure of aircraft provides:  
 Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled 
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to 
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration th e 
Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of 
those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by 
request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.  
 
246. This language is replicated, either identically or with only minor 
modifications, in several treaties: the Convention on the prevention and punishment 
of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents 
(art. 13); the International Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 16); the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (art. 30); the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel (art. 22); the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings (art. 20); the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism (art. 24); the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (art.  35); the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
__________________ 
 
421
 Cede (see footnote 413 above), p. 360. 
 
422
 In contrast, the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims do not provide for dispute 
settlement at the International Court of Justice, but do provide for a type of conciliation 
procedure—by means of Protecting Powers—in the interest of protected persons, “particularly 
in cases of disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or 
interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention”. See, for example, article 11 of the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (Convention I). To date, this procedure has not been used.  
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Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (art.  15); the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (art.  66); and the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance 
(art. 42). 
247. While there are some alternative possibilities,423 this multi-step dispute 
settlement process of negotiation, arbitration and judicial settlement is often used in 
treaties addressing crimes in national law. Such provisions appear to reflect a belief 
by States that a dispute settlement process is an important mechanism for helping to 
ensure compliance with treaty commitments. Even if relatively few cases ultimately 
are taken to arbitration or filed at the International Court of Justice, the process 
provides a channel for inter-State negotiation “in the shadow” of a possible resort to 
arbitration or judicial settlement. Each of these steps — negotiation, arbitration and 
judicial settlement — is discussed briefly below. 
 
 1. Negotiation 
 
248. The antecedent requirement that there be negotiations prior to resort to inter -
State compulsory dispute settlement is commonly included in inter -State dispute 
settlement provisions. Such provisions, however, do not usually specify what 
exactly it means when a dispute “cannot be settled by negotiation”. The travaux 
préparatoires of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime indicates that such a provision “is to be 
understood in a broad sense to indicate an encouragement to States to exhaust all 
avenues of peaceful settlement of disputes, including conciliation, mediation and 
recourse to regional bodies”.424 
249. In Mavrommatis, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that the 
requirement for negotiation prior to resort to compulsory dispute settlement was 
intended to ensure that the respondent party simply had notice of the impending 
__________________ 
 
423
 For example, the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism does not 
require that States submit a dispute to arbitration prior to referring a case to the International 
Court of Justice. The Convention provides that, after negotiation, a State party to the dispute can 
elect to submit the case either to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice (art. 22). The 
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism provides for dispute settlement through consultation, 
negotiation or “any other peaceful means” (art. XIX). Further, treaties establishing international 
criminal tribunals may have alternative methods of dispute settlement given the existence of 
institutional mechanisms. See, for example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, article 119 (“1. Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled 
by the decision of the Court. 2. Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to 
the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled through negotiations within 
three months of their commencement shall be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The 
Assembly may itself seek to settle the dispute or may make recommendations on further means 
of settlement of the dispute, including referral to the International Court o f Justice in conformity 
with the Statute of that Court”). 
 
424
 Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,  
Official Records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, Tenth session (A/AC.254/33), para. 34. 
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case before it was filed.425 The International Court of Justice reached a similar 
conclusion in the South West Africa cases, where it held that the duty to negotiate 
can be met even when no direct or formalized negotiations have taken place.426 In 
more recent cases, however, the Court has indicated that the applicant State must 
make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute through negotiation. For example, in 
Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, the Court distinguished between merely 
providing notice of an impending case and engaging in actual good faith 
negotiations with the intent of resolving the dispute. 427 In Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , 
the Court stated: 
 In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observes that 
negotiations are distinct from mere protests or disputations. Negotiations entail 
more than the plain opposition of legal views or interests between two parties, 
or the existence of a series of accusations and rebuttals, or even the exchange 
of claims and directly opposed counter-claims. As such, the concept of 
“negotiations” differs from the concept of “dispute”, and requires — at the 
very least — a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in 
discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the 
dispute.428 
 
250. The Court maintained that fulfilment of this step does not mean that States 
must settle their dispute through negotiation, but that they must negotiate until they 
reach a deadlock or a stage where further negotiations would be futile. 429 
251. In addition, most treaties do not specify the amount of time required for 
negotiations prior to resort to inter-State compulsory dispute settlement.430 In some 
__________________ 
 
425
 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions; Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2 , pp. 13–15 
(“[This rule] recognises, in fact, that before a dispute can be made the subject of an action at 
law, its subject matter should have been clearly defined by means of diplomatic negotiations. … 
When negotiations between the private person and the authorities have already—as in the 
present case—defined all the points at issue between the two Governments, it would be 
incompatible with the flexibility which should characterise international relations to require the 
two Governments to reopen a discussion which has in fact already taken place and on which  
they rely” (ibid., p. 15)).  
 
426
 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 21 December 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319, at p. 346 (“[N]o such direct 
negotiations have ever been undertaken by [the parties]. But in this respect it is not so much the 
form of negotiation that matters as the attitude and views of the Parties on the substantive issues 
of the question involved. So long as both sides remain adamant, and this is obvious even from 
their oral presentations before the Court, there is no reason to think that the dispute can be 
settled by further negotiations between the Parties”).  
 
427
 Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, at  
pp. 40–41, para. 91 (despite various protests by the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 
respect to the actions of Rwanda, made both directly to Rwanda and within international 
organizations, the Court held there was insufficient evidence that the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo sought to commence negotiations).  
 
428
 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 70, at p. 132, para. 157. 
 
429
 Ibid., pp. 132–133, para. 158.  
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cases, the relevant provision may indicate that disputes which “cannot be settled 
through negotiation within a reasonable time” may be referred to compulsory 
dispute settlement,431 or indicate that a specific period of time for negotiations must 
have passed, although this is not common with respect to treaties addressing crimes 
at the national level.432 
 
 2. Arbitration 
 
252. As indicated above in paragraph 246, the Convention for the suppression of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft, at article 12, paragraph 1, provides that a dispute 
“which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be 
submitted to arbitration”, and “[i]f within six months from the date of the request 
for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, 
any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to” judicial settlement. Such a 
provision provides considerable flexibility to the States in the formation of the 
arbitral tribunal and its procedures. While further detail might be provided in the 
provision with respect to those matters, including designation of an appointing 
authority and a registry, the approach taken in treaties addressing crimes under 
national law is not to do so. Instead, if an arbitral process i s not organized within a 
set period of time, either State party may resort to judicial settlement.  
__________________ 
 
430
 Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft 
reads, in relevant part: “Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiations, 
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration.” See also the Convention on the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents, article 13 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft); the International Convention against the taking of hostages, article 
16 (almost identical language); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 30 (almost identical language); and the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
article 42 (almost identical language).  
 
431
 Article 20, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings reads, in relevant part: “Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation 
within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration.” See 
also the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, article 24 
(identical language to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings); 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,  article 35 (almost 
identical language to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings); 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
article 15 (almost identical language); and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 
article 66 (almost identical language).  
 
432
 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 119, paragraph 2, in relevant 
part (“Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or 
application of this Statute which is not settled through negotiations within three months of their 
commencement shall be referred to the Assembly or States Parties”).  
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253. Under the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, and 
most other treaties addressing crimes in national law, the amount of time during 
which arbitration must first be pursued is six months. 433 
254. In Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite , the 
International Court of Justice found that a State party can satisfy the requirement to 
submit a dispute to arbitration by attempting to resort to arbitration, even if the 
other party refuses to respond.434 The Court held that the requirement to submit the 
case to arbitration was complied with when “[a] direct request to resort to 
arbitration was made by Belgium in a Note Verbale of 20 June 2006”, in which 
Belgium stated that “the attempted negotiation with Senegal, which started in 
November 2005, ha[d] not succeeded” and referenced its obligations under 
article 30 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman o r Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.435 After Senegal did not respond, Belgium sent a Note 
Verbale on 8 May 2007, which reiterated “its wish to constitute an arbitral tribunal” 
and noted that they had “received no response from the Republic of Senegal on the 
issue of this proposal of arbitration”.436 The Court concluded that “[t]he present case 
is one in which the inability of the Parties to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration results from the absence of any response on the part of the State to which 
the request for arbitration was addressed”, given that the request for arbitration was 
filed over two years before the case was brought before the Court, the requirement 
to submit the case to arbitration was met.437 
 
 3. Judicial settlement 
 
255. The judicial settlement provision in article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention 
for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft allows States to refer a dispute to 
the International Court of Justice, “by request in conformity with the Statute of the 
__________________ 
 
433
 Article 12, paragraph 1, reads, in relevant part: “If within six months from the date of the 
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any 
one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court.” See also the Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents, 
article 13 (identical language); the International Convention against the taking of hostages, 
article 16 (identical language); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 30, paragraph 1 (identical language); the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, article 22, paragraph 1 
(almost identical language); the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, article 20 (almost identical language); the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, article  24 (almost identical language); the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 35 (almost identical 
language); the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, article 15 (almost identical language); the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, article 66 (almost identical language); and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 42 (identical language). 
 
434
 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (see footnote 416 above), p. 448, 
para. 62. 
 
435
 Ibid., p. 447, para. 60 (quoting the Note Verbale of 20 June 2006).  
 
436
 Ibid. (quoting the Note Verbale of 8 May 2007).  
 
437
 Ibid., p. 448, para. 61.  
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Court”, when a dispute arises and the parties are unable to agree on the organization 
of the arbitration. 
256. Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
provides that the jurisdiction of the Court “comprises … all matters specially 
provided for … in treaties and conventions in force”. The Court’s jurisdiction often 
has been invoked on the basis of a compromissory clause contained in a treaty or 
convention.438 
 
 4. Opting out of inter-State dispute settlement 
 
257. While most treaties addressing crimes under national law provide for inter -
State dispute settlement, they also typically allow a State party to opt out of such 
dispute settlement.439 For example, article 12, paragraph 2, of the Convention for the 
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft provides that “[e]ach State may at the 
time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that 
it does not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other Contracting 
States shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any 
Contracting State having made such a reservation”. 
258. Equivalent clauses, allowing a State party to opt out of the entire dispute 
settlement mechanism, are contained in several other treaties addressing crimes 
under national law, including: the Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; 440 the 
International Convention against the taking of hostages; 441 the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 442 the 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel; 443 the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 444 the 
International Convention of the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;445 and 
__________________ 
 
438
 For a list of treaties or conventions in force conferring jurisdiction upon the Court, either 
directly or through reference to the Permanent Court of Justice, see www.icj -cij.org/jurisdiction/ 
index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4. 
 
439
 An alternative approach would be to allow States to opt into inter-State dispute settlement, but 
that approach tends to result in lower exposure to compulsory dispute settlement. See Galbraith 
(footnote 409 above), p. 330 (empirical and behavioural economics study finding that when 
States have the right to opt out of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 80 per 
cent do not do so, whereas if States have the right to opt into such jurisdiction, only 5 per cent 
do so). 
 
440
 Art. 13, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft).  
 
441
 Art. 16, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft). 
 
442
 Art. 30, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft). 
 
443
 Art. 22, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft). 
 
444
 Art. 20, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft).  
 
445
 Art. 24, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft). 
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the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.446 
259. In some recent treaties, however, the State party is only able to opt out of the 
portion of the dispute settlement mechanism that relates to arbitration and judicial 
settlement, not the portion relating to negotiation. Thus, article 66 of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption only allows a State party to opt out of 
paragraph 2, containing the provisions on arbitration and judicial settlement. The 
provision on negotiation is separately included in paragraph  1: 
 l. States Parties shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention through negotiation.  
 2. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention that cannot be settled through 
negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States 
Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request 
for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of 
the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice by request in accordance wi th the Statute of the 
Court. 
 3. Each State Party may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or 
approval of or accession to this Convention, declare that it does not consider 
itself bound by paragraph 2 of this article. The other States Partie s shall not be 
bound by paragraph 2 of this article with respect to any State Party that has 
made such a reservation. 
 4. Any State Party that has made a reservation in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation b y 
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
 
260. This approach was first adopted in article 35 of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime447 and article 15 of its Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, which contains identical language. Although the term “reservation” is used 
in paragraphs 3 and 4, the term “declaration” would also appear appropriate in this 
context.448 
261. As of January 2017, there are 181 States parties to the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. Of those, 42 States parties have filed a reservation 
__________________ 
 
446
 Art. 42, para. 2 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft). 
 
447
 Art. 35 (identical language to the United Nations Convention against Corruption).  
 
448
 See, for example, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, article 42, paragraphs 2 and 3 (“2. A State may, at the time of signature or 
ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound 
by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this 
article with respect to any State Party having made such a declaration. 3. Any State Party having 
made a declaration in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article may at any 
time withdraw this declaration by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations”).  
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declaring that they do not consider themselves bound by paragraph 2 of article 66.449 
Similarly, there are 187 States parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. Of those, 43 States parties have made a reservation 
declaring that they do not consider themselves bound by paragraph 2 of article 35 of 
that Convention.450 
 
 
 D. Draft article 17. Inter-State dispute settlement 
 
 
262. As outlined in the first section of this chapter, there is a variety of existing 
monitoring mechanisms that are used to address situations of crimes against 
humanity. In the event that the draft articles on crimes against humanity are 
transformed into a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
humanity, there also exists a possibility for the selection of one or more mechanisms 
to supplement existing mechanisms, but that selection would turn less on legal 
considerations and more on policy factors and the availability of resources. 
Moreover, some or all of such mechanisms might be optional and might be included 
in a supplemental protocol rather than in the convention itself. As such, no proposal 
is made in this report with respect to the selection of one or more new mechanisms.  
263. As outlined above in the previous section, however, treaties addressing crimes 
in national law commonly include a provision for inter-State dispute settlement in 
the form of negotiation, arbitration and judicial settlement of a dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of the treaty.451 Bearing these considerations in 
mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft article:  
 
   Draft article 17. Inter-State dispute settlement 
 
 1. States shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present draft articles through negotiation.  
 2. Any dispute between two or more States concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present draft articles that cannot be settled through 
negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those 
States, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request 
for arbitration, those States are unable to agree on the organization of the 
arbitration, any one of those States may refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court.  
 3. Each State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or 
approval of or accession to the present draft articles, declare that it does not 
__________________ 
 
449
 The European Community filed a declaration to article 66, paragraph 2, stating: “With respect to 
Article 66, paragraph 2, the Community points out that, according to Article 34, paragraph 1, of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, only States may be parties before that Court. 
Therefore, under Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in disputes involving the 
Community, only dispute settlement by way of arbitration will be available.”  
 
450
 The European Community also filed a statement to article 35: “With respect to Article 35, 
paragraph 2, the Community points out that, according to Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, only States may be parties before that Court. Therefore, 
under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in disputes involving the community only 
dispute settlement by way of arbitration will be available.”  
 
451
 See, generally, Gray and Kingsbury (footnote 412 above).  
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consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of this draft article. The other States sha ll 
not be bound by paragraph 2 of this draft article with respect to any State that 
has made such a declaration.  
 4. Any State that has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this draft article may at any time withdraw that declaration.  
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Chapter VIII 
  Remaining issues 
 
 
264. This chapter addresses other issues that have arisen in the course of 
discussions within the Commission relating to this topic: concealment of crimes 
against humanity; immunity; and amnesty.  
 
 
 A. Concealment of crimes against humanity 
 
 
265. During the course of the sixty-eighth session, it was suggested within the 
Commission that the present draft articles might include, in some fashion, an 
express obligation upon States to take necessary measures to criminalize 
“concealment” of a crime against humanity.452 In other words, States might be 
obligated to criminalize an “after-the-fact” act of concealing one of the offences 
currently identified in draft article 5, even if an individual was not involved in the 
offences him or herself. Some members expressed a view, however, that inclusion of 
concealment was not appropriate, while others stated that concealment was already 
implicitly included in draft article 5, namely draft article 5, paragraph 2 (c). 
266. Most treaties addressing crimes do not address, at least expressly, the 
criminalization of “concealment” of a crime. Thus, no provision on concealment 
appears in: the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid; the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; the 
International Convention against the taking of hostages; the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  
267. Only a few global treaties on crimes address criminalization of “concealment” 
as such and do so in the form of a provision relating to concealment of property 
rather than concealment of the crime itself. Article 24 of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption provides:  
 Without prejudice to the provisions of article 23 of this Convention, each State 
Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally 
after the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this 
Convention without having participated in such offences, the concealment or 
continued retention of property when the person involved knows that such 
property is the result of any of the offences established in accordance with this 
Convention.  
268. Under article 24, States are encouraged (“shall consider adopting”), but are not 
obligated, to take measures to criminalize the “concealment” of “property” that “is 
the result of” any of the offences established by the Convention. Further, article 24, 
by its terms, speaks of concealment that is (a) intentional, (b) committed after one 
__________________ 
 
452
 See the provisional summary record of the 3297th meeting of the International Law Commission 
on 12 May 2016 (A/CN.4/SR.3297). 
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of the other offences established by the Convention has been committed, and  
(c) committed by a person who did not participate in such other offence. 453  
269. Article 23 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption also obligates 
States parties to take measures criminalizing the laundering of the proceeds of a 
crime of corruption, which is also a form of concealment. 454 A few other treaties on 
crimes at the global and regional levels also address concealment in the context of 
the laundering of proceeds of crime.  For example, in the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, article 6, paragraph 1, on “Criminalization 
of the laundering of proceeds of crime” states, in part: 
 Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:  
 (a)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the 
commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or 
her action; 
 (a)(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime.  
270. Similar articles may be found in: the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (art. 3); the Inter -American 
Convention against Corruption;455 the 2001 Southern African Development 
Community Protocol against Corruption;456 and the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption.457 None of these conventions address 
concealment of the offence itself, but instead confine their scope to concealment of 
proceeds from the offence. 
__________________ 
 453 See the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (footnote 35 above), p. 87, para. 313.  
 
454
 Art. 23 (“Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences, when committed intentionally: … (a)(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true 
nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to 
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime”).  
 
455
 Art. VI, para. 1 (“This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corrupt ion: … d. The 
fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in this 
article”).  
 
456
 Art. 3 (“This Protocol is applicable to the following acts of corruption: … g) the fraudulent use 
or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in this Article”).  
 
457
 Article 4, in relevant part (“This Convention is applicable to the following acts of corruption 
and related offences: … (h) the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts 
referred to in this Article”) and article 6, in relevant part (“State Parties shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences: … b) The 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or 
ownership of or rights with respect to property which is the proceeds of corruption or related 
offences”). 
A/CN.4/704 
 
 
17-00990 126/165 
 
271. The Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption includes an 
article that addresses concealment in the context of “account offences” (art. 14), 
meaning offences such as creating an invoice with false or incomplete information 
or unlawfully omitting the record of a payment. This article obligates States to adopt 
legislative and other measures to establish certain account offences as “offences 
liable to criminal or other sanctions” when these offences are committed in order to 
“commit, conceal or disguise the offences referred to in [the Convention]” (art. 14). 
272. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance addresses concealment in two ways. First, the definition of “enforced 
disappearance” requires an act of depriving someone of his or her liberty “followed 
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate 
or whereabouts of the disappeared person*” (art. 2). Second, the Convention 
addresses concealment in the context of the falsification, concealment or destruction 
of documents attesting to the true identity of a child who is subject to enforced 
disappearance, whose father, mother or guardian was subjected to enforced 
disappearance, or who was born during the captivity of a mother subjected to 
enforced disappearance (art. 25, para. 1). Hence, the Convention does not include 
any provisions addressing generally the concealment of evidence that a crime 
occurred. 
273. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption both include an article on overall 
obstruction of justice. Article 25 of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption reads: 
 Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:  
  (a) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise, 
offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to 
interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a 
proceeding in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance 
with this Convention;  
  (b) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with 
the exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in 
relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with this 
Convention. Nothing in this subparagraph shall prejudice the right of States 
Parties to have legislation that protects other categories of public official. 458 
274. This article obligates States to establish two acts as criminal offences under 
national law, namely efforts to influence witnesses or the production of evidence 
and any interference with the exercise of judicial or law enforcement officials. 459 
The protection of witnesses and other individuals who participate in an investi gation 
or criminal proceeding was addressed in chapter IV, subsection A, and in proposed 
draft article 14, paragraph 1. Regarding interference with the actions of judicial or 
__________________ 
 * Emphasis added. 
 
458
 See also the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, article 23 
(almost identical language).  
 
459
 See the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (footnote 35 above), pp. 75–76, paras. 255–260.  
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law enforcement officers, there appear to be no other global treaties on crimes t hat 
address this other than the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption.  
275. While global treaties on crimes typically do not address “concealment” of a 
crime as such, the issue has been considered during negotiations. For example, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, under article 4, paragraph 1, obligates States parties to make torture a 
crime under their national law, including an act “which constitutes complicity or 
participation in torture”. When the Working Group tasked with drafting the 
Convention first proposed this text, some representatives questioned if “complicity 
or participation in torture” would “cover those persons who were accessories to the 
crime of torture after it had occurred or who had in some way concealed acts of 
torture”.460 Some speakers stated that, under their national legal systems, the term 
“complicity” encompassed persons who were an accomplice to the crime after the 
fact or engaged in concealing that a crime occurred, while others felt that the 
additional text was necessary. The English text of article 4 was not changed 461 but 
the Working Group proposed that the Spanish text of draft article 4, parag raph 1, be 
written to include the phrase o encubrimiento de la tortura (“concealment of 
torture”).462 Ultimately, however, the equally authentic Spanish text of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment also contained no such language, referring instead in article 4, 
paragraph 1, to an act by any person which constituya complicidad o participación 
en la tortura (“constitutes complicity or participation in torture”).  
276. There was a similar debate within the Commission as to whether the proposed 
articles on individual responsibility in the draft code of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind should incorporate the concept of an “attempt to conceal a 
crime”.463 Several members stated that concealment of a crime was not as serious as 
the commission of a crime and should not be viewed as meriting comparable 
treatment. Further, uncertainty was expressed as to what exactly was meant by 
“concealment”, such as whether a government’s unwillingness to release 
information might constitute “concealment”. Ultimately, the Commission decided 
not to include express language on concealment in article 2 of the draft code.  
277. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur is of the view 
that the Commission should follow existing practice by not including a provision on 
“concealment” of a crime against humanity in these draft articles. Most treaties 
addressing crimes do not seek to single out, as a separate offence, “concealment” of 
the crime, leaving that instead to the operation of national laws as they currently 
__________________ 
 
460
 Nowak and McArthur (see footnote 67 above), p. 232; and United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Report of the Working Group on a draft convention against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (E/CN.4/1367), para. 34.  
 
461
 Nowak and McArthur (see footnote 67 above), p. 232; and the Report of the Working Group on 
a draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (see footnote above), para. 35.  
 
462
 Ibid., para. 36.  
 
463
 See Yearbook … 1996, vol. I, 2437th meeting, pp. 38–39, paras. 59–60; see also ibid., p. 40, 
paras. 76–77, and 2438th meeting, pp. 42–43, paras. 1–17. 
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exist.464 When concealment is addressed, it typically concerns concealment of 
property or proceeds of the crime, not concealment of the crime itself.  
 
 
 B. Immunity 
 
 
278. When prosecutions occur under national law of persons alleged to have 
committed crimes against humanity, it is possible that the alleged offender will 
assert that he or she is immune under international law from national jurisdiction. 
When this occurs, an immunity existing under customary or conventional 
international law may prevent a State from exercising its national criminal 
jurisdiction over a foreign State’s official. Indeed, some international conventions 
provide detailed rules for certain classes of State officials, including diplomats, 465 
consular officials,466 those participating in special missions467 and officials of 
international organizations.468 
279. At its fifty-ninth session in 2007, the Commission decided to include the topic 
“Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” in its work 
programme.469 The Commission appointed Mr. Roman A. Kolodkin as Special 
Rapporteur,470 and requested the secretariat to prepare a background study on the 
topic471 which the secretariat produced in 2008.472 Mr. Kolodkin submitted three 
reports, which the Commission received and considered at its sixtieth session in 
2008473 and its sixty-third session in 2011.474 Those reports did not include draft 
articles.475  
280. In 2012, Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández replaced Mr. Kolodkin as 
Special Rapporteur, as Mr. Kolodkin was no longer a member of the Commission at 
that time. The Commission received and considered the preliminary report of the 
__________________ 
 
464
 For example, the United Kingdom International Criminal Court Act, 2001 c.17, which was 
enacted to implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, includes as an 
ancillary offence under section 55, paragraph (1) (d), “assisting an offender or concealing the 
commission of an offence”. Section 55, paragraph (5) (b), provides that “the reference to 
concealing an offence is to conduct that in relation to an arrestable offence would amount to an 
offence under section 5(1) of [the Criminal Law Act 1967]”. An accompanying explanatory note 
indicates: “This section defines ancillary offences for the purposes of this Part. They include the 
forms of secondary liability in Article 25.3 of the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court] but are defined in terms of the principles of secondary liability under the law of England 
and Wales.” The United Kingdom statute and explanatory note are available from 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17/contents.  
 
465
 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  
 
466
 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  
 
467
 Convention on special missions.  
 
468
 See, for example, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.  
 
469
 Yearbook … 2007, vol. II (Part Two), p. 98, para. 376.  
 
470
 Ibid. 
 
471
 Ibid., p. 101, para. 386. 
 
472
 Memorandum by the secretariat on “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction” (A/CN.4/596 and Corr. 1).  
 
473
 Yearbook … 2008, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/601, p. 157 (preliminary report). 
 
474
 The second report is available as document A/CN.4/631 and the third report is available as 
document A/CN.4/646, from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixth-third session). 
 
475
 Ibid. 
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
129/165 17-00990 
 
Special Rapporteur at the same session in 2012,476 her second report during the 
sixty-fifth session in 2013,477 her third report during the sixty-sixth session in 
2014,478 her fourth report during the sixty-seventh session in 2015479 and her fifth 
report during the sixty-eighth session in 2016.480 On the basis of the draft articles 
proposed by the Special Rapporteur in the second, third, and fourth reports, the 
Commission has provisionally adopted five draft articles and commentaries 
thereto.481 It is noted that these draft articles do not address immunities that exist 
under “special rules of international law”, such as those on the immunity of 
diplomats, consular officials, persons on special mission or officials of international 
organizations.482 The Commission’s work on this topic is ongoing.  
281. Treaties addressing crimes typically do not contain a provision on the issue of 
immunity, leaving the matter to other treaties addressing immunities of classes of 
officials or to customary international law. Thus, there is no provision on immunity 
of State officials or officials of international organizations in: the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions for the protection of war victims; the Convention for the suppression 
of unlawful seizure of aircraft; the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation; the Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents; the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishmen t 
of the Crime of Apartheid; the International Convention against the taking of 
hostages; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism; and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime.483 Some treaties provide that State officials have international criminal 
responsibility or shall be punished, but do not preclude procedural immunities in 
national courts.484  
__________________ 
 
476
 A/CN.4/654; available from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixty-fourth session). 
 
477
 A/CN.4/661; available from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixty-fifth session). 
 
478
 A/CN.4/673; available from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixty-sixth session). 
 
479
 A/CN.4/686; available from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixty-seventh session). 
 
480
 A/CN.4/701; available from the Commission’s website (documents of the sixty-eighth session). 
 
481
 Draft article 2 on the use of terms is still a developing text. 
 
482
 Draft article 1, paragraph 2, provides: “The present draft articles are without prejudice to the 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed under special rules of international law, in 
particular by persons connected with diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions, 
international organizations and military forces of a State.”  
 
483
 Article 26, paragraph 3, of this Convention does address immunity from prosecution of a person 
who cooperates with law enforcement authorities in the investigation or prosecution of 
Convention offences (“Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in 
accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from 
prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution 
of an offence covered by this Convention”).  
 
484
 See, for example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
article IV (individuals “shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals”); and the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, article III (“[i]nternational criminal responsibility 
shall apply . . . to . . . representatives of the State, whether residing in the territory of the State 
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282. There is a provision on immunity in the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons,485 but that provision was not reproduced in the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. Indeed, while an initial draft of what became the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
contained an article explicitly excluding immunity of State officials other than 
diplomats,486 States decided to drop that article in the final version of the 
Convention.487 There is also a provision on immunity in the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption,488 but that provision is focused on the immunity of a 
State official within his or her own country, not on the immunity of a State official 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction.  
283. Treaties establishing international courts and tribunals typically abrogate 
immunities of State officials, out of a belief that concerns with respect to 
prosecutions at the national level are not warranted before courts and tribunals 
consisting of international prosecutors and judges. Building upon the text of the 
Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal ( “Nürnberg Charter”) 
and statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, article 27, paragraph 2, of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court provides that “[i]mmunities or special procedural 
rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national 
or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over 
such a person”. To the extent that the issue arises, international criminal tribunals 
seem to recognize the difference between prosecutions before international 
jurisdictions and national jurisdictions, such as by noting that “national authorities 
might use prosecutions to unduly impede or limit a foreign state’s ability to engage 
in international action”, whereas such a risk “does not arise with international courts 
and tribunals, which are ‘totally independent of states and subject to strict rules of 
impartiality’”.489 
__________________ 
in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other State”). Whatever effects may exist under the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide with respect to 
immunity, article VI limits jurisdiction over the crime to “the State in the territory of which the 
act was committed” and “such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect 
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction”.  
 
485
 Article IX reads, in relevant part: “Privileges, immunities, or special dispensations shall not be 
admitted in such trials, without prejudice to the provisions set forth in the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.” 
 
486
 The initial draft was prepared by the Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. See the Report of the sessional working group on 
the administration of justice (footnote 175 above), article 10, paragraph 2 (“No privileges, 
immunities or special exemptions shall be granted in such trials, subject to the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”).  
 
487
 The Convention does address immunities in the context of granting them to the members of that 
treaty’s committee of experts; see article 26, paragraph 8, of the Convention.  
 
488
 Art. 30, para. 2 (“Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or 
maintain, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional principles, an appropriate 
balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for 
the performance of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively 
investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this 
Convention”). 
 
489
 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the 
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284. Consistent with the approach taken in prior treaties addressing crimes, the 
Special Rapporteur is of the view that the draft articles on crimes against humanity 
should not address the issue of immunity of State officials or officials of 
international organizations, and instead should leave the matter to be addressed by 
treaties on immunities for particular classes of officials and by customary 
international law. This approach should not be construed as having any implications 
for the Commission’s work on “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction”. 
 
 
 C. Amnesty 
 
 
285. When prosecutions occur under national law of persons alleged to have 
committed crimes against humanity, it is also possible that the alleged offender will 
assert that he or she is protected by an amnesty granted by his or her State of 
nationality. An amnesty refers to legal measures that have the effect of prospectively 
barring criminal prosecution and, in some cases, civil action against certain 
individuals or categories of individuals in respect of specified criminal conduct 
committed before the amnesty’s adoption. It may also refer to legal measures that 
retroactively nullify legal liability that was previously established. 490 Amnesties 
accorded under national law by a State in which crimes have occurred may arise 
pursuant to constitutional, statutory or executive sources of law, and may be the 
product of a negotiated peace agreement ending an armed conflict. Such an amnesty 
may be general in nature or may be conditioned by certain requirements, such as 
disarmament of a non-State actor group, a willingness of an alleged offender to 
testify in public to the crimes committed or an expression of apology to the victims 
or their families by the alleged offender.  
286. Conflicting views exist as to the permissibility of amnesties under 
international law, including with respect to crimes against humanity. With respect to 
treaties, “[n]o international treaty explicitly prohibits amnesties”,491 including: the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the 
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims; the International Convention 
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ; 
or the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.  
287. To the contrary, article 6, paragraph 5, of the Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of 
non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), which has 168 States parties, 
__________________ 
Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation 
Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, 12 December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I, International Criminal Court, para. 34 
(citing A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 312).  
 
490
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for 
Post-Conflict States: Amnesties (HR/PUB/09/1), available from 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf, p. 5. This report distinguishes 
between amnesties, pardons, official immunities and other elements of impunity.  
 
491
 See the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability , University of Ulster and Transitional 
Justice Initiative, 2013, available from www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/5783 9/ 
TheBelfastGuidelinesFINAL_000.pdf, guideline 6 b).  
A/CN.4/704 
 
 
17-00990 132/165 
 
encourages States to enact amnesties at the end of hostilities. It reads: “At the end of 
hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible 
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of 
their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained.” The 2005 study on Customary International Humanitarian Law 
published under the auspices of the ICRC interprets article 6, paragraph 5, as 
excluding persons suspected of, accused of or sentenced for war crimes, concluding 
that State practice established this as a norm of customary international law 
applicable in non-international armed conflicts.492 That interpretation, however, has 
been criticized.493 
288. Recently negotiated treaties also have not precluded amnesties, including 
treaties addressing serious crimes. Thus, the possibility of including a provision on 
amnesty was debated during the negotiations for both the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and the International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, but the issue proved controversial and 
the final treaties excluded any such provision.494 
289. Many treaties that address crimes at the national level impose an obligation on 
States parties to submit certain offences to prosecution (unless the person is 
extradited or surrendered to another authority capable of doing so) and sometimes 
obligate States parties to provide victims with reparations (see chapter IV, section D 
above). Some commentators,495 treaty bodies496 and courts497 have found that such 
__________________ 
 
492
 See J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Volume I: Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005, rule 159 (“At the end of hostilities, the 
authorities in power must endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have 
participated in a non-international armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to the armed conflict, with the exception of persons suspected of, accused of or 
sentenced for war crimes”).  
 
493
 See, for example, the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability  (footnote 491 above), 
p. 41 (“The limited evidence cited … seems to contradict the ICRC’s justification for 
reformulating Article 6(5)”). 
 
494
 See the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability  (footnote 491 above), p. 36; Report of 
the inter-sessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative 
instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance (footnote 44 above), 
paras. 73–80; J. Gavron, “Amnesties in the light of developments in international law and the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court”, The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 51, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 91–117, at pp. 107–108; and Marguš v. Croatia 
(footnote 420 above), para. 109. 
 
495
 See, for example, Cassese et al. (footnote 234 above), p. 310.  
 
496
 See, for example, general comment No. 20 (footnote 145 above), paragraph 15, in which the 
Human Rights Committee concluded that amnesty laws were incompatible with article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment (“The Committee has noted that some States 
have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with 
the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their 
jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States may not deprive 
individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full 
rehabilitation as may be possible”). 
 
497
 See, for example, Ould Dah v. France, Application no. 13113/03, Decision of 17 March 2009, 
Fifth Section, European Court of Human Rights, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2009-I, p. 
438; Barrios Altos v. Peru (footnote 420 above), paras. 41–44; and Decision on Ieng Sary’s 
Appeal against the Closing Order, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC75), 11 April 
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provisions implicitly preclude amnesties. It is noted, however, that such treaties do 
not require prosecution; they require that the matter be submitted to prosecution, 
which leaves intact prosecutorial discretion. Further, such treaties typically provide 
that when the offence is submitted to prosecution, the national authorities shall 
decide whether to prosecute in a similar manner as they would for ordinary offences 
of a serious nature.498 
290. With respect to State practice, amnesties historically have been adopted by 
various States, even for serious crimes. For example, the 1999 Peace Agreement 
Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone provided for a blanket amnesty. Article IX, paragraph 2, read: “After 
the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also 
grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in 
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the 
signing of the present Agreement.”499 At the same time, the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone attached a disclaimer to the agreement 
stating that “the amnesty provision contained in article IX of the Agreement 
(‘absolute and free pardon’) shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law”.500 
291. In considering the effect of an amnesty, a distinction might be drawn between 
the ability of an amnesty to affect a prosecution in the State where the amnesty was 
issued, and its ability to affect a prosecution before the courts of other States or a 
prosecution before an international or “hybrid” court. With respect to prosecution 
before the courts of other States, it is generally accepted that the granting of 
amnesty by one State has no direct effect on prosecutions in a different State. 501 
__________________ 
2011, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, paragraph 201.  
 
498
 See the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, article 7, paragraph 2 (“These authorities shall take their decision in the same 
manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the l aw of that State. In 
the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution 
and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to 
in article 5, paragraph 1”); and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, article 11, paragraph 2 (“These authorities shall take their 
decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the 
law of that State Party. In the cases referred to in article 9, paragraph 2, the standards of 
evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those 
which apply in the cases referred to in article 9, paragraph 1”).  
 
499
 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front 
of Sierra Leone, signed in Lomé on 7 July 1999, available from www.usip.org/sites/default/files/  
file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sierra_leone_07071999.pdf.  
 
500
 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(S/2000/915), para. 23; see also Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties 
(footnote 490 above), p. 11. 
 
501
 See the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability  (footnote 491 above), guideline 18 a) 
(“Although amnesties bar criminal proceedings within the states that enacted the amnesty, they 
cannot bar international, hybrid or foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction. Such courts may 
decide under their own jurisdiction whether to recognise an amnesty”). See also R. O’Keefe, 
International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 477; and Ould Dah v. France 
(footnote 497 above), p. 438. 
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292. With respect to international or “hybrid” courts, the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia rejected any affect of a national amnesty upon its 
jurisdiction;502 it further maintained that amnesties for international offences were 
generally invalid under international law, a position that has been criticized. 503 Other 
international courts or hybrid tribunals have been more cautious on the latter point, 
indicating that this is an area where the law is “developing” or where there is an 
“emerging consensus”. For example, article 10 of the Statute of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone included a clause providing that an amnesty was not a bar to 
prosecution before that court.504 Based on article 10, the Appeals Chamber of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone consistently held that article IX of the Peace 
Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone was not a bar to the jurisdiction of the Special Court. While 
the Special Court found “support for the statement that it is a crystallized norm of 
international law that a government cannot grant amnesty for serious crimes under 
international law”,505 it recognized that this presented the “direction in which 
customary international law is developing”,506 adopting Antonio Cassese’s analysis 
__________________ 
 
502
 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of 
10 December 1998, Trial Chamber II, paragraph 155; see also the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty 
and Accountability (footnote 491 above), guideline 18; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-
5/18-PT, Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue, 
17 December 2008, Trial Chamber International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, 
paragraphs 17 and 25; and Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.4, Decision on 
Karadžić’s Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Alleged Holbrooke Agreement, 12 October 
2009, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, paragraph 
52. 
 
503
 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that the jus 
cogens prohibition on torture delegitimized any amnesty for torture. Roger O’Keefe, however, 
has argued that “the hypothetical peremptory status of an international criminal prohibition has 
no logical implications for the international legality of a statute of limitations or amnesty in 
respect of that crime” (O’Keefe, footnote 501 above, p. 476).  
 
504
 Art. 10 (“An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court 
in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to 
prosecution”). For similar provisions, see the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, article 40 (“The Royal Government of Cambodia shall not 
request an amnesty or pardon for any persons who may be investigated for or convicted of 
crimes referred to in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law. The scope of any amnesty or pardon 
that may have been granted prior to the enactment of this Law is a matter to be decided by the 
Extraordinary Chambers”); and the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (footnote 255 
above), article 6 (“An amnesty granted to any person for any crime falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal shall not be a bar to prosecution”).  
 
505
 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary 
Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal Delegation of Jurisdiction by Sierra Leone, 25 May 
2004, Appeals Chamber, Special Court for Sierra Leone, para. 3.  
 
506
 Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara,Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-
AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, 13 March 2004, 
Appeals Chamber, Special Court for Sierra Leone, paras. 71 and 82–84, especially para. 84. 
See also Cassesse et al. (footnote 234 above), p. 312. Cassese further states that “[i]t should be 
added that whenever general rules prohibiting specific international crimes come to acquire the 
nature of peremptory norms (jus cogens), they may be construed as imposing among other 
things the obligation not to cancel by legislative or executive fiat the crimes they proscribe. … 
The same argument should hold true for genocide and crimes against humanity, since there 
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that there was not yet any general obligation for States to refrain from amnesty laws 
for crimes against humanity. 
293. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia concluded that there 
was an “emerging consensus” that prohibits amnesties in relation to serious 
international crimes based on a duty to investigate and prosecute these crimes and to 
punish their perpetrators.507 However, the Trial Chamber accepted that State practice 
was arguably insufficiently uniform to establish an absolute prohibition of 
amnesties in relation to them.508 
294. Amnesties have been found impermissible by regional human rights courts 
because they preclude accountability under regional human rights treaties, although 
some distinctions may be found as among those courts. In its seminal case of 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that all 
amnesty provisions are inadmissible because they are intended to prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious violations of  
non-derogable rights under the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of 
San José, Costa Rica”.509 In Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, the Court also 
concluded that “crimes against humanity are crimes which cannot be susceptible of 
amnesty”.510 In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that “[t]here has been consistent 
international jurisprudence suggesting that the prohibition of amnesties leading to 
impunity for serious human rights [violations] has become a rule of customary 
international law”.511 In Marguš v. Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights 
more cautiously recognized the “growing tendency in international law” to see 
amnesties to grave breaches of fundamental human rights as unacceptable as they 
are incompatible with the unanimously recognized obligation of States to prosecute 
and punish such crimes. However, the Court noted that amnesties may be possible in 
particular circumstances, such as a reconciliation process and/or as a form of 
compensation to victims, while holding that those circumstances were not relevant 
in that particular case.512 
__________________ 
seems to be conclusive evidence that conduct amounting to such crimes is prohibited by 
peremptory norms of international law. It would follow that amnesty passed for such crimes 
would not be applicable as contrary to international law” (ibid.). 
 
507
 See Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections (Ne Bis In Idem and Amnesty and 
Pardon), Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 3 November 2011, Trial Chamber, Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, paragraph 53. The European Court of Human Rights, in 
Marguš v. Croatia (see footnote 420 above) cited submissions by interveners in that case that, 
since the Second World War, States have increasingly relied on amnesty laws (para. 110). 
Although the number of new amnesty laws excluding international crimes had increased, so too 
had the number of amnesties including such crimes. 
 
508
 Ibid. 
 
509
 Barrios Altos v. Peru (see footnote 420 above), para. 41. See also The Massacres of El Mozote 
and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Judgment of 25 October 2012, Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, Series C, No. 252, paragraphs 283–286. 
 
510
 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile (see footnote 418 above), para. 114. See also ibid., paragraph 
129.  
 
511
 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Communication No. 245/02, Decision of 15 
May 2006, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para. 201. 
 
512
 Marguš v. Croatia (see footnote 420 above), para. 139.  
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295. This mixed practice is summarized in the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and 
Accountability: 
 Crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflicts have been defined in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and where it has jurisdiction, the ICC can prosecute 
these crimes. These developments together with the case law of international 
courts and the opinions of authoritative bodies have provided greater clarity on 
the nature of these offences and contributed to a body of opinion to support the 
existence of a customary prohibition on amnesties for international crimes. 
However, other sources of opinio juris from domestic and hybrid courts 
together with state practice on amnesties does not reflect an established, 
explicit and categorical customary prohibition of amnesties for international 
crimes.513 
296. As a result, many publicists have found it difficult to conclude that there is a 
consensus on whether a complete prohibition on amnesties, even for serious crimes, 
has attained the status of customary international law. 514 Rather, such publicists call 
for taking account of situation-specific various factors, such as whether the 
particular amnesty provisions amount to a blanket amnesty or provide relevant 
conditions, or exclude those most responsible for the crimes committed. 515 
297. Consistent with the approach taken in prior treaties addressing crimes, the 
Special Rapporteur is of the view that the present draft articles should not address 
the issue of amnesties under national law. Any amnesty granted by a State would 
have to be evaluated in light of that State’s obligations under, inter alia, draft 
articles 9 and 14, and under customary international law as it currently exists or as it 
evolves in the future. Further, it should be recalled that a national amnesty would 
not bar prosecution of a crime against humanity by a competent international 
criminal tribunal or a foreign State with concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction over 
that crime. 
  
__________________ 
 
513
 The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability  (see footnote 491 above), guideline 6 d). 
See also L. Mallinder, “The end of amnesty or regional overreach? Interpreting the erosion of 
South America’s amnesty laws”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly , vol. 65 (July 
2016), pp. 645–680. 
 
514
 See, for example, R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure , 
3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 570–572; and O’Keefe (footnote 501 above), 
pp. 468–469 and 474. 
 
515
 See the Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability  (footnote 491 above), guidelines 7 
and 8. See also Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objections (footnote 507 above), 
paragraph 52, in which the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia noted that 
certain conditional amnesties have met with widespread approval, such as in South Africa where 
amnesties were granted as part of the reconciliation process. 
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Chapter IX 
  Preamble 
 
 
298. A preamble to the present draft articles might highlight several core elements 
that motivate and justify the present draft articles: the fact that over the course of 
history crimes against humanity, which deeply shock the conscience of humanity, 
have been committed, causing extreme harm and suffering to children, women and 
men; the fact that such crimes threaten international peace and security; the desire 
that such crimes be punished, including through measures taken at the national level 
and with the support of inter-State cooperation; the value of punishment as a means 
of preventing such crimes from happening again; and therefore the duty of States to 
exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for such crimes. Further, 
the preamble is an appropriate place to reaffirm the basic purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, including rules with respect to the use of force 
and non-intervention, with which the present draft articles are consistent and do not 
seek to change.  
299. Prior instruments provide guidance in this regard. Notably, the preamble to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides in 
part: 
  Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great 
losses on humanity, and 
  Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious 
scourge, international co-operation is required …  
300. The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides in part: 
  Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men 
have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience 
of humanity, 
  Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well -
being of the world, 
  Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation,  
  Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes 
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,  
  Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,  
  Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,  
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  Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken 
as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the 
internal affairs of any State …  
301. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the 
following draft preamble: 
 
   Draft preamble 
 
  Mindful that throughout history millions of children, women and men 
have been victims of crimes that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,  
  Recognizing that such crimes against humanity threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world, 
  Affirming that crimes against humanity, one of the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole, must not go unpunished 
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation, 
  Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes 
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,  
  Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, 
  Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any S tate, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,  
  Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in the present draft articles 
shall be taken as authorizing any State to intervene in an armed conflict or in 
the internal affairs of any other State, 
  
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
139/165 17-00990 
 
Chapter X 
  Final clauses of a convention 
 
 
 A. Final clauses in the work of the Commission 
 
 
302. The syllabus for this topic provided that the objective is “to draft articles for 
what would become a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Humanity”.516 Such a convention ultimately would need to have final 
clauses, potentially addressing issues such as: adoption and authentication of the 
treaty; the depositary; participation in the treaty; signature; methods of  consent to be 
bound; provisional application; reservations; declarations; notifications; entry into 
force; registration and publication; authentic texts; amendment; duration; and 
termination.517 
303. The statute of the Commission is silent on the possibility for the Commission 
to propose final clauses of a draft convention to the General Assembly. At the same 
time, the statute does not place any limitation on the type of draft articles that can 
be submitted to the General Assembly. Article 22 of the statute merely requires the 
Commission to prepare a “final” draft and explanatory report, which it shall submit 
with its recommendation. Article 23, paragraph 1 (c), of the statute provides that the 
draft can be recommended with a view to the conclusion of a convention, without 
limiting the possible content of the draft.  
304. In practice, however, the Commission has only twice proposed final clauses 
for draft conventions to the General Assembly: the draft convention on the reduction 
of future statelessness and the draft convention on the elimination of future 
statelessness.518 Those two topics were included in the Commission’s list of topics 
of international law selected for codification. Noting these recommendations, in 
1950 the Economic and Social Council requested the Commission to undertake the 
drafting of two conventions.519 Thereafter, at its sixth session in 1954, the 
Commission adopted the draft convention on the reduction of future statelessness 
and the draft convention on the elimination of future statelessness , both of which 
contained final clauses. 
305. In light of this prior practice, the present report does not recommend that the 
Commission adopt draft articles that would serve as final clauses to a convention. 
Nevertheless, given the Commission’s prior work on the topic of reservations, and 
the possibility that States may wish for further guidance on this issue specifically in 
the context of a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
humanity, the remainder of this chapter discusses possible options for a final clause 
relating to reservations. 
 
 
__________________ 
 
516
 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/68/10), p. 140, Annex B, paragraph 3. 
 
517
 See Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties: Handbook (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.04.V.3), available from https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/fc/english.pdf.  
 
518
 Yearbook … 1954, vol. II, document A/CN.4/81, p. 26. 
 
519
 Economic and Social Council resolution 304 D (XI) of 17 July 1950; and Economic and Social 
Council resolution 319 B (XI) of 11 August 1950.  
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 B. Balancing of interests with respect to reservations to a treaty  
 
 
306. The Commission has previously addressed reservations in the context of treaty 
law generally, notably in the 1969 Vienna Convention (arts. 19-23), the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on succession of States in respect of treaties (art. 20) and the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations (hereinafter the “1986 Vienna 
Convention”), and most recently in its 2011 Guide to Practice on reservations to 
treaties.520 Adopting a composite of the definitions included in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention521 and the 1986 Vienna Convention,522 the Commission defined 
reservations in guideline 1.1 of the 2011 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties 
as follows: 
 “Reservation” means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made 
by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally 
confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when 
making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or 
organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to that international 
organization.523 
307. The Commission recognized that reservations are substantially linked to a 
State’s consent to be bound by a treaty and are an important tool for building 
consensus around and participation in multilateral treaties.524 Appropriately 
formulated reservations allow States to participate in treaties while providing a 
method to account for their different legal and political systems. Allowing such 
flexibility is particularly pertinent for treaties and conventions that promote the 
adoption of national laws.525 Further, the Commission concluded that there was no 
__________________ 
 
520
 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-
sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10/Add.1). 
 
521
 Art. 2, para. (1) (d) (“‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby 
it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State”). 
 
522
 Art. 2, para. (1) (d) (“‘reservation’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State or by an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally 
confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State or to 
that organization”). 
 
523
 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see footnote 520 above).  
 
524
 Ibid., guideline 4.3 and the commentary thereto. See also General Assembly resolution 68/111 
of 16 December 2013, preamble (“Recognizing the role that reservations to treaties may play in 
achieving a satisfactory balance between the objectives of safeguarding the integrity of 
multilateral treaties and facilitating wide participation therein”).  
 
525
 In the 2011 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties, the Commission noted that a State very 
often formulates a reservation because the treaty imposes on it obligations incompatible with its 
internal law, which it is not in a position to amend, at least initially. The Commission developed 
guideline 3.1.5.5, concerned with reservations relating to internal law “to establish that, contrary 
to an erroneous but fairly widespread perception, a reservation is not invalid solely because it 
aims to preserve the integrity of specific rules of internal law—on the understanding that, as is 
the case of any reservation, those made with such an objective must be compatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty to which they relate” (Guide to Practice on reservations to 
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reason to apply different rules on reservations to human rights treaties determining 
that, even in the case of essential rights, reservations are possible if they do not 
preclude protection of the rights in question and do not have the effect of 
excessively modifying the legal regime.526 
308. On the other hand, in the context of human rights treaties, some States, 527 
treaty bodies528 and commentators have expressed concern about the potential for 
general, unlimited reservations to undermine the integrity of a treaty. For example, 
concerns have been expressed529 about the extent and impact of reservations on the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. In a report following its eighteenth and nineteenth sessions, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women adopted a statement on 
reservations, noting with concern the number and extent of reservations to the 
Convention, including the fact that some reservations are drawn so widely that they 
cannot be limited to specific provisions.530 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
__________________ 
treaties (see footnote 520 above), para. (7) of the commentary to guideline 3.1.5.5)). Further, the 
Commission recognized that the concern of a State or international organization to preserve its 
freedom of action while accepting in principle to limit that freedom by becoming bound by a 
treaty is particularly present in two situations: “where the treaty in question deals with 
especially sensitive matters or contains exceptionally onerous obligations or where it binds 
States whose situations are very different and whose needs are not necessarily met by a uniform 
set of rules” (ibid., para. (1) of the commentary to guideline 1.7.1).  
 
526
 Ibid., paras. (5)–(9) of the commentary to guideline 3.1.5.6. Professor Edward Swaine similarly 
observes that, “[w]hile reservations, by definition, seek unilaterally to compromise a State’s 
treaty obligations, States are nonetheless presumptively free to propose them. Generally they do 
so to adapt the treaty to domestic legal and political circumstances in matters that are usually of 
keen local (and, happily, minimal international) interest” (E. T. Swaine, “Treaty reservations”, 
in Hollis (see footnote 309 above), pp. 277–303). Professor Schabas also asserts that “[a]rticle 
27 should not be invoked in the context of the legality of reservations. Normally, states make 
reservations precisely because their internal law is in conflict with the treaty. Indeed, the Human 
Rights Committee specifically urges states ‘to indicate in precise terms the domestic legislation 
or practices which [they believe] to be incompatible with the Covenant obligation reserved’” 
(W. A. Schabas, “Reservations to human rights treaties: time for innovation and reform”, The 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. XXXII (1994), pp. 39–82, at p. 59). 
 
527
 See the Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fiftieth session, Supplement No. 40 (A/50/40, Annex), observations of the United Kingdom, 
paragraph 3. 
 
528
 See the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 24 (1994) on issues relating to 
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols 
thereto, or in relation to the declarations under article 41 of the Covenant 
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6).  
 
529
 See W. A. Schabas, “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the rights of the child”, William and 
Mary Journal of Women and the Law , vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 79–112, at p. 80. Despite 
these criticisms, Professor Schabas observes that, “[i]n many cases, these reservations are quite 
precise and limited, and leave most of the instrument intact. … Indeed, [the drafters’] intent was 
to allow such minor reservations specifically in order to encourage widespread ratification, and 
this goal has been accomplished” (ibid., p. 110). 
 
530
 See the Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-third session, Supplement No. 38 (A/53/38/Rev.1), 
pp. 47–49.  
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Programme of Action from the World Conference on Human Rights urged States, as 
far as possible, to avoid resorting to reservations. 531 
309. Thus, the issue of reservations may be seen, to a large extent, as a debate 
between promoting breadth of State participation in a treaty regime (by allowing 
States to calibrate their obligations so as to harmonize with difficult -to-change 
national law)532 and ensuring that the depth of the regime remains meaningfully 
intact (by limiting or prohibiting such changes). Reflecting on this debate, the 
Commission noted, in its conclusions on the reservations dialogue, the necessity of 
bearing in mind “the need to achieve a satisfactory balance between the objectives 
of safeguarding the integrity of multilateral treaties and securing the widest possible 
participation therein”.533 
 
 
 C. Approaches taken in existing treaties to reservations 
 
 
310. There appear to be at least five different approaches for addressing the issue of 
reservations. For each approach, the treaty is governed, in the first instance, by any 
relevant provision within the treaty on reservations and, in the second instance, by 
the provisions on reservations contained in the conventional or customary 
international law relating to reservations.  
311. First, the treaty might be completely silent on the issue of reservations, such as 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Alternatively, the treaty might contain a 
provision permitting reservations.534 
312. Second, the treaty generally might be silent on the issue of reservations, except 
for a provision that permits a reservation (sometimes styled as a declaration) to the 
treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism. This is the dominant approach 535 for treaties 
__________________ 
 
531
 See the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (A/CONF.157/24 (Part I))), section I, 
paragraph 26. In section II, the Declaration notes that, “[t]he World Conference on Human 
Rights encourages States to consider limiting the extent of any reservations they lodge to 
international human rights instruments, formulate any reservations as precisely and narrowly as 
possible, ensure that none is incompatible with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty and 
regularly review any reservations with a view to withdrawing them” ( ibid., chap. II, para. 5).  
 
532
 For example, in the 2011 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties, the Commission noted the 
reservation by Mozambique to the International Convention against the taking of hostages as an 
example of reservations relating to the application of internal law that “give rise to no 
objections and have in fact not met with any” (Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see 
footnote 520 above), para. (4) of the commentary to guideline 3.1.5.5). Mozambique declared 
that, in accordance with its Constitution and domestic law, it could not extradite its citizens 
(ibid., last footnote to paragraph (4) of the commentary to guideline 3.1.5.5).  
 
533
 Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see footnote 520 above), Annex, p. 601. 
 
534
 See, for example, the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources  
for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, article 14, paragraph 1 (“When definitively 
signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or any amendment hereto, a State Party may 
make reservations”).  
 
535
 Exceptions to this include: the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art. 9 (prohibiting all reservations); the 
Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their 
disposal, art. 26, para. 1 (prohibiting all reservations); the International Convention on the 
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addressing crimes in national law, as may be seen in: the Convention for the 
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft;536 the Convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents;537 the International Convention against the taking of hostages; 538 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment;539 the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel;540 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings;541 the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism;542 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime543 and accompanying Protocols; and the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 544 Such an approach does 
not necessarily implicitly preclude other reservations to the treaty. 545 Rather, it 
__________________ 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (silent on reservations); and the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography (silent on reservations).  
 
536
 Art. 12, para. 2 (“Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or 
accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The 
other Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any 
Contracting State having made such a reservation”).  
 
537
 Art. 13 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft). 
 
538
 Art. 16 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
539
 Art. 30 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft). Article 28 contains a clause providing for an opt-out in relation to article 20, 
concerning the competence of the Committee Against Torture. In contrast, the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, article 30, prohibits reservations completely.  
 
540
 Art. 22 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
541
 Art. 20 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
542
 Art. 24 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
543
 Art. 35 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft).  
 
544
 Art. 42 (almost identical language to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft). At the fifth session of the inter-sessional open-ended working group, the Chairperson 
noted that States parties would have the right to enter reservations at the time of accession, on 
the understanding that such reservations must be in keeping with international law (Commission 
on Human Rights, Report of the inter-sessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft 
legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced 
disappearance (E/CN.4/2006/57), para. 160). 
 
545
 The 1969 Vienna Convention, article 19 (a) and (b), provides that a reservation may be 
formulated unless the treaty prohibits all reservations or the treaty prohibits specified 
reservations which do not include the reservation in question. Such language does not directly 
address the situation of a treaty that permits specified reservations and is silent with respect to 
other reservations. In its Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties , the Commission stipulated 
that: “A cursory reading of article 19, subparagraph (b), of the Vienna Conventions might 
suggest that it represents one side of the coin and subparagraph (a) represents the other. The 
symmetry is far from total, however. To have total symmetry, it would have been necessary to 
stipulate that reservations other than those expressly provided for in the treaty were prohibited. 
But that is not the case. Subparagraph (b) contains additional elements which prevent 
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simply makes clear that a reservation to the treaty’s dispute settlement mechanism 
does not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.  
313. Third, the treaty might contain a provision identifying articles to which 
reservations may be formulated, while prohibiting all other reservations. Examples 
of this approach may be found in: the 1949 Revised General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes;546 the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs;547 the 1971 Convention on psychotropic substances;548 the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;549 the Second Optional Protocol to the 
__________________ 
oversimplification. The implicit prohibition of certain reservations arising from this provision, 
which is considerably more complex than it seems, depends on the fulfilment of three 
conditions: (a) The treaty’s reservation clause must permit the formulation of reservations; (b) 
The reservations permitted must be ‘specified’; (c) It must be specified that ‘only’ those 
reservations ‘may be made’” (Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see footnote 520 
above), para. (1) of the commentary to guideline 3.1.2). 
 
546
 Art. 39, paras. (1)–(2) (“1. In addition to the power given in the preceding article, a Party, in 
acceding to the present General Act, may make his acceptance conditional upon the reservations 
exhaustively enumerated in the following paragraph. These reservations must be indicated at the 
time of accession. 2. These reservations may be such as to exclude from the procedure descr ibed 
in the present Act: (a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession either of the Party 
making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the said Party may have a dispute; (b) 
Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States; (c) Disputes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subject-
matters, such as territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories”).  
 
547
 Art. 50 (“1. No reservations other than those made in accordance with article 49 or with the 
following paragraphs shall be permitted. 2. Any State may at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession make reservations in respect of the following provisions of this Convention: Article 
12, paragraphs 2 and 3; article 13, paragraph 2; article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2; article 31, 
paragraph 1 (b), and article 48. 3. A State which desires to become a Party but wishes to be 
authorized to make reservations other than those made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 
article or with article 49 may inform the Secretary-General of such intention. Unless by the end 
of twelve months after the date of the Secretary-General's communication of the reservation 
concerned, this reservation has been objected to by one third of the States that have ratified or 
acceded to this Convention before the end of that period, it shall be deemed to be permitted, it 
being understood, however, that States which have objected to the reservation need not assume 
towards the reserving State any legal obligation under this Convention which is affected by the 
reservation”). 
 
548
 Art. 32 (“1. No reservation other than those made in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of 
the present article shall be permitted. 2. Any State may at the time of signature, ratification or 
accession make reservations in respect of the following provisions of the present Convention: 
(a) Article 19, paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) Article 27; and (c) Article 31. 3. A State which desires to 
become a Party but wishes to be authorized to make reservations other than those made in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 may inform the Secretary-General of such intention. Unless 
by the end of twelve months after the date of the Secretary-General’s communication of the 
reservation concerned, this reservation has been objected to by one third of the States that have 
signed without reservation of ratification, ratified or acceded to this Convention before the end 
of that period, it shall be deemed to be permitted, it being understood, however, that States 
which have objected to the reservation need not assume towards the reserving State any legal 
obligation under this Convention which is affected by the reservation”).  
 
549
 Art. 309 (“No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly 
permitted by other articles of this Convention”). In fact, no article of the Convention expressly 
permits reservations, although article 298 allows for declarations opting out of compulsory 
procedures for certain categories of disputes. Article 310 of the Convention provides that 
interpretative declarations are permitted “provided that such declarations or statements do not 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the 
death penalty;550 and the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages.551 
314. Fourth, the treaty might contain a provision identifying treaty articles, or 
category of articles, to which reservations may not be formulated, while permitting 
all other reservations. Examples of this approach are: the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees;552 the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf;553 and the 
International Sugar Agreement, 1977.554 
315. A variation of this approach is a provision prohibiting reservations that defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty, but otherwise allowing reservations. Examples 
of such an approach are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination;555 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women;556 the Convention on the rights of the child;557 
__________________ 
purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their 
application to that State”. 
 
550
 Art. 2, para. 1 (“ No reservation is admissible to the present Protocol, except for a reservation 
made at the time of ratification or accession that provides for the application of the death 
penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature 
committed during wartime”). 
 
551
 Art. 21, para. 1 (“Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make one or more reservations to paragraphs 2 
to 5 of Article 7 of this Charter. No other reservation may be made”).  
 
552
 Art. 42 (“1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations 
to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36–46 inclusive. 2. Any 
State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may at any time 
withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary -General 
of the United Nations”). See also the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
article 38.  
 
553
 Art. 12 (“1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations 
to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive. 2. Any Contracting Sta te 
making a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw the 
reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary -General of the United 
Nations”). 
 
554
 Article 78, paragraph 3, reads, in relevant part: “Any Government entitled to become a Party to 
this Agreement may, on signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make 
reservations which do not affect the economic functioning of this Agreement.”  
 
555
 Art. 20, para. 2 (“A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention 
shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of 
any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered 
incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to 
it”). For criticisms of the formulation adopted in this Convention, see the Commission’s Guide 
to Practice on reservations to treaties in which the Commission noted that “[i]t must be 
admitted, however, that such clauses—however attractive they may seem intellectually—are, in 
any case, far from resolving all the problems: in practice they do not encourage States parties to 
maintain the special vigilance that is to be expected of them and they leave important questions 
unanswered” (Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see footnote 520 above), para. (4) of 
the commentary to guideline 3.2). 
 
556
 Art. 28, para. 2 (“A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present 
Convention shall not be permitted”).  
 
557
 Art. 51, para. 2 (“A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present 
Convention shall not be permitted”).  
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and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. 558 The 
“object and purpose” test, of course, was articulated in the International Court of 
Justice’s 1951 advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ,559 where the Court held that 
the “object and purpose” of the Convention limits both the freedom of making 
reservations and that of objecting to them. 560 This “object and purpose” test was 
adopted in article 19, paragraph (c), of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, and 
was analysed in the Commission’s 2011 Guide to Practice on reservations to 
treaties.561 
316. A further variation is where a treaty prohibits “reservations of a general 
character”, an approach designed to avoid vague reservations whose effects are 
unclear and therefore difficult to assess.562 Examples of such a provision may be 
found in: the European Convention on Human Rights;563 the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;564 and the Inter-American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons.565 
317. Fifth, the treaty may contain a provision prohibiting all reservations. 566 
Whether a particular treaty actually prohibits all reservations needs to be carefully 
assessed based on other flexibility mechanisms567 or techniques used568 for opting 
__________________ 
 
558
 Art. 19, para. 4 (“No State Party may enter a reservation which is incompatible with the object 
and purposes of this Convention”). 
 
559
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15. Some scholars consider the International Court of 
Justice’s 1951 advisory opinion as the “starting point” in any analysis of reservations to 
international human rights treaties. See Schabas, “Reservations to human rights treaties …” 
(footnote 526 above), p. 45.  
 
560
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(see footnote above), p. 24. The International Court of Justice further held that “it is the 
compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish 
the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the 
appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation” (ibid.).  
 
561
 See, for example, Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (footnote 520 above), guideline 
3.1.5 on “Incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty” (“A 
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential 
element of the treaty that is necessary to its general tenour, in such a way that  the reservation 
impairs the raison d’être of the treaty”). 
 
562
 Ibid., guideline 3.1.5.2 on “Vague or general reservations” (“A reservation shall be worded in 
such a way as to allow its meaning to be understood, in order to assess its compatibility with the  
object and purpose of the treaty”).  
 
563
 Art. 57 (“1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the 
extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. 
Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article. 2. Any reservation 
made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned”).  
 
564
 Art. 21 (“The States Parties may, at the time of approval, signature, ratification, or accession, 
make reservations to this Convention, provided that such reservations are not incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention and concern one or more specific provisions”). 
 
565
 Art. XIX (“The states may express reservations with respect to this Convention when adopting, 
signing, ratifying or acceding to it, unless such reservations are incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention and as long as they refer to one or more specific provisions”).  
 
566
 See the Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (footnote 520 above), guideline 3.1.1. 
 
567
 For example, many environmental and labor treaties include differential treatment rules. See 
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out of some obligations. Notable examples of treaties that prohibit all reservations 
are the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change569 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.570 
Aside from some treaties that are found at the regional or subregional level, 571 most 
treaties that prohibit reservations are not focused on how a State party should 
regulate persons or property within the State’s territory; the few that do so typically 
do not concern criminal jurisdiction.572 
318. With respect to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
prohibition on reservations appears closely tied to the desire to establish an 
international institution that would have the exact same legal relationship vis-à-vis 
all States parties. The Commission noted in its draft of what became the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court that “[t]he draft statute has been 
constructed as an overall scheme, incorporating important balances and 
qualifications in relation to the working of the court: it is intended to operate as a 
whole. These considerations tend to support the view that reservations to the statute 
and its accompanying treaty should either not be permitted, or should be limited in 
scope”.573 Of course, a complete prohibition of reservations does not prevent 
__________________ 
L. R. Helfer, “Not fully committed? Reservations, risk and treaty design”, Yale Journal of 
International Law, vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 367–382, at p. 377. See also the Guide to 
Practice on reservations to treaties (footnote 520 above), guideline 1.1.6 and guideline 1.7, on 
alternatives to reservations and interpretative declarations. The Guide to Practice cites the 
statement of the Legal Adviser of the International Labour Organization to the 1968 United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Treaties. The Legal Adviser stated that reservations to 
international labor conventions were incompatible with the object and purpose of those 
Conventions and inapplicable because of the tripartite character of the ILO as an organization 
but noted that great flexibility was required for the application of certain international labour 
conventions to widely varying circumstances (Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see 
footnote 520 above), para. (3) of the commentary to guideline 1.1.6).  
 
568
 Professor Swaine notes that a number of treaties, including in the area of trade, environmental 
and arms control in the first instance appear to prohibit all reservations, but on inspection 
actually enable reservations to affiliated agreements or to technical and dynamic content 
(Swaine (see footnote 526 above), p. 290).  
 
569
 Art. 26 (“No reservations made be made to this Protocol”).  
 
570
 Art. 120 (“No reservations may be made to this Statute”). Article 124 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court did provide a transitional provision allowing States not to accept 
the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of war crimes for a period of seven years.  
 
571
 See, for example, Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundametnal Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, as amended by Protocol 
No. 11, article 4; and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 21.  
 
572
 See, for example, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, article 9; the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, article 18; the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti -Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction, article 19; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, article XXII 
(although reservations are permitted to the Convention’s annexes that are not incompatible wi th 
its object and purpose). Yet treaties prohibiting reservations and touching upon national criminal 
jurisdiction do exist. See the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, article 9; and the Basel Convention on 
the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, article 26.  
 
573
 Yearbook … 1994, vol. II (Part Two), p. 69, Appendix I, para. 3 (e). The Commission also noted 
that, “[w]hether or not the statute would be considered to be ‘a constituent instrument of an 
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controversy arising when a State ratifies a treaty, as the State may still file a 
“declaration” that arguably seeks to alter unilaterally the State’s obligations. A 
scholarly commentary to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court noted 
that forbidding reservations, in the belief that the problems with reservations can be 
prevented, is a “deceptively simple” solution.574 For example, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
objected to the “interpretative declaration” by Uruguay to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court as amounting, in substance, to a reservation. 575 
319. For treaties that allow reservations, it is possible to include a provision 
requiring States parties to indicate reasons why the reservation is being made. For 
example, the European Convention on Human Rights requires that States should 
indicate the reasons why a reservation is being formulated, specifically providing 
that any reservation made “shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned”.576 
While recognizing that this Convention is lex specialis and that there is no 
requirement under the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions577 to give reasons for 
reservations, the Commission concluded that there were “obvious advantages of 
giving reasons”,578 and included in guideline 2.1.2 that “[a] reservation should, to 
the extent possible, indicate the reasons why it is being formulated”.579 
320. Other mechanisms, not amounting to reservations, can also be used to enable 
States and international organizations to modify obligations under treaties to which 
__________________ 
international organization’ within the meaning of article 20, paragraph 3, of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties, it is certainly closely analogous to a constituent instrument, 
and the considerations which led the drafters to require the consent of the ‘competent organ of 
that organization’ under article 20, paragraph 3, apply in rather similar fashion to it” ( ibid.). 
 
574
 See Schabas, The International Criminal Court (footnote 257 above), p. 1489. Writing outside 
his capacity as Special Rapporteur, Professor Pellet observed that “[i]t is not certain that the 
possibility of limited, well-circumscribed reservations would have harmed the fundamental 
objectives aimed at, and it would have certainly facilitated ratification of the Rome Statute [of 
the International Criminal Court] by States that in good faith strive to overcome constitutional 
obstacles they meet on technical points that all in all are of only secondary importance” (A. 
Pellet, “Entry into force and amendment of the Statute”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. 
Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a Commentary , vol. I, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 156).  
 
575
 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General (available from 
http://treaties.un.org/), chap. XVIII.10. The interpretative declaration stated that, “as a State 
party to the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court], the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay shall ensure its application to the full extent of the powers of the State insofar as it is 
competent in that respect and in strict accordance with the Constitutional provisions of the 
Republic”. The interpretative declaration was withdrawn in a communication on 26 February 
2008. 
 
576
 See the European Convention on Human Rights, article 57, paragraph 2.  
 
577
 The Commission has noted: “Neither the Commission’s work on the law of treaties nor the 1969 
and 1986 Vienna Conventions establish any requirement that a State or international 
organization that formulates a reservation must give its reasons for doing so or explain why it 
considered it necessary to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or 
of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects” (Guide to Practice on 
reservations to treaties (see footnote 520 above), para. (1) of the commentary to guideline 
2.1.2). 
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 Ibid., para. (8) of the commentary to guideline 2.1.2.  
 
579
 Ibid., guideline 2.1.2. 
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they are parties, including restrictive clauses,580 escape clauses,581 “opting-in” or 
“contracting-in clauses”,582 “opting-out” or “contracting-out clauses”,583 clauses 
which offer the parties a choice among several provisions or provisions allowing for 
suspension or amendments to a treaty. In its Guide to Practice on reservations to 
treaties, the Commission noted that “these procedures, far from constituting 
invitations to States to limit the effects of the treaty, would instead help to make 
recourse to reservations less ‘necessary’ or frequent by offering more flexible treaty 
techniques”.584 
 
 
 D. Reservations in the context of a convention on crimes  
against humanity 
 
 
321. To the extent that the present draft articles are transformed into a convention, 
it would appear that the approaches identified above are all available as possibilities  
for one of the final clauses to the convention.  
322. The convention could be completely silent on the issue of reservations or 
expressly permit all reservations, leaving it open for States to file reservations that 
they deem necessary, within the constraints of the rules set forth in the Vienna 
Conventions. 
323. The convention could be generally silent on the issue of reservations, though 
provide for an opportunity for States to opt out of any dispute settlement 
mechanism. If draft article 17 (discussed above in the chapter on monitoring 
mechanisms and dispute settlement) is adopted as proposed, then States would have 
this opportunity. Such an approach in a convention on the prevention and 
punishment of crimes against humanity would be consistent with the approach taken 
in other global treaties addressing crimes. If this is done, background rules on treaty 
law, either conventional or customary in nature, would still apply, thereby barring 
__________________ 
 
580
 Defined in the Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties as clauses “‘which limit the purpose 
of the obligation by making exceptions to and placing limits on it’ in respect of the area covered 
by the obligation or its period of validity” (Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties (see 
footnote 520 above), para. (6) of the commentary to guideline 1.7.1).  
 
581
 Defined in the Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties as clauses “‘which have as their 
purpose to suspend the application of general obligations in specific cases’, and among which 
mention can be made of saving and derogations clauses” (ibid.). 
 
582
 Defined in the Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties as clauses “‘to which the parties 
accede only through a special acceptance procedure, separate from accession to the treaty as a 
whole’” (ibid.).  
 
583
 Defined in the Guide to Practice on reservations to treaties as clauses “‘under which a State will 
be bound by rules adopted by majority vote even if it does not express its intent not to be bound 
within a certain period of time’” (ibid.). 
 
584
 Ibid., para. (1) of the general commentary to subsection 1.7 on “Alternatives to reservations and 
interpretative declarations”. See also ibid., guideline 1.7.1, entitled “Alternatives to 
reservations” (“In order to achieve results comparable to those effected by reservations, States 
or international organizations may also have recourse to alternative procedures, such as: (a) the 
insertion in the treaty of a clause purporting to limit its scope or application; (b) the conclusion 
of an agreement, under a specific provision of a treaty, by which two or more States or 
international organizations purport to exclude or modify the legal effects of certain provisions of 
the treaty as between themselves”).  
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States from making reservations that defeat the object and purpose of the 
convention. 
324. The convention could contain a provision identifying articles of the 
convention to which reservations may be filed, while prohibiting all other 
reservations. Conversely, the convention might contain a provision identifying 
treaty articles to which reservations may not be filed, while permitting all other 
reservations. Such approaches obviously would require identifying the particular 
articles within a convention to which States parties see a strong need to allow for, or 
prohibit, reservations. 
325. Alternatively, a more general provision might be crafted that prohibits certain 
types of reservations, such as reservations that defeat the object and purpose of the 
treaty. While such a provision, strictly speaking, is not necessary since reservations 
of that kind are already prohibited under international law, this type of text appears 
in many conventions relating to human rights and is apparently seen as a useful 
reminder to States parties. Further, a provision could be included stating that  when 
reservations are made, they must be focused on specific provisions of the 
convention, thereby prohibiting reservations of a general nature. This additional 
element could help to avoid the problem of “constitutional” reservations or 
reservations that seek to subordinate a treaty to the national law of the reserving 
State as a whole, from which it is difficult to determine the effect on the reserving 
State’s obligations. Finally, a provision might be included requiring States to 
provide reasons both for any reservations formulated or objections by other States to 
a reservation, as included in the European Convention on Human Rights in relation 
to reservations. If this is done, such a provision might read as follows:  
 “1.  States may, at the time of approval, signature and ratification, or 
accession, make reservations to this convention, [other than to articles …], 
provided that such reservations are not incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the convention and concern one or more specific provisions.  
 “2.  States shall, to the extent possible, indicate the reasons why a reservation 
in accordance with paragraph 1, or objection to a reservation, is being 
formulated.” 
326. Finally, the convention could contain a complete prohibition on reservations. 
Doing so might avoid some types of reservations that radically alter the obligations 
of the convention, but would also deny States any opportunity to calibrate the 
interface of the convention with uncontroversial aspects of the ir national criminal 
law, some of which may be constitutional and therefore difficult to change. If so, a 
complete prohibition might preclude the widespread adherence of States to the 
convention. 
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Chapter XI 
  Future programme of work 
 
 
327. A possible timetable for the subsequent programme of work would be to 
complete this topic on first reading in 2017. Alternatively, if additional work is 
required, a fourth report addressing any further matters could be submitted in 2018, 
after which a first reading could be completed. 
328. If the topic is completed on first reading in 2017, then a second reading could 
be completed in 2019.  
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Annex I 
 
  Draft articles provisionally adopted by the Commission to date 
 
 
  Article 1. Scope 
 
 The present draft articles apply to the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against humanity. 
 
  Article 2. General obligation 
 
 Crimes against humanity, whether or not committed in time of armed conflict, 
are crimes under international law, which States undertake to prevent and punish. 
 
  Article 3. Definition of crimes against humanity 
 
1. For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against humanity” means 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
 (a) Murder; 
 (b) Extermination; 
 (c) Enslavement; 
 (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
 (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law; 
 (f) Torture; 
 (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
 (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on pol itical, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection wi th the crime 
of genocide or war crimes;  
 (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
 (j) The crime of apartheid; 
 (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
 (a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against 
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack; 
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 (b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, 
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about 
the destruction of part of a population;  
 (c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in 
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;  
 (d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the 
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law; 
 (e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the 
accused, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions; 
 (f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy; 
 (g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity; 
 (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to 
those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized 
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other 
racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;  
 (i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a 
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those 
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time. 
3. For the purpose of the present draft articles, it is understood that the term 
“gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The 
term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.  
4. This draft article is without prejudice to any broader definition provided for in 
any international instrument or national law.  
 
  Article 4. Obligation of prevention 
 
1. Each State undertakes to prevent crimes against humanity, in conformity with 
international law, including through:  
 (a) effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other preventive measures 
in any territory under its jurisdiction or control; and  
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 (b) cooperation with other States, relevant intergovernmental organizations, 
and, as appropriate, other organizations.  
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, such as armed conflict, internal 
political instability or other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
crimes against humanity.  
 
  Article 5. Criminalization under national law 
 
1. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that crimes against 
humanity constitute offences under its criminal law.  
2. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following acts 
are offences under its criminal law:  
 (a) committing a crime against humanity; 
 (b)  attempting to commit such a crime; and  
 (c)  ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in or 
contributing to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime.  
3. Each State shall also take the necessary measures to ensure that the following 
are offences under its criminal law:  
 (a) a military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes against humanity committed 
by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces, where: 
 (i) that military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing 
or about to commit such crimes; and  
 (ii) that military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
 (b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
subparagraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes against 
humanity committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and 
control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
subordinates, where: 
 (i) the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit 
such crimes; 
 (ii) the crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and  
 (iii) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within 
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter 
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.  
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4. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, under its criminal 
law, the fact that an offence referred to in this draft article was committed pursuant 
to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, is not a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility of a subordinate.  
5. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, under its criminal 
law, the offences referred to in this draft article shall not be subject to any statute of 
limitations. 
6. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, under its criminal 
law, the offences referred to in this draft article shall be punishable by appropriate 
penalties that take into account their grave nature.  
7. Subject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall take measures, 
where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons for the offences referred 
to in this draft article. Subject to the legal principles of the State, such liability of 
legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.  
 
  Article 6. Establishment of national jurisdiction 
 
1. Each State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offences referred to in draft article 5 in the following cases:  
 (a) when the offence is committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or 
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State ; 
 (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State or, if that State 
considers it appropriate, a stateless person who is habitually resident in that State ’s 
territory; 
 (c) when the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate. 
2. Each State shall also take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction 
over the offences referred to in draft article 5 in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite or surrender 
the person in accordance with the present draft articles.  
3. The present draft articles do not exclude the exercise of any criminal 
jurisdiction established by a State in accordance with its national law.  
 
  Article 7. Investigation 
 
 Each State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and 
impartial investigation whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that acts 
constituting crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in any 
territory under its jurisdiction. 
 
  Article 8. Preliminary measures when an alleged offender is present  
 
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that 
the circumstances so warrant, any State in the territory under whose jurisdiction a 
person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in draft article 5 is present 
shall take the person into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his or her 
presence. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided in the law of 
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that State, but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any 
criminal, extradition or surrender proceedings to be instituted.  
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.  
3. When a State, pursuant to this draft article, has taken a person into custody, it 
shall immediately notify the States referred to in draft article 6, paragraph 1, of the 
fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his or her 
detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in 
paragraph 2 of this draft article shall promptly report its findings to the said States 
and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.  
 
  Article 9. Aut dedere aut judicare 
 
 The State in the territory under whose jurisdiction the alleged offender is 
present shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, unless it extradites or surrenders the person to another State or 
competent international criminal tribunal. Those authorities shall take their decision 
in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the 
law of that State. 
 
  Article 10. Fair treatment of the alleged offender  
 
1. Any person against whom measures are being taken in connect ion with an 
offence referred to in draft article 5 shall be guaranteed at all stages of the 
proceedings fair treatment, including a fair trial, and full protection of his or her 
rights under applicable national and international law, including human rights  law. 
2. Any such person who is in prison, custody or detention in a State that is not of 
his or her nationality shall be entitled:  
 (a) to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative 
of the State or States of which such person is a national or which is otherwise 
entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if such person is a stateless person, of the 
State which, at that person’s request, is willing to protect that person’s rights; 
 (b) to be visited by a representative of that State or those States; and  
 (c) to be informed without delay of his or her rights under this paragraph.  
3. The rights referred to in paragraph 2 shall be exercised in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of the State in the territory under whose jurisdiction the person 
is present, subject to the proviso that the said laws and regulations must enable full 
effect to be given to the purpose for which the rights accorded under paragraph 2 are 
intended. 
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Annex II 
 
  Draft articles and preamble proposed in the third report 
 
 
  Draft article 11. Extradition 
 
1. Each of the offences referred to in draft article 5 shall be deemed to be 
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between States. 
States undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every 
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.  
2. For the purposes of extradition between States, an offence referred to in draft 
article 5 shall not be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with 
a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a 
request for extradition based on such an offence may not be refused on these 
grounds alone. 
3. If a State that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treat y 
receives a request for extradition from another State with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may consider the present draft articles as the legal basis for extradition in 
respect of any offence referred to in draft article 5.  
4. A State that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall:  
 (a) use the present draft articles as the legal basis for cooperation on 
extradition with other States, unless it informs the Secretary -General of the United 
Nations to the contrary at the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval of, or accession to the present draft articles; and  
 (b) if it does not use the present draft articles as the legal basis for 
cooperation on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on 
extradition with other States to the present draft articles in order to implement this 
draft article. 
5. States that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty 
shall recognize offences to which this draft article applies as extraditable offences 
between themselves.  
6. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the national law 
of the requested State or by applicable extradition treaties, including, inter alia, 
conditions in relation to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the 
grounds upon which the requested State may refuse extradition.  
7. States shall, subject to their national law, endeavour to expedite extradition 
procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating thereto  in respect of 
any offence referred to in draft article 5.  
8. If necessary, the offences set forth in draft article 5 shall be treated, for the 
purposes of extradition between States, as if they had been committed not only in 
the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have 
established jurisdiction in accordance with draft article 6, paragraph 1.  
9. Whenever a State is permitted under its national law to extradite or otherwise 
surrender one of its nationals only upon condition that the person will be returned to 
that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceedings for 
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which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and that State and the 
State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms 
that they may deem appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be 
sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in draft article 9.  
10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused because 
the person sought is a national of the requested State, the requested State shall, if its 
national law so permits and in conformity with the requirements of such law, upon 
application of the requesting State, consider the enforcement of the sentence 
imposed under the national law of the requesting State or the remainder thereof.  
11. Nothing in the present draft articles shall be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believ ing 
that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person 
on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political 
opinions or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that pers on’s 
position for any of these reasons.  
12. Before refusing extradition, the requested State shall, where appropriate, 
consult with the requesting State to provide it with ample opportunity to present its 
opinions and to provide information relevant to its allegation.  
13. States shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements or 
arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of extradition.  
 
  Draft article 12. Non-refoulement 
 
1. No State shall expel, return (refouler), surrender or extradite a person to 
territory under the jurisdiction of another State where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to a crime against 
humanity. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, including, where 
applicable, the existence in the territory under the jurisdiction of the State 
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights or of serious violations of international humanitarian law.  
 
  Draft article 13. Mutual legal assistance 
 
  General cooperation 
 
1. States shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance 
in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences 
referred to in draft article 5 in accordance with this draft article.  
2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible under 
relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested State with 
respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the 
offences for which a legal person may be held liable in accordance with draft article 
5, paragraph 7, in the requesting State.  
3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this draft article may 
be requested for any of the following purposes:  
 
A/CN.4/704 
 
159/165 17-00990 
 
 (a) taking evidence or statements from persons;  
 (b) effecting service of judicial documents;  
 (c) executing searches and seizures; 
 (d) examining objects and sites; 
 (e) providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;  
 (f) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records;  
 (g) identifying, tracing or freezing proceeds of crime, property, 
instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes;  
 (h) facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting State; or  
 (k) any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the national law of the 
requested State. 
4. States shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pursuant to this draft 
article on the ground of bank secrecy.  
5. States shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve the purposes 
of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this draft article.  
 
  Transmission of information without a prior request  
 
6. Without prejudice to national law, the competent authorities of a State may, 
without prior request, transmit information relating to crimes against humanity to a 
competent authority in another State where they believe that such information could 
assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding investigations, 
prosecutions and judicial proceedings or could result in a request formulated by the 
latter State pursuant to the present draft articles.  
7. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 6 of this draft article 
shall be without prejudice to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in 
the State of the competent authorities providing the information. The competent 
authorities receiving the information shall comply with a request that said 
information remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on it s use. 
However, this shall not prevent the receiving State from disclosing in its 
proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a case, the 
receiving State shall notify the transmitting State prior to the disclosure and, if so 
requested, consult with the transmitting State. If, in an exceptional case, advance 
notice is not possible, the receiving State shall inform the transmitting State of the 
disclosure without delay. 
 
  Relationship to treaties on mutual legal assistance between the States concerned 
 
8. The provisions of this draft article shall not affect the obligations under any 
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or in part, 
mutual legal assistance. 
9. Paragraphs 10 to 28 of this draft article shall apply to requests made pursuant 
to this draft article if the States in question are not bound by a treaty of mutual legal 
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assistance. If those States are bound by such a treaty, the provisions of that treaty 
shall apply instead, unless the States agree to apply paragraphs 10 to 28 of this draft 
article in lieu thereof. States are strongly encouraged to apply those paragraphs if 
they facilitate cooperation. 
 
  Designation of a central authority  
 
10. Each State shall designate a central authority that shall have the responsibility 
and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and either to execute them 
or to transmit them to the competent authorities for execution. Where a State has a 
special region or territory with a separate system of mutual legal assistance, it may 
designate a distinct central authority that shall have the same function for that 
region or territory. Central authorities shall ensure the speedy and proper execution 
or transmission of the requests received. Where the central authority transmits the 
request to a competent authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and 
proper execution of the request by the competent authority. The Secretary -General 
of the United Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this 
purpose at the time each State deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval of or accession to the present draft articles. Requests for mutual legal 
assistance and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the central 
authorities designated by the States. This requirement shall be without prejudice to 
the right of a State to require that such requests and communications be addressed to 
it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent circumstances, where the States agree, 
through the International Criminal Police Organization, if possible.  
 
  Procedures for making a request 
 
11. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means capable of 
producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the requested State, under 
conditions allowing that State to establish authenticity. The Secretary -General of the 
United Nations shall be notified of the language or languages acceptable to each 
State at the time it deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of 
or accession to the present draft articles. In urgent circumstances and where agreed 
by the States, requests may be made orally, but shall be confirmed in writing 
forthwith. 
12. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain: 
 (a) the identity of the authority making the request;  
 (b) the subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of the authority 
conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;  
 (c) a summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for the 
purpose of service of judicial documents;  
 (d) a description of the assistance sought and details of any particular 
procedure that the requesting State wishes to be followed;  
 (e) where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person 
concerned; and 
 (f) the purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.  
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13. The requested State may request additional information when it appears 
necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its national law or 
when it can facilitate such execution.  
 
  Response to the request by the requested State  
 
14. A request shall be executed in accordance with the national law of the 
requested State and, to the extent not contrary to the national law of the requested 
State and where possible, in accordance with the procedures specified in the request.  
15. The requested State shall execute the request for mutual legal assistance as 
soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any deadlines 
suggested by the requesting State and for which reasons are given, preferably in the 
request. The requested State shall respond to reasonable requests by the reque sting 
State on progress of its handling of the request. The requesting State shall promptly 
inform the requested State when the assistance sought is no longer required.  
16. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:  
 (a) if the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this draft 
article; 
 (b) if the requested State considers that execution of the request is likely to 
prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests; 
 (c)  if the authorities of the requested State would be prohibited by its 
national law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any similar 
offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial proceedings 
under their own jurisdiction; 
 (d) if it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State relating 
to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.  
17. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.  
18. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State on the 
ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding. 
19. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 16 of this draft article or 
postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 18 of this draft article, the request ed 
State shall consult with the requesting State to consider whether assistance may be 
granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems necessary. If the requesting 
State accepts assistance subject to those conditions, it shall comply with the 
conditions. 
20. The requested State: 
 (a) shall provide to the requesting State copies of government records, 
documents or information in its possession that under its national law are available 
to the general public; and 
 (b) may, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State in whole, in part or 
subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any government 
records, documents or information in its possession that under its national law are 
not available to the general public.  
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  Use of information by the requesting State 
 
21. The requesting State shall not transmit or use information or evidence 
furnished by the requested State for investigations, prosecutions or judicial 
proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the 
requested State. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the requesting State from 
disclosing in its proceedings information or evidence that is exculpatory to an 
accused person. In the latter case, the requesting State shall notify the reques ted 
State prior to the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the requested State. If, 
in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the requesting State shall 
inform the requested State of the disclosure without delay.  
22. The requesting State may require that the requested State keep confidential the 
fact and substance of the request, except to the extent necessary to execute the 
request. If the requested State cannot comply with the requirement of 
confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting State. 
 
  Testimony of person from the requested State  
 
23. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 27 of this draft article, a 
witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State, consents 
to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or 
judicial proceeding in territory under the jurisdiction of the requesting State shall 
not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction of his or 
her personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior 
to his or her departure from territory under the jurisdiction of the requested State. 
Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, 
for a period of fifteen consecutive days or for any period agreed upon by the States 
from the date on which he or she has been officially informed that his or her 
presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity of leaving, 
has nevertheless remained voluntarily in territory under the jurisdiction of the 
requesting State or, having left it, has returned of his or her own free will.  
24. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of national law, 
when an individual is in territory under the jurisdiction of a State and has to be 
heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State, the first 
State may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take place by 
videoconference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in question to 
appear in person in territory under the jurisdiction of the requesting State. States 
may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of the 
requesting State and attended by a judicial authority of the requested State. 
 
  Transfer for testimony of person detained in requested State  
 
25. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory under 
the jurisdiction of one State whose presence in another State is requested for 
purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining 
evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in relation to 
offences referred to in draft article 5, may be transferred if the following conditions 
are met: 
 (a) the person freely gives his or her informed consent; and  
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 (b) the competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such conditions 
as those States may deem appropriate.  
26. For the purposes of paragraph 25 of this draft article:  
 (a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and 
obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or 
authorized by the State from which the person was transferred;  
 (b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay 
implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from which 
the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the 
competent authorities of both States;  
 (c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the State 
from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the 
return of the person; and 
 (d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence 
being served from the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in 
the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.  
27. Unless the State from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with 
paragraphs 25 and 26 of this draft article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her 
nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other 
restriction of his or her personal liberty in territory under the jurisdiction of the 
State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or convictions 
prior to his or her departure from territory under the jurisdiction of the State from 
which he or she was transferred.  
 
  Costs 
 
28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the requested 
State, unless otherwise agreed by the States concerned. If expenses of a substantial 
or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil the request, the States shall 
consult to determine the terms and conditions under which the request will be 
executed, as well as the manner in which the costs shall be borne.  
 
  Draft article 14. Victims, witnesses and others 
 
1.  Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:  
 (a) any individual who alleges that a person has been subjected to a crime 
against humanity has the right to complain to the competent authorities; and  
 (b) complainants, witnesses, and their relatives and representatives, as well 
as other persons participating in any investigation, prosecution, extradition or other 
proceeding within the scope of the present draft articles, shall be protected against 
ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of any complaint, information, 
testimony or other evidence given. These measures shall be without prejudice to the 
rights of the alleged offender referred to in draft article 10.  
2. Each State shall, subject to its national law, enable the views and concerns of 
victims of a crime against humanity to be presented and considered at appropriate 
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stages of criminal proceedings against alleged offenders in a manner not prejudicial 
to the rights referred to in draft article 10.  
3. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure in its legal system that 
the victims of a crime against humanity have the right to obtain reparation, on an 
individual or collective basis, consisting of one or more of the following forms: 
restitution; compensation; rehabilitation; satisfaction; guarantees of non -repetition. 
 
  Draft article 15. Relationship to competent international criminal tribunals  
 
 In the event of a conflict between the rights or obligations of a State under the 
present draft articles and its rights or obligations under the constitutive instrument 
of a competent international criminal tribunal, the latter shall prevail.  
 
  Draft article 16. Federal State obligations 
 
 The provisions of the present draft articles shall apply to all parts of federal 
States without any limitations or exceptions.  
 
  Draft article 17. Inter-State dispute settlement 
 
1. States shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present draft articles through negotiation.  
2. Any dispute between two or more States concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present draft articles that cannot be settled through negotiation 
within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States, be submitted to 
arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States 
are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States 
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance 
with the Statute of the Court.  
3. Each State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of 
or accession to the present draft articles, declare that it does not consider itself 
bound by paragraph 2 of this draft article. The other States shall not be bound by 
paragraph 2 of this draft article with respect to any State that has made such a 
declaration.  
4. Any State that has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
draft article may at any time withdraw that declaration.  
 
  Draft preamble 
 
 Mindful that throughout history millions of children, women and men have 
been victims of crimes that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,  
 Recognizing that such crimes against humanity threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world, 
 Affirming that crimes against humanity, one of the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole, must not go unpunished and that 
their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level 
and by enhancing international cooperation, 
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 Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and 
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,  
 Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes, 
 Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,  or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,  
 Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in the present draft articles shall 
be taken as authorizing any State to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal 
affairs of any other State. 
 
